Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes and Fleet Age: Air Quality Implications by Barbour, Karie Anne
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative 
Exchange 
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 
8-2004 
Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes and Fleet Age: Air Quality 
Implications 
Karie Anne Barbour 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barbour, Karie Anne, "Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes and Fleet Age: Air Quality Implications. " PhD diss., 
University of Tennessee, 2004. 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1888 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee 
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact 
trace@utk.edu. 
To the Graduate Council: 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Karie Anne Barbour entitled "Motor Vehicle 
Wealth Taxes and Fleet Age: Air Quality Implications." I have examined the final electronic copy 
of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in 
Economics. 
Michael J. McKee, Major Professor 
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: 
Donald J. Bruce, Terry L. Miller, Matthew N. Murray 
Accepted for the Council: 
Carolyn R. Hodges 
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.) 
To the Graduate Council: 
 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Karie Anne Barbour entitled “Motor 
Vehicle Wealth Taxes and Fleet Age: Air Quality Implications.”  I have examined the 
final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be 
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
with a major in Economics. 
 
 
    Michael J. McKee                    
            Major Professor 
 
 
 
 
 
We have read this dissertation 
and recommend its acceptance: 
 
 
  Donald J. Bruce                                                                 
 
 
  Terry L. Miller                                   
 
 
  Matthew N. Murray                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Accepted for the Council: 
 
          Anne Mayhew  
                              Vice Chancellor and Dean of  
Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
MOTOR VEHICLE WEALTH TAXES AND FLEET AGE: 
AIR QUALITY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
Presented for the  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Degree 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Karie Anne Barbour 
August 2004
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my family in recognition of the endless love and 
encouragement they have given me over the years. 
ii 
Acknowledgments 
 
I have shared this endeavor with many individuals to whom I must give credit and 
thanks.  First and foremost, I owe my eternal gratitude to Dr. Donald Bruce for his 
unyielding commitment to and support of my professional development.  I contribute 
much of the success I have experienced over the past several years to his superb 
guidance.  His excellent scholarship will always serve as the bar to which I measure my 
work and achievements.    
I am extremely grateful to Dr. Matthew Murray for opening a door to opportunity 
for me five years ago and for believing enough in my abilities to present me with many 
opportunities since.  His tireless mentoring has been very instrumental in my professional 
growth.  
My dissertation research could not have been completed without the guidance and 
encouragement I received from my committee, Dr. Michael McKee, Dr. Donald Bruce, 
Dr. Matthew Murray and Dr. Terry Miller.  In addition, I would like to thank the 
participants of various Department of Economics research workshops for their helpful 
comments and suggestions.  Stacia Couch has graciously provided her expert assistance 
in support of this and so many other projects.  Joel Shelton supplied many hours of 
research assistance during the data collection phase of this research. 
I thank the Center for Business and Economic Research and the Department of 
Economics for the financial support and academic opportunities they have provided 
throughout my Ph.D. program.  I greatly appreciate the dissertation research funding that 
I received from the Scholarly Research Grant Program of the College of Business 
 iii
Administration at the University of Tennessee.  Dr. Michael McKee was very generous in 
funding a portion of this research with funds from the J. Fred Holly Distinguished Chair 
of Economics.  The support I received from the Bonham Dissertation Award from the 
College of Business Administration has allowed me to spend much of this past year 
working on this research.  
Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues and friends John Deskins, Brian Hill, 
Julie Marshall, Tami Richards, Jeff Smith and Mark Tuttle.  I may not have survived this 
experience without their support and friendship.  
 iv
Abstract 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to determine whether motor vehicle wealth 
taxes have unintended consequences for fleet turnover, emissions and air quality.  
Twenty-eight U.S. states have an annual motor vehicle wealth tax that is based on either 
the age or value of the vehicle, which results in tax liabilities that decrease with age.  
Given this structure, households have an incentive to make adjustments to their vehicle 
stocks in favor of older vehicles.  These adjustments may be harmful to the environment 
as older vehicles have higher emissions.   
To achieve this objective I have divided this dissertation into three separate 
empirical analyses.  In the first analysis, I use data from the 2001 National Household 
Travel Survey to identify the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on households’ 
vehicle purchase and age decisions.  I estimate a binary choice model to examine the 
effects of various measures of the motor vehicle wealth tax on households’ decisions to 
purchase a vehicle in a given year while controlling for household demographics, the 
availability of public transportation and transaction taxes.  I then estimate an ordinary 
least squares regression model to examine the effects of wealth taxes on the vehicle age 
decision for those households that purchased at least one vehicle in 2001.  The results 
indicate that motor vehicle wealth taxes have a statistically significant negative but rather 
modest effect on the probability that a household purchases a vehicle in a given year.  
However, once a household has decided to make a purchase, the presence of a wealth tax 
does not affect its vehicle age decision. 
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In the second analysis, I use state vehicle registration data from R.L. Polk and 
Company to estimate vehicle age distributions in individual states.  To isolate the effects 
of motor vehicle wealth taxes on the proportion of vehicles in each of twenty-five age 
categories, I estimate a multinomial logit model.  I then conduct simulations using the 
results from this model to construct vehicle age distributions under each state’s current 
wealth tax regime and the age distributions that would result given a change in the wealth 
tax regime.  A comparison of these distributions identifies the magnitude of the effects of 
wealth taxes on fleet age by state.  The results suggest that motor vehicle wealth taxes do 
indeed have a statistically significant effect on vehicle age distributions; however, the 
magnitude of the effect is quite modest.  Specifically, motor vehicle wealth taxes slightly 
increase the fraction of vehicles between the ages of ten and sixteen and decrease the 
fraction of vehicles in the oldest age categories, all else constant. 
In the final analysis, I employ the MOBILE6 emissions model created by the 
Environmental Protection Agency to explore the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on 
emissions and air quality.  I use vehicle age distributions associated with different motor 
vehicle wealth tax regimes in the emissions model to generate emission factors for three 
major mobile source pollutants.  The emission factors associated with these different 
scenarios suggest that the slight differences that exist between vehicle age distributions 
by wealth tax status have virtually no effect on emissions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Overview of the Analysis 
 
As of 2001 wealth taxes on motor vehicles were utilized in twenty-eight U.S. 
states in the form of ad valorem personal property taxes, privilege taxes or age-based 
fees.  Regardless of their form, motor vehicle wealth taxes tend to be based on either the 
age or value of the vehicle which results in a tax liability that decreases with age.  The 
age distribution of vehicles in states with a wealth tax is expected to be skewed towards 
older vehicles as consumers have the incentive to delay the purchase of a new vehicle or 
to enter the used vehicle market to avoid paying higher tax liabilities.  Older vehicles are 
more likely to emit larger amounts of harmful pollutants.  Therefore, to the extent that 
motor vehicle wealth taxes have delayed fleet turnover, they may have resulted in 
additional unintended consequences, namely a decrease in air quality resulting from 
increases in emissions from motor vehicles.  The objective of my analysis is to determine 
whether motor vehicle wealth taxes affect household decisions of whether to purchase a 
vehicle and of how old of a vehicle to purchase, state vehicle age distributions and 
consequently emissions and air quality. 
 The analysis begins in the present chapter with an overview of the use and 
structure of motor vehicle wealth taxes used throughout the United States.  This summary 
highlights the specific tax provisions that lead to tax liabilities that decrease with the age 
of the vehicle and identifies key differences in tax provisions across states.  Various 
measures of the motor vehicle wealth tax that serve as the key variables of interest in the 
empirical models are then defined and summarized.  This chapter concludes with a 
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discussion of the effects of vehicle age on emissions and a brief review of the relevant 
literature. 
 The objective of Chapter 2 is to identify the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes 
on household vehicle purchase and age decisions using data from the 2001 National 
Household Travel Survey.  The data collected for this survey contain a wealth of 
information on the demographics, travel patterns and vehicle stocks for roughly 26,000 
households living throughout the U.S. and allow for the identification of households that 
purchased a vehicle in 2001 as well as the ages of purchased vehicles.  I estimate a binary 
choice model to examine the effects of various measures of the motor vehicle wealth tax 
on households’ decisions to purchase a vehicle in a given year while controlling for 
household demographics, the availability of public transportation and transaction taxes.  I 
then estimate an ordinary least squares regression model to examine the effects of wealth 
taxes on the vehicle age decision for those households that purchased at least one vehicle 
in 2001.  
  The objective of Chapter 3 is to model the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes 
on the state-level age distribution of all vehicles.  I use state vehicle registration data 
obtained from R.L. Polk and company in multinomial logit models of vehicle age.  
Again, I estimate three separate models using alternative measures of the motor vehicle 
wealth tax.  I then use the results of these models in simulations that construct national 
and state vehicle age distributions that would result under various motor vehicle wealth 
tax regimes.  A comparison of these distributions identifies the magnitude of the effects 
of wealth taxes on fleet age. 
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  In Chapter 4, I use the MOBILE6 emissions model created by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to identify the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on 
emissions and air quality.  To accomplish this objective, I use vehicle age distributions 
associated with different motor vehicle wealth tax regimes in the emissions model to 
generate emission factors for three major mobile source pollutants (carbon monoxide, 
hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxide).  I then compare emission factors associated with 
various wealth tax policies for eight different states that face significant pollution 
reduction challenges to determine whether a change in the use of motor vehicle wealth 
taxes is a viable option for reducing emissions.  In the final chapter of the analysis, I offer 
some concluding remarks and directions for future research. 
Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes at a Glance 
 
 As of 2001, annual wealth taxes on motor vehicles were used in twenty-eight 
states in the United States in the form of either an ad valorem personal property tax, a tax 
in lieu of a property tax or an age-based fee.  In recent years, politicians have sought to 
take advantage of the unpopularity of these taxes to win votes.  In particular, 
gubernatorial candidates in Virginia and California have proposed the reduction or 
removal of motor vehicle wealth taxes as part of their political platforms.  Such proposals 
have been very popular among the electorate as the issue applies to nearly everyone given 
high motor vehicle ownership across most segments of the population.  In 1998 alone, 
proposals to reduce motor vehicle wealth tax liabilities were made in California, 
Missouri, South Carolina, and Virginia.  In practice, however, these proposals have been 
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difficult to implement as these taxes represent an attractive source of revenues for state 
and local governments.1   
Motor vehicle wealth taxes represent a fairly stable source of revenues given the 
relatively high demand for motor vehicle services.  Although new vehicle demand is 
procyclical, households continue to drive and pay taxes on their existing vehicle fleets 
during economic downturns.2 There is also some empirical evidence that suggests that 
motor vehicle wealth taxes are more equitable than other forms of taxation.  A recent 
study by Dill et al. (1999) found that motor vehicle wealth taxes are less regressive than 
sales and gasoline taxes frequently used by state and local governments.  Motor vehicle 
wealth tax revenues represent a sizable portion of annual revenues collected by local 
governments.  Thus if these taxes are removed or reduced, local governments must find 
alternative sources of revenue to fund local public expenditures.  Given the 
characteristics of the motor vehicle wealth tax, these alternative revenue sources would 
likely decrease the stability and increase the regressivity of the tax base.  
Despite these attractive qualities, the utilization of motor vehicle wealth taxes 
may result in unintended consequences.  These taxes may be inefficient in a fiscal sense 
as they may distort decisions made by households regarding their vehicle fleets.  
Regardless of their form, motor vehicle wealth taxes tend to be based on either the age or 
value of the vehicle which results in a tax liability that decreases with age.  Given this 
structure, consumers have an incentive to make adjustments to their vehicle stocks in 
                                                          
1 Since 1998, California has successfully reduced its tax rate on motor vehicles and Virginia has phased-out 
a large portion of the tax.  However, both states have encountered fiscal budget constraints that have 
prevented the complete elimination of the tax.  The proposals to reduce the tax in Missouri and South 
Carolina never passed their state legislatures. 
2 Greenspan and Cohen (1996) report a contemporaneous correlation of the quarterly growth rate of motor 
vehicles and real GDP of about 0.5 over the past four decades. 
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favor of older vehicles as they receive preferential tax treatment.  Specifically, motor 
vehicle wealth taxes are expected to affect household vehicle purchase decisions in two 
ways.  First, households that reside in a state with a wealth tax on vehicles are expected 
to delay the purchase of a new vehicle.  A household can expect to have a higher motor 
vehicle wealth tax liability when it replaces an older less valuable vehicle with a newer 
more expensive vehicle or makes an addition to its vehicle stock.  All else constant, the 
higher tax liability may discourage many households from purchasing a vehicle.  Second, 
those households living in a wealth tax state that do purchase a vehicle are expected to 
purchase older vehicles on average, all else constant.  Given that a household has decided 
to purchase a vehicle, the structure of motor vehicle wealth taxes provides an incentive to 
purchase older vehicles as their absolute tax liabilities, and in some cases their tax 
liabilities as a percentage of their value, are lower than those of newer vehicles.  Given 
these incentives, the age distribution of vehicles in states with a wealth tax is expected to 
be skewed towards older vehicles as consumers have the incentive to delay the purchase 
of a new vehicle or to enter the used vehicle market. 
To the extent that motor vehicle wealth taxes have delayed fleet turnover, they 
may have resulted in additional unintended consequences, namely a decrease in air 
quality resulting from increases in emissions from motor vehicles.  Older vehicles are 
likely to emit larger amounts of harmful pollutants due to their less sophisticated 
emission control systems and the deterioration of these systems over time.  Therefore, to 
the extent that motor vehicle wealth taxes affect vehicle age distributions, changes to 
these taxes may be a viable option for governments charged with the task of decreasing 
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mobile source emissions.  The objective of this analysis is to quantify the economic 
distortions of motor vehicle wealth taxes that affect vehicle age distributions, emissions 
and air quality so that policy makers might make more informed decisions regarding the 
future use and structure of motor vehicle wealth taxes. 
Overview of Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes in 2001 
Annual motor vehicle wealth taxes are used in some form or another in a majority 
of states across the U.S.  Figure 1.1 (all figures appear in Appendix A) highlights the 28 
states with motor vehicle wealth taxes as of 2001.3  The taxing methodologies used in 
these states generally fell into one of three categories: an ad valorem personal property 
tax, a state or local tax in lieu of a personal property tax or an aged-based fee.  Thirteen 
states shown in the light gray color, located primarily in the southeast, tax motor vehicles 
as personal property.  In these states, local jurisdictions administer the tax and have the 
authority to set their own mill levies and collect their own revenues.  Thus, the effective 
tax rates as of 2001 varied across counties in a given state and may have even varied 
within a county if cities, municipalities or school districts had their own taxing authority.  
The twelve states shown in the dark gray color, located primarily in the West and Mid-
west, levy “privilege” taxes that are based on vehicle value but are levied “in lieu” of 
property taxes to eliminate situs and tax disparity problems.  In a majority of these states 
the state legislature sets a statewide tax rate and the state collects tax liabilities as part of 
the annual vehicle registration process and later distributes these revenues to local 
                                                          
3 This figure reflects the changes that have occurred in motor vehicle wealth tax usage in recent years.  See 
Mackey and Rafool (1998) for an overview of motor vehicle wealth tax usage and structure as of January 1, 
1998.  Motor vehicle wealth tax provisions from 2001 are used in this analysis to complement the 2001 
National Household Travel Survey and the state vehicle registration data used by the empirical models. 
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governments.  The remaining three states with motor vehicle wealth taxes (Montana, 
Utah and Oklahoma) simplified their tax structures in the years just prior to 2001 by 
replacing existing privilege taxes with annual age-based fees. The fee schedules are 
established such that residents with newer vehicles pay higher fees.  The remaining states 
as well as the District of Columbia did not impose a wealth tax on motor vehicles as of 
2001.4  However, many of these states did impose flat registration fees or taxes based 
upon the weight of the vehicle. 
Wealth taxes in these 28 states differ by more than just their classification.  
Additional details collected through surveys, personal interviews and searches of state tax 
codes reveal that there are several significant differences in the taxing methodologies 
implemented in these states.  Table 1.1 (all tables appear in Appendix B) provides a brief 
summary of motor vehicle wealth tax provisions by state as of 2001.  As indicated in this 
table, different states use different methods for determining the value of a vehicle.  Three 
of the most common valuation methods include the National Automobile Dealers 
Association “Blue Book” value method, the Manufacturers Suggested Retail Price 
(MSRP) base method and the purchase price base method.  In most cases, state law 
specifies the valuation method that is used by all taxing jurisdictions within a state.  
States with wealth taxes classified as personal property taxes primarily use the “blue 
book” valuation method.  This method allows tax assessors to set values for vehicles 
based upon their “trade-in” value which in most all cases decreases with the age of the 
                                                          
4 Taxing jurisdictions in Texas had the option to impose wealth taxes on motor vehicles in 2001.  However 
only approximately 1 in 20 counties contained at least one jurisdiction that imposed the tax.  Therefore, for 
the purposes of this analysis Texas is treated as a no-tax state. 
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vehicle.  States with privilege taxes or age-based fees primarily use either the MSRP or 
purchase price base methods and establish their own depreciation rates so that the 
assessed value of the vehicle decreases with age. 
As expected, the tax rate and assessment ratios on motor vehicles differed across 
states in 2001.  However, in some instances they also differed within the same state based 
on the age of the vehicle.  In 2001, the tax rates ranged from 0.65 percent in California to 
4 percent in Nevada.  The average mill rate in property tax states ranged from 10.5 mills 
in North Carolina to 87 mills in Kansas.5  Tax rates also varied significantly between 
local jurisdictions in states that used personal property taxes.  For example, in Kansas 
mill levies ranged from roughly 37 to 131 mills.  Most states had a uniform tax rate with 
respect to vehicle age; however, in a few states such as Colorado and New Hampshire the 
rate varied with vehicle age. Assessment ratios on motor vehicles ranged from 100 
percent of a vehicle’s value in several states such as Kentucky and North Carolina to a 
low of 10.5 percent in South Carolina.  In several states the assessment ratio was a 
function of the age of the vehicle.  For example, in Minnesota a tax rate of 1.25 percent 
was applied to 100 percent of a vehicle’s value in years one and two, 90 percent of a 
vehicle’s value in years three and four, 75 percent of a vehicle’s value in years five and 
six and so forth until year ten when only 10 percent of a vehicle’s value was subject to 
taxation. 
Minimum tax liabilities were a common feature of motor vehicle wealth tax 
provisions in 2001.  By law, tax liabilities in several states reached their minimums at 
                                                          
5 A mill rate indicates the tax liability per $1,000 of assessed value.  For example the tax liability of a 
vehicle with an assessed value of $5,000 would be equal to $52.50 in North Carolina in 2001. 
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some threshold value or vehicle age.  For example, in Maine the motor vehicle tax statute 
set a minimum tax payment of $5.   In Wyoming, the tax liability on motor vehicles 
remained frozen at 3% of 15% of the MSRP after year six.  The consideration of a 
minimum tax provision is very important to this analysis since it implies that after some 
threshold age there would no longer be any marginal tax advantages of holding older 
vehicles.  
To model the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on household vehicle purchase 
decisions and vehicle age distributions, a practical empirical measure of the wealth tax is 
needed.  Given the disparities in the taxing methodologies used by states including 
differences in valuation methods, tax rates, assessment ratios and minimum tax 
thresholds it is virtually impossible to adequately represent motor vehicle wealth taxes 
with a simple measure such as a tax rate.  Such a measure fails to capture the dynamic 
structure of the tax that results in a decline in tax liabilities with vehicle age.  Therefore, 
my analysis relies on more creative measures of the motor vehicle wealth tax to model 
households’ vehicle purchase decisions and the age distribution of state fleets.   
In theory, the vehicle purchase decisions of households are expected to be more 
responsive in situations where the tax liabilities of vehicles of various ages differ more 
dramatically.  Therefore, I used the tax provisions outlined in Table 1.1 to create two 
measures of motor vehicle wealth taxes that compare the tax liabilities of a brand-new 
vehicle to the tax liabilities of a used vehicle.  The representative vehicle used in this 
process was the Honda Accord as it has been one of the best selling sedans in the U.S. 
over the past several years.  The process also required the creation of a depreciation 
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schedule for the Honda Accord in order to generate tax liabilities in states that use the 
blue book valuation method.   I used the manufacturer’s suggested retail price and resale 
value data for various model years of Accords to create a depreciation schedule.  
Specifically this process required the collection of MSRP and resale value data at various 
ages for 13 different model years of Accords.  The first step in the calculation was to 
create a measure that represented the total percentage change in value for vehicles of each 
age.  The second, and final, step was to create annual depreciation rates over a thirteen-
year period by comparing the total percentage change in value for vehicles of consecutive 
ages.6 
Figure 1.2 depicts the depreciation schedule derived from this method.  Notice 
that the figure does not show a smooth downward trend that is normally expected.  There 
are several explanations for the visible spikes.  Recall that the calculations used to derive 
this schedule actually used price data for several model years of Accords.  These different 
models tend to have different features; therefore, it is probably realistic to expect their 
values to depreciate at different rates.  Also, the spikes at years five and eleven may 
reflect higher maintenance cost as vehicles generally reach mileage milestones near these 
ages and thus require more maintenance.  So while this method may be less than perfect, 
using observed data on prices to create a depreciation schedule most likely leads to fewer 
errors than would using a schedule that had just been assumed. 
The present value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities for both a new 2001 
Accord and a used 1998 Accord were created for each state using the MSRP values of the 
                                                          
6 For example, I created the depreciation rate for year three  by subtracting the total percentage change in 
value of two-year-old Accords from the total percentage change in value for three-year-old Accords.  
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two vehicles, the depreciation schedule shown in Figure 1.2 and the tax laws for each 
respective state.7  Table 1.2 provides a list of the resulting tax liabilities by state for states 
with a wealth tax.  The average present value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities for a 
new 2001 Accord across states with wealth taxes was $1,417 in 2001.  Households living 
in South Carolina faced the highest tax liability, $3,372, if they purchased a brand-new 
Honda Accord in 2001 and keep it for at least ten years.  Households living in Michigan 
faced the lowest tax liability for the 2001 Accord, $627.  The second column of this table 
presents the present value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities for the used 1998 Accord.  
Notice that in all states the tax liability for the used vehicle is lower than the tax liability 
for the new vehicle.  Given the higher MSRP value for the 1998 Accord, this result is due 
entirely from the relatively favorable tax treatment received by older vehicles.  Again, 
residents in South Carolina face the highest tax liability for the used Accord, $2,443; 
however, the lowest tax liabilities are borne by residents of Indiana, $444.  
Two measures of the wealth tax are created using the respective tax liabilities for 
the new 2001 Accord and the used 1998 Accord in each state.  The first of these variables 
is the absolute difference, which is the 2001 Accord tax liability minus the 1998 Accord 
tax liability.  Column three of Table 1.2 shows the results of this calculation by state.  
The average difference between these tax liabilities across states is $551.  Mississippi has 
the largest difference ($1,273), while Oklahoma has the smallest ($85).  The second 
measure of the wealth tax is the relative difference in the tax liabilities of a new versus 
                                                          
7 I chose the three-year-old 1998 Honda Accord as my representative used vehicle because it is old enough 
that its associated wealth tax liability is lower than that of a brand new vehicle, yet it is young enough to be 
driven for ten additional years.  The 2001 and 1998 Honda Accord had MSRP values (in real dollars) of 
$22,800 and $23,801 respectively.   The differences in these MSRP values are most likely due to 
differences in the features of the two vehicles.  
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used car, which is the ratio of the 2001 Accord tax liability to the 1998 Accord tax 
liability, thus the larger the ratio the more favorable the tax treatment for older vehicles 
relative to newer vehicles.  The average wealth tax ratio across states is 1.72, indicating 
that on average the present value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities for a brand new 
vehicle is 72 percent larger than the present value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities for 
a three-year-old vehicle.  Once again, Mississippi and Oklahoma define the range for this 
measure of the wealth tax with ratios of 3.00 and 1.15 respectively. 
Each of these wealth tax measures reflects the degree to which older vehicles 
receive favorable tax treatment relative to new vehicles under the motor vehicle wealth 
tax provisions in each state as of 2001.  Larger values of both measures suggest that older 
vehicles receive more favorable tax treatment.  However, the values of these measures 
reported in Table 1.2 seem rather modest considering that they represent a comparison of 
tax liabilities over a ten-year period.  The maximum difference of $1,273 would likely 
have larger implications on household vehicle purchase and age decisions if the entire 
amount were due at the time of purchase.  Instead, households must pay the difference in 
tax liabilities over a ten-year time period.  However, these values do represent the present 
value of tax liabilities; therefore, $1,273 today would actually add up to more dollars over 
ten years.  Of course, these calculations would generate larger differences if tax liabilities 
of vehicles older than the age of three were used in the comparison.   
To some extent, the values reported in Table 1.2 may understate the relative 
differences in tax liabilities for average new and used vehicles.  Although the Honda 
Accord is representative to the extent that it is a popular vehicle year after year, its 
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depreciation schedule may not be representative of the average vehicle.  As evidenced by 
the depreciation schedule in Figure 1.2, the Accord tends to retain a large portion of its 
value over several years.  The average vehicle’s depreciation schedule likely exhibits 
larger depreciation rates for relatively newer vehicles.  Thus the models estimated in this 
analysis use an alternative vehicle, the Ford Taurus, as a robustness check.  Figure 1.3 
depicts the depreciation schedule derived for the Ford Taurus using the same methods 
used for the Honda Accord.  The value of the Taurus depreciates at a more rapid rate than 
the Accord, and its depreciation schedule is much smoother.  Table 1.3 provides a list of 
tax liabilities by state for the Ford Taurus.  Notice that although the value of the tax 
liabilities are lower compared to those of the Honda Accord, the absolute and relative 
difference measures are generally larger for the Taurus due to its more rapid depreciation 
rate.   
It remains to be seen whether the relative and absolute differences reported in 
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 are sufficiently large to affect household vehicle purchase and 
age decisions.   The maximum difference between the present value of a ten-year stream 
of tax liabilities in Table 1.2 ($1,273) represents roughly 5.6 percent of the MSRP of the 
2001 Honda Accord, while the minimum difference ($85) represents only 0.37 percent of 
the Accord’s suggested price.  Wheeler (1998) claims that motor vehicle wealth tax 
liabilities are such a small percentage of a vehicle’s value that most individuals do not 
take this tax into consideration when purchasing a motor vehicle; however, her analysis 
offers no empirical evidence to support this claim.  In fact, there appears to be no existing 
literature that directly tests the hypothesis of this analysis. 
 13
The Effects of Vehicle Age on Emissions 
 To the extent that motor vehicle wealth taxes have delayed fleet turnover, they 
may have resulted in additional unintended consequences, namely a decrease in air 
quality resulting from increases in emissions from older motor vehicles.  In 1999, motor 
vehicle emissions represented 51 percent of carbon monoxide emissions, 34 percent of 
nitrogen oxide emissions and 29 percent of hydrocarbon emissions in the United States 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 1999). Although all motor vehicles contribute to 
pollution problems, older vehicles contribute disproportionately to the overall emissions 
from motor vehicles.  Older vehicles are likely to emit larger amounts of harmful 
pollutants including hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides.  Zachariadis et 
al. (2001) outlines the various interdependencies between vehicle age, technological 
parameters and vehicle emissions.  Their analysis identifies less sophisticated emissions 
control systems and the deterioration of emission control systems with age as the primary 
reasons why older vehicles have higher emissions. 
 Older vehicles tend to have less sophisticated emissions control systems than their 
newer counterparts, which must meet increasingly strict standards established by the 
Environmental Protection Agency under provisions of the Clean Air Act.  Figure 1.4 
depicts federal emission standards in grams per mile traveled between the years of 1966 
and 2005 for three major pollutants.  The EPA has dramatically increased the standards 
(i.e. lowered the allowable grams of emissions per mile traveled) for all three pollutants 
since the Clean Air Act was passed in 1969.  Since 1966, emissions standards for carbon 
monoxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides have increased by 96, 90 and 98 percent 
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respectively.  As a result, newer vehicles have more sophisticated emission control 
technologies designed to meet these stricter standards and thus have lower emissions, all 
else constant.  The change most relevant for this analysis given the data used occurred in 
1994 when the EPA lowered the tailpipe standards for hydrocarbon and nitrogen oxide 
emissions.  Even with this change the federal emission standards have remained fairly 
constant over the past twenty years.  Most vehicles in today’s fleet have emission control 
systems that were designed to meet roughly the same emission control standards.  
Therefore, of larger environmental consequence is the fact that emission control systems 
tend to deteriorate with age.   
 Fleet turnover is important in reducing overall vehicle emissions because vehicles 
pollute more as they age.  For example, the MOBILE5 model used by the EPA to 
quantify mobile source emissions includes adjustments in emissions rates that account for 
deterioration in emission control systems with age.  The model estimates that carbon 
monoxide emissions for a representative vehicle are ten times higher after four years or 
50,000 miles, volatile organic compounds are four times higher, and nitrogen oxide 
emissions are about twice as high as when the car was new (U.S. Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1992).  Results of emission tests reported in Johnstone et al. 
(2001) provide further evidence that the deterioration of emission control systems occurs 
quite rapidly.  The results of these tests indicate that the average emission rates for model 
year 1990 vehicles increase dramatically in the first seven years of a vehicle’s life as 
carbon monoxide emissions increase by 500 percent, hydrocarbons by 300 percent and 
nitrogen oxide by more than 200 percent.  Thus, there is sufficient evidence that emission 
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rates are strongly correlated with vehicle age.  Therefore, if motor vehicle wealth taxes 
result in older fleets, the unintended environmental consequences could be rather large. 
The potential environmental consequences associated with motor vehicle wealth 
taxes may be more severe in states with extreme pollution problems.  Motor vehicles are 
major contributors to the ground-level ozone as it is formed by reactions involving 
hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides in the presence of sunlight, and carbon monoxide is a 
direct by-product of the combustion process of a motor vehicle.   As of September 2002, 
nearly 25 states contained areas that were classified as either an ozone or carbon 
monoxide nonattainment area.  The Environmental Protection Agency classifies an area 
as a nonattainment area when air pollution levels persistently exceed the national ambient 
air quality standards it has established.  Nearly 57 percent of states with an ozone 
nonattainment area and 75 percent of states with a carbon monoxide nonattainment area 
as of 2002 were wealth tax states.8   
State and local governments in nonattainment areas are charged with the task of 
developing air pollution reduction measures that are designed to achieve attainment of 
ambient standards.  To the extent that motor vehicle wealth taxes affect vehicle age 
distributions, state and local governments in these states may be able to remove, reduce 
or change the structure of the wealth tax to reduce emissions and improve area quality.  
Simulations using the EPA’s most recent emissions model (MOBILE6) reveal that a 20 
percent age shift to older vehicles yields a 50 percent increase in hydrocarbon and carbon 
monoxide emissions and a 40 percent increase in nitrogen oxide emissions 
                                                          
8 For additional details on the specific areas that are currently designated as nonattainment or the technical 
details underlying these classifications see the Green Book published by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (2004). 
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(Environmental Protection Agency, 2002).9  Therefore, if changes to motor vehicle 
wealth taxes sufficiently increase the fraction of vehicles in younger age categories, 
emissions of these criteria pollutants could decrease dramatically. 
Relevant Literature 
 
This analysis is not the first to propose a relationship between tax structures and 
vehicle age.  Johnstone et al. (2001) conducted a study in Costa Rica where a rapid 
depreciation schedule and extremely high consumption taxes have traditionally favored 
the importation of used vehicles.  The results of their analysis indicated that a 10 percent 
increase in the relative price of used cars would result in a 5.6 percent fall in their share 
of total vehicle sales.  Simulation results revealed considerable environmental benefits in 
terms of emission levels.  A 10 percent increase in the price of used cars relative to that 
of new cars would after 5 years decrease nitrogen oxide emissions by 17 percent, 
decrease carbon monoxide emissions by 10 percent, and hydrocarbons emissions by 4 
percent.  Thus, changing the tax structure so that it does not favor used cars would have 
the potential to yield significant environmental gains.  However, Johnstone et al. may 
have underestimated the magnitude of these emissions reductions.  The simulations in 
their analysis are not based on the most recent mobile source emissions model developed 
by the EPA, but are instead based upon a vehicle certification database developed by the 
EPA’s National Vehicle and Fuels Emissions Laboratory in Ann Arbor, Michigan.  This 
data set was developed based on tests of vehicles thsat were not in use; therefore, it 
ignores the effects of the deterioration of the emission control systems on emissions rates. 
                                                          
9 This simulation adjusted vehicle age distributions by increasing the fraction of vehicles with ages greater 
than 13 years old and subtracting the same fraction from vehicles that were younger than 13 years old.  
Each vehicle age had an equal fraction added to or subtracted from it. 
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Thus, if consumers are as responsive to wealth taxes as they are to the transaction taxes 
examined in this analysis, reducing or removing the wealth tax on motor vehicles may 
lead to even larger environmental gains than those reported by Johnstone et al.  Under 
these circumstances, removing the wealth tax on motor vehicles may be a viable option 
for governments charged with the task of decreasing mobile source emissions. 
The hypothesis that annual motor vehicle wealth taxes may affect vehicle age 
distributions is certainly not original to this analysis.  In fact, the government of 
Singapore has recognized that higher registration taxes on newer vehicles may discourage 
car owners from replacing their vehicles or encourage them to buy old cars and has 
placed an annual tax on vehicles that is in part based on age.  Each vehicle registered 
faces an annual road tax and a surcharge of 10 percent for each additional year is imposed 
on vehicles more than 10 years old.  For example, a 12-year-old vehicle faces a surcharge 
of 20 percent.  The objective of the surcharge is to discourage households from holding 
older vehicles that pollute more.  Chia and Phang (2001) analyze the use of this tax as 
well as other motor vehicles taxes as environmental management tools.  Although their 
analysis concludes that motor vehicle wealth taxes offer a double dividend (i.e. tax 
revenues and emission reductions), they also note that it is difficult to isolate the direct 
impacts of these taxes on air quality.  These taxes are generally applied simultaneously 
with other instruments such as fuel taxes, congestion tolls, and vehicle quota systems 
designed to reduce annual vehicle miles traveled and vehicle ownership rates that also 
impact air quality.  Therefore, while the current analysis does not offer new economic 
theory, it is perhaps still the first to attempt to quantify the effects of annual motor 
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vehicle ownership taxes on vehicle age distributions and emissions using the variation in 
tax structures across states. 
An extensive body of literature has developed over the past several decades on 
individual and household vehicle purchase and consumption decisions.  Hensher (1985) 
provides an excellent review of the empirical studies of vehicle choice and usage models. 
The focus of much of this literature has been on household-based sub-choice models of 
fleet size, vehicle type and usage.  Efforts to integrate at least two of these decisions in 
either a holdings or transaction framework include Hensher and LePlastrier (1985), 
Manski and Sherman (1980) and Hensher and Mansfield (1982).  Train and Lohrer 
(1983) and Mannering and Winston (1983) represent the first attempts to incorporate all 
three decisions into one model.   Many of these studies include various financial 
characteristics such as vehicle purchase price, operating costs, transaction-search costs, 
service and repair cost and sales taxes in multivariate choice models.  Hensher and Le 
Plastrier (1985) include motor vehicle registration cost in a nested logit model of vehicle 
choice.   Hayashi et al. (2001) use measures of motor vehicle purchase and annual 
ownership taxes in multivariate models of household vehicle purchase, ownership and 
usage.  The results of their analysis indicate that increases in purchase and ownership 
taxes reduce fleet turnover.  Their analysis also concludes that a significant increase in 
ownership taxes results in an increase in the fraction of the vehicle fleet that is made up 
of smaller vehicles.   Although a general specification of ownership taxes would include 
motor vehicle wealth taxes, the models estimated by Hayashi et al. use data from Japan 
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and thus could not possibly include a measure that is representative of the vehicle wealth 
taxes used in the United States.  
Johnson (1978) is perhaps the first analysis that uses a multinomial logit 
probability model to explain a family’s choice of vehicle age.  The model includes only 
three independent variables (income, family size, and age of the head of the family) and 
six vehicle age outcome categories where the final category includes all vehicles that are 
six years of age or older.  Given the capabilities of the latest software technology, this 
model could easily be extended to include a larger number of vehicle age categories and 
independent variables.  The multinomial logit model has also been used extensively to 
model ownership and vehicle type decisions by Lave and Train (1979) and Manski and 
Sherman (1980).  More recent research including that by Mannering and Winston (1983) 
and Hensher and Le Plastrier (1985) has focused on the use of the nested logit model to 
analyze joint fleet size and vehicle type decisions.  While an extensive body of literature 
exists on vehicle consumption decisions such as ownership levels, vehicle type and 
usage, no paper exists that specifically analyzes the effects of wealth taxes on 
households’ vehicle purchase and age decisions, state vehicle age distributions and 
emissions.   
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Chapter 2 
 Effects of Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes on Household Vehicle Purchase 
and Age Decisions 
 
Introduction to the Analysis of Household Vehicle Purchase and Age Decisions 
 The first objective of my analysis is to determine whether motor vehicle wealth 
taxes affect the vehicle purchase and age decisions of households.  The main hypothesis 
is that motor vehicle wealth taxes discourage households from purchasing a vehicle in a 
given year and increase the age of vehicles that are purchased.  Households living in a 
state with a motor vehicle wealth tax can expect their annual motor vehicle ownership 
costs to increase if they add a vehicle to their fleet or replace a vehicle with a newer, 
more valuable one as a result of the tax.  Therefore, households living in motor vehicle 
wealth tax states are expected to be less likely to purchase a vehicle in a given year, all 
else constant.  Those households that do decide to purchase a vehicle are expected to 
select older vehicles to avoid paying the higher tax liabilities associated with newer 
vehicles. 
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the data and methods used in this portion 
of the analysis.  I then present descriptive statistics of households and their vehicle 
purchase decisions to motivate the multivariate analyses.  I then analyze the results of 
binary choice models of household vehicle purchase decisions and the results of 
multivariate regression analyses of the vehicle age decision.  The chapter concludes with 
a brief summary of the main findings of these models and motivation for the next step in 
the analysis.  
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Data and Methods Used to Model Household Vehicle Purchase and Age Decisions 
In my analysis, I use data from the 2001 National Household Travel Survey 
(NHTS) conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation between March of 2001 
and May of 2002 to model the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on household vehicle 
purchase and age decisions.10  The data contain a wealth of information on demographics, 
travel patterns and vehicle stocks for a sample of 26,000 households living across the 
U.S.  However, the state of residence is unidentified for those households living in states 
with small populations to protect the confidentiality of survey participants.11  This lack of 
information reduces the viable sample to approximately 24,000 observations as the 
corresponding state motor vehicle wealth tax data cannot be matched with household data 
for those living in states that cannot be identified.  I also merged state and local sales tax 
rates collected from the (2001) U.S. Master Sales and Use Tax Guide with the NHTS 
data. 
The first column of data in Table 2.1 provides a distribution of households 
included in the NHTS data across various household demographics and other variables 
that may affect households’ vehicle purchase decisions.  These other variables include the 
availability of public transportation, household travel patterns, characteristics of the 
household’s vehicle stock and taxes on automobile transactions in the household’s state 
                                                          
10 For additional details on the sampling process, survey procedure and information included in the NHTS 
data file see the 2001 NHTS User’s Guide available at http://nhts.ornl.gov/2001/usersguide/index.shtml. 
11 The state of residence cannot be identified for 2,024 households in the data set.  To protect 
confidentiality, MSAs with a population of less than 1 million, states with a population of less than 2 
million, and states that have a non-MSA population that is less than one half million can not be specifically 
identified in the data set.  The states omitted include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont and 
Wyoming. 
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of residence.  Households in the sample are more likely to have two or fewer members, 
an annual income below $50,000 and a home of their own.  Households are also more 
likely to reside in an MSA, drive less than 10 miles to work, and most likely do not use 
public transportation.  Nearly all households live in a state that imposes a tax on the 
transaction of automobiles and roughly 50 percent live in a state where local jurisdictions 
have the option of taxing automobile transactions.   Finally, household survey 
respondents are more likely to be white, without a college degree, and younger than the 
age of 56.   
Also included in the data is information on the year, make, model, estimated 
annual miles driven and length of current ownership for over 45,500 vehicles that are 
owned by households in the survey.  The survey data provide all the information 
necessary to identify the households that purchased a vehicle in 2001 and the age of each 
vehicle at the time of purchase.  Specifically, the survey date and the length of time the 
household reports owning each of its vehicles is used to identify households that 
purchased a vehicle in 2001.  For example, households that were surveyed in July of 
2001 must report owning at least one vehicle for six months or less to be identified as a 
household that purchased a vehicle in 2001.  However, certain vehicles are excluded from 
the sample of possible purchases for one reason or another.  Vehicles not owned by the 
household, such as leased or company vehicles, are excluded from the analysis as it is not 
obvious whether the household is responsible for paying the wealth tax.  Recreational 
vehicles, motorcycles and vehicles classified as something other than an automobile, van, 
SUV or truck are excluded because they are usually employed in leisure activities which 
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would represent a different choice decision facing households.  A vehicle’s age at the 
time of purchase is derived using information on the model year of the vehicle, survey 
data and length of ownership.  Vehicles over the age of 39 are excluded as they were 
lumped into the same model year in the original data file and thus their actual age can not 
be determined.  Finally, vehicles for which age cannot be determined for some other 
reason are excluded from the sample.  
To model the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on household vehicle purchase 
decisions, I merged the motor vehicle wealth tax data described above with the survey 
data.  Roughly half of the households in the data set resided in a state that had a wealth 
tax on motor vehicles in 2001.  Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of the three 
motor vehicle wealth tax measures for the households used in this analysis.  The average 
ratio of the 2001 Accord tax liability to the 1998 Accord tax liability was 1.29 for these 
households and the average difference in these tax liabilities was $208. 
From the final sample of 23,278 households, 25 percent purchased at least one 
vehicle in 2001.  Households living in states with a motor vehicle wealth tax were just as 
likely to purchase a vehicle in 2001 as households living in states without a motor vehicle 
wealth tax.   Specifically, 24.95 percent of households living in states with a wealth tax 
purchased at least one vehicle, while 24.75 percent of households living in states without 
a wealth tax purchased at least one vehicle.  However this simple comparison fails to 
control for the effects other variables may have on the vehicle purchase decision.  Other 
variables such as household demographics, household composition, travel patterns, 
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access and use of public transportation and transaction tax rates most slikely affect a 
household’s decision to purchase a vehicle. 
Columns two and three of Table 2.1 show the distribution of households across 
various characteristics by vehicle purchase status.  Households that purchase a vehicle in 
2001 are more likely to be larger in size, have higher annual incomes, and have more 
drivers and workers.  Households that purchase a vehicle are also more likely to drive 
further distances to work and drive more miles in a year.  Of course, to isolate the effect 
wealth taxes have on vehicle purchase decisions from the effects of these other variables 
a multivariate strategy is required. 
The vehicle purchase decision represents a binary choice; either the household 
chooses to purchase a vehicle or it chooses not to purchase a vehicle.  Therefore, a binary 
response model such as the probit model is an appropriate multivariate strategy.  Such a 
model assumes that a household’s vehicle purchase decision is a function of a vector of 
explanatory variables represented by xi.  The dependent variable in the model, yi, takes a 
value of one for households that purchase a vehicle and a value of zero for households 
that do not purchase a vehicle.  The probability that a household purchases a vehicle is 
expressed as Pr(yi  = 1| xi), while the probability that the household does not purchase a 
vehicle is expressed as 1-Pr(yi  = 1| xi).  The likelihood equation estimated by any binary 
response model is: 
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When a latent variable y* =  xiβ + εi is used to derive the model, this equation can be 
expressed as: 
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where F(xiβ) = Pr(yi  = 1| xi) and is simply the cumulative density function of the error 
distribution evaluated at xβ.  The probit model specifically assumes that the error terms 
have a normal distribution with E(ε|x) = 0 and Var(ε|x) = 1.  Maximum likelihood 
estimates of the parameters associated with each explanatory variable are obtained by 
applying the Newton-Raphson method to the log of equation 2.2. 
 To determine the effects of individual continuous variables on the household 
vehicle purchase decision, the parameters estimated by the probit model are used to 
calculate the partial change in the probability that a vehicle is purchased for a given 
change in each explanatory variable.  This change is often referred to as the marginal 
effect and is calculated as: 
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where  )( βφ x is the normal probability density function evaluated at the mean values of 
the independent variables and the parameters estimated by the model. 
The marginal effects of dummy variables are calculated as: 
 Pr(y = 1 | x , dummy variable = 1) – Pr(y = 1| x , dummy variable = 0) 12          2.4 
To summarize the estimation procedure, the dependent variable of the probit 
model of the vehicle age decision used in this analysis takes a value of one for 
households that purchased at least one vehicle in 2001.  A variety of independent 
                                                          
12 This is the change in the probability that a vehicle is purchased as the dummy variable goes from 0 to 1, 
holding all other variables at their means. 
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variables that measure household demographics, composition, travel patterns, vehicle 
fleets and transaction tax rates are used in the model as controls.  See Table 2.3 for a list 
of definitions for the variables used in the model.  I estimate three separate models of the 
purchase decision that include different specification of the motor vehicle wealth tax 
measure.  The effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes as well as the effects of  
explanatory variables are expressed as marginal effects.  The marginal effect on the 
wealth tax dummy variable is expected to be negative indicating that the presence of a 
wealth tax decreases the probability that the average household purchases a vehicle.  The 
marginal effects of the ratio and difference measures of the wealth tax are also expected 
to be negative as larger differences between the tax liabilities of new and used vehicles 
likely encourage households to keep their current vehicles.  
  The next step in this portion of the analysis is to model households’ vehicle age 
decisions.  The final column of Table 2.1 presents the average age of vehicles purchased 
by households in 2001 across various characteristics.  For those households that were 
interviewed in 2001, vehicle age is determined by subtracting the vehicle model year 
from 2002; however, model year 2002 vehicles are assigned an age of one year.  Vehicle 
age for those households interviewed in 2002 is derived by subtracting the model year 
from 2003.   Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of vehicle age by the wealth tax status in 
the household’s state of residence.  There are only minor differences in these 
distributions.  In fact, as noted above, the mean vehicle age for households in states with 
a wealth tax is 5.42 years, and the mean age is 5.24 years for households in states without 
a wealth tax.  According to standard t-test, these values are not statistically different.  
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Notice that the largest difference between these distributions occurs for new cars (where 
age = 1).   A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test applied to these distributions generates a 
corrected p-value of 0.128. 13   This result suggests that these distributions are not 
statistically different at the ten-percent level of significance.  
These results certainly suggest that motor vehicle wealth taxes do not 
significantly influence the age of vehicles purchased.  However, simply comparing the 
vehicle age distribution by wealth tax status fails to control for the effects other variables 
may have on a household’s vehicle age decisions.  As reported in Table 2.1, a household 
with a survey respondent that is white, older and has more education tends to purchase 
newer vehicles.  Households that live in a metropolitan statistical area, have higher 
annual incomes, drive further distances to work and plan to put more miles on the vehicle 
purchased also tend to purchase newer vehicles.  To isolate the effects of motor vehicle 
wealth taxes from the effects of these other variables a multivariate strategy is required.  
Therefore, in this portion of the analysis I use an ordinary least squares regression model 
to model vehicle age for those 5,500 plus households that purchased a vehicle in 2001.  
As reported in Table 2.1, over 86 percent of these households purchased only one 
vehicle.  However, the dependent variable in the regression is set equal to the average age 
of vehicles purchased in 2001 since nearly 15 percent of these households did purchase 
more than one vehicle.  Again, the wealth tax measures of interest include a wealth tax 
dummy variable and the wealth tax ratio and difference measures.  Each of these 
alternative specifications of the wealth tax is used in a separate linear regression model.  
                                                          
13 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a test of the equality of two distributions.  The test is a statistical 
procedure that uses the maximum vertical distance between two functions as a measure of how well the 
functions resemble each other (Conover, 1998). 
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For the most part, the other independent variables used in the baseline specification 
include those variables that are used in the purchase decision model.  In addition to these 
variables, the vehicle age model includes two vehicle-specific attributes.  The first is a 
dummy variable indicating whether any of the vehicles purchased by the household are 
classified as something other than an automobile.14  The second is the household’s 
estimate of the average number of miles it expects to drive the newly purchased vehicle 
(or vehicles) in the first year of ownership. 
 The motor vehicle wealth tax is expected to have a positive effect on vehicle 
purchase age in the multivariate regression analysis, all else constant.  Households that 
live in states with a wealth tax are expected to purchase older vehicles in order to avoid 
paying higher taxes.  Both the ratio of the new versus used vehicle tax liabilities and the 
difference between these tax liabilities are also expected to have a positive effect on 
vehicle age as larger values of these variables reflect higher relative tax payments for 
newer vehicles.  Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics of the wealth tax variables for 
households that purchased at least one vehicle in 2001.  The mean ratio of tax liabilities 
faced by these households is 1.28, while the mean tax difference is roughly $208.  
Analysis of the Household Vehicle Purchase Decisions 
Table 2.5 presents the marginal effects for three different probit models of the 
2001 vehicle purchase decision.  Over 21,000 households whose state of residence could 
be identified in the NHTS and whose data for the included variables was non-missing are 
                                                          
14 This classification includes sports utility vehicles, mini-vans and trucks. 
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included in the sample used to estimate the model. 15  The analysis includes separate 
models for three different measures of the motor vehicle wealth tax – a dummy variable 
indicating the presence of a wealth tax in the household’s state of residence, the ratio of 
tax liabilities and the absolute difference in tax liabilities.  In each of the models the 
dependent variable takes a value of one for households that purchased at least one vehicle 
in 2001.  The control variables in the models reflect household demographics, household 
composition, public transportation use and access and transaction tax rates.   
 The wealth tax variable has a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
probability that a household purchased a vehicle in two of the three models.  However, in 
all cases the magnitude of the effect is rather modest.  The results from model 1 indicate 
that if a household lives in a state with a wealth tax, its probability of purchasing a 
vehicle is 1.23 percentage points less than that of a household living in a state without a 
wealth tax, all else constant.  The baseline proportion of households in this sample that 
actually purchased a vehicle is 26.61 percent; therefore, this change represents a 4.62 
percent decrease in the likelihood that a vehicle is purchased.  The marginal effect of the 
ratio of tax liabilities is highly statistically significant in model 2.  However, the small 
marginal effect results in an elasticity of only –0.10.  Thus the model predicts that a one- 
percent increase in the ratio of tax liabilities would decrease the predicted probability that 
a vehicle is purchased by only 0.10 percent, all else constant.  The marginal effect of the 
difference in tax liabilities fails to be statistically significantly different from zero in 
model 3. 
                                                          
15 Although the state of Virginia could be identified in the data, its 2001 wealth tax data are difficult to 
obtain due to recent changes in the tax structure.  Therefore all households living in Virginia are excluded 
from this analysis. 
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 A majority of the marginal effects on the additional explanatory variables used in 
these models are statistically significant and consistent across the various specifications 
of the wealth tax.  In most cases, the marginal effects of these explanatory variables are 
of the expected signs or are consistent with the trends presented in Table 2.1.  For 
example, increasing a household’s income would increase the probability that it 
purchases a vehicle, all else constant.  Households with a youngest child between the 
ages of 16 and 21 are more likely to purchase a vehicle than are households in other 
stages of the life cycle.  Homeowners are less likely to purchase a vehicle in 2001, which 
is not surprising considering that mortgage payments tend to impose liquidity constraints 
on households.  Households that reside in an MSA with a population of at least a million 
people and a heavy transit system are less likely to purchase a vehicle, perhaps due to a 
lack of need or the availability of other transportation options.  However, the marginal 
effect of the public transportation variable that indicates whether a member of the 
household used some form of public transportation in the past two months is not 
statistically significant.  Increasing the household size, worker count or average distance 
to work would increase the probability that a vehicle is purchased.  Households with 
younger respondents and those with respondents without a college degree are less likely 
to purchase a vehicle.  Intuition would suggest that transaction taxes such as sales, use or 
excise taxes on motor vehicles would discourage households from purchasing a vehicle 
as they increase the overall cost of the purchase.  However, neither state nor local 
transaction tax rates in the household’s state of residence significantly affect the purchase 
decision in these models. 
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Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the results of various alternative specifications of the 
vehicle purchase decision that serve as robustness checks of the baseline model.  The first 
set of results in Table 2.6 is from a model that includes additional control variables at the 
expense of nearly half of the observations.  The most interesting of these variables are 
perhaps those that provide information on the households’ current vehicle fleet.  
Variables that measure the average age of the household’s fleet as well as the total annual 
miles the household drives are included in this model.   The addition of explanatory 
variables and the reduction in the sample size lead to several changes in the results of the 
model.  However, the overall results for the wealth tax variables are fairly consistent.  
The magnitude of the effects of the wealth tax dummy and wealth tax ratio increases 
slightly in absolute value.  The presence of a wealth tax now decreases the predicted 
probability that a household purchased a vehicle by roughly 0.02 or nearly 8 percent, 
which is indeed a larger effect.  Interestingly, the difference between the wealth tax 
liability of new versus used vehicles is now statistically significant in model 3; however, 
again the effect is very small.  A $100 increase in the tax difference between new and 
used vehicles would decrease the probability that households purchase a vehicle by only 
0.34 percentage points or only 0.01 percent. 
 Of the additional explanatory variables, only two are statistically significant; 
however, there are considerable changes in the significance patterns of the original 
explanatory variables.  However, most of the changes reflect a loss of statistical 
significance, which certainly suggests that the significant decrease in the sample size may 
be the primary force behind these changes.  In fact, re-estimating the baseline model 
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using only those observations that are included in this alternative specification results in 
nearly all of the same changes. 
 The second set of results in Table 2.6 includes a dummy variable that indicates 
whether or not the household was interviewed in the fourth quarter of 2001.  This dummy 
variable serves two purposes.  First, it captures the effects of special promotions (such as 
zero percent down) that are frequently offered during this time of the year as auto-dealers 
prepare to make room for new model year vehicles.   Secondly, the dummy variable 
serves as a control for the influence that the events of September 11, 2001 may have had 
on household vehicle purchase decisions.  The results of the baseline model are 
somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of this additional variable.  The marginal effect on 
the wealth tax dummy variable is no longer statistically significantly different from zero.  
However, the marginal effect on the wealth tax ratio variable remains statistically 
significant.  These results suggest that after controlling for a fourth quarter interview 
households’ vehicle purchase decisions are not affected by the mere presence of a motor 
vehicle wealth tax but are still responsive to the relative differences in tax liabilities for 
new versus used vehicles. 
 The first three columns of Table 2.7 present the marginal effects of a model that 
excludes households with one or no vehicles.  For most households, the marginal utility 
from their first vehicle is likely larger than the marginal utility from any subsequent 
vehicle.  As a result, households with more than one vehicle may be more sensitive to 
motor vehicle wealth taxes.  The results in Table 2.7 suggest that this may indeed be the 
case.  The marginal effects on all three motor vehicle wealth tax measures are statistically 
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significant at the ten-percent level or better in this specification.  Although the marginal 
effect of the presence of a wealth tax declines in this specification, the magnitude of the 
marginal effect on the wealth tax ratio variable increases in terms of absolute value and 
the difference in wealth tax liabilities becomes statistically significant.  These results 
suggest that households with more than one vehicle are less likely to purchase a vehicle 
when faced with greater relative and absolute differences in tax liabilities of new versus 
used vehicles.   However, the marginal effect on the wealth tax difference variable is very 
small.  A $100 increase in the difference between the ten-year present value stream of tax 
liabilities for a new and used vehicle would decrease the probability these households 
purchase a vehicle by only 0.27 percentage points. 
 As mentioned above, the tax liabilities created using the Honda Accord may not 
be representative of the average vehicle since the Accord tends to retain its value over a 
longer period of time.  Therefore, the final robustness check uses alternative continuous 
wealth tax measures created using the Ford Taurus as the representative vehicle.   The 
results of these models suggest that the results of the baseline model are robust to the use 
of an alternative representative vehicle.  Although the marginal effect for the Ford Taurus 
wealth tax difference measure is statistically significant, it has little economic 
significance as a $300 increase in the difference in tax liabilities would be required to 
decrease the probability that the average household purchases a vehicle by even one 
percentage point.  
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Analysis of the Household Vehicle Age Decisions 
 The results of this analysis have thus far established that household vehicle 
purchase decisions are indeed affected by the presence and structure of motor vehicle 
wealth taxes.  Therefore, the next objective of the analysis is to model the effects of 
motor vehicle wealth taxes on the age of vehicles purchased in 2001.  The sample used to 
model vehicle age includes the 5,656 households that purchased at least one vehicle in 
2001 and provided complete records of data for necessary variables.  Table 2.8 presents 
the results of multivariate OLS regression models of vehicle age.  In each model, the 
dependent variable is the average age of vehicles purchased by households in 2001; 
however, each model includes a different measure of the motor vehicle wealth tax.  The 
control variables include household demographics and composition, public transportation 
and transaction tax rate variables.  Overall the baseline models perform fairly well.  Each 
model is capable of explaining over 17 percent of the variation in average vehicle age.  
The results of F tests strongly reject the hypothesis that the coefficients in each model are 
jointly equal to zero.  In fact, a large majority of coefficients are statistically significantly 
different from zero in each of the models and the results tend to be consistent across the 
various specifications of the wealth tax.  However, each of the motor vehicle wealth tax 
variables fail to be statistically significant, suggesting that wealth taxes do not have a 
significant effect on households’ vehicle age decisions.  This result is unsurprising given 
the vehicle age distributions in Figure 2.1.  
The largest effects in each of these models appear on the life cycle and MSA 
dummy variables.  For example, households that have reached the retirement phase of life 
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purchase vehicles that are roughly one and a half years younger than the vehicles 
purchased by households whose youngest child is of driving age.  Households with no 
children or with a youngest child below the age of 16 also purchase vehicles that are 
younger than households with a youngest child between the ages of 16 and 21 do.  
Households not living in an MSA purchase vehicles that are approximately two years 
older than the vehicles purchased by households in the largest MSAs with a heavy transit 
system, all else constant.  Households living in smaller MSAs also purchase older 
vehicles. 
Households that own their own homes, have higher incomes, drive further 
distances to work, do not use public transportation and have fewer members tend to 
purchase newer vehicles on average.  Households where the survey respondent is white, 
older and has a college education are more likely to purchase newer vehicles.  
Tables 2.9 through 2.12 present the results of various models estimated to test the 
robustness of the baseline specification.  The first set of results reported in Table 2.9 is 
from a model that adds additional explanatory variables to the baseline specification in a 
parallel fashion to Table 2.6 above.  The addition of the estimated number of miles the 
household intends to drive the purchased vehicle(s), average vehicle age, and total annual 
miles traveled significantly improves explanatory power.  Each of these models explains 
over 25 percent of the variation in the purchase age of vehicles; however, the inclusion of 
the additional variables results in a large reduction in the sample size as many 
observations are missing data for one or more of these variables.  Although the wealth tax 
variables remain insignificant, the statistical significance of a few variables does in fact 
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change between model specifications.  However, once again further investigation reveals 
that many of these changes are due to the drastic reduction in the sample size rather than 
to the addition of new variables. 
 Interestingly, in all three specifications both the state and local transaction tax 
rates are statistically significant.  However, the economic significance of changes in 
transaction tax rates on vehicle age is rather small.  Increasing the state transaction tax 
rate in the household’s state of residence in the wealth tax dummy variable model by one 
percentage point would only increase vehicle age by approximately 0.24 years or roughly 
three months.  Increasing the average local transaction tax rate in the household’s state of 
residence by one percentage point would only increase vehicle age by 2.28 months.  
These small increases in vehicle age that would result from changes in transaction tax 
rates are unlikely to have significant effects on emissions levels.  It is unlikely that the 
emissions of a vehicle that is one year and three months old would differ dramatically 
from the emissions of a vehicle that is only one year old.16 
Unlike the results of the vehicle purchase model, the coefficients on the wealth 
tax measures in the vehicle age models are unaffected by the inclusion of a control for a 
fourth quarter purchase as reported in the final three columns of Table 2.9.  The 
coefficients on the dummy variable that indicates whether the household purchased at 
least one vehicle in the fourth quarter of 2001 are negative and highly statistically 
significant.  Households that purchase vehicles in the fall select vehicles that are roughly 
half a year younger than households that purchase a vehicle during the rest of the year, all 
                                                          
16 Although these vehicles are likely to be of different model years, CAFÉ and emission standards rarely 
change dramatically from year to year.  In addition, three extra months of wear and tear on the emission 
control system is unlikely to have a significant affect on emissions. 
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else constant.  However, the coefficients on all three specifications of the wealth tax 
remain statistically insignificant. 
Intuitively, vehicle age decisions for households with more than one vehicle may 
be more sensitive to motor vehicle wealth taxes than those for households who own only 
one vehicle.  Households with only one vehicle may rely solely on this vehicle for their 
transportation needs; therefore, they are probably more likely to purchase a more reliable, 
newer vehicle.  Thus the status of motor vehicle wealth taxes in their state of residence 
may be less of a factor in their vehicle age decisions.  However, wealth taxes may be a 
stronger factor in the decision process of households with two or more vehicles.  As long 
as these households have at least one reliable vehicle, they may be more willing to 
purchase an older second vehicle to avoid paying higher motor vehicle wealth taxes.  To 
test this hypothesis the model is estimated using only the households that report owning 
more than one vehicle.  The first set of results in Table 2.10 reports the coefficients from 
these models.  Once again the results are robust to those presented in Table 2.8; the 
coefficients on the wealth tax measures remain statistically significant. 
The final columns of Table 2.10 report the results of vehicle age models that use 
wealth tax measures that I created using the Ford Taurus as the representative vehicle.  
The coefficients on the wealth tax measures remain statistically insignificant, which 
suggests that the conclusions of the baseline model are robust to the selection of the 
representative vehicle. 
Table 2.11 presents the results of the final robustness checks of the vehicle age 
linear regression model.  The first three columns of results are from models that use the 
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vehicle as the unit of analysis. To accomplish this, the data set is adjusted to allow each 
vehicle that was purchased in 2001 to be its own observation in the data.  Thus the 
dependent variable in the model becomes the respective vehicle’s age instead of the 
average age of vehicles purchased by its respective household.  The estimation technique 
used for these models allows for possible heterogeneity across households.17  As with all 
other robustness checks the results of these models are consistent with the results in Table 
2.8.  In other words, using vehicles as the unit of observation did not change the fact that 
the wealth tax variables fail to significantly affect vehicle age. 
The exclusion of households that failed to purchase a vehicle in 2001 in the 
vehicle age model may bias the coefficients of the ordinary least squares regression 
model.  Households that failed to purchase a vehicle in 2001 may have been more likely 
to purchase vehicles in certain age groups.  The final three columns of Table 2.11 report 
the results of a two-step Heckman selection model that controls for any selection bias that 
may occur.    The specification of the model is such that the selection equation is the 
household’s vehicle purchase decision and the regression equation models the vehicle age 
decision.  The instrument used to identify the model is the count of drivers in the 
household.  After controlling for the age of the drivers in the household, the actual 
number of drivers is unlikely to affect household vehicle age decisions.  However this 
variable is expected to affect vehicle purchase decisions as a larger number of drivers 
leads to the need for more vehicles regardless of the age of the drivers.  This variable 
proves to be a sufficient instrument as it is highly statistically significant in the probit 
                                                          
17 The model is estimated in Stata and employs the robust cluster option that specifies that the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is to be used allowing observations (vehicles) to be dependent 
within groups (households). 
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model but fails to be significant in the regression model. Again the results are robust for 
the wealth tax measures.  The coefficients on all three measures remain insignificant.   In 
fact, the lack of statistical significance for the coefficient on the inverse mills ratio 
suggests that sample selection bias is not a concern in the vehicle age model. 
Figure 2.1 reveals that the largest difference between the vehicle age distributions 
of vehicles purchased by NHTS households in 2001 by wealth tax status occurs for new 
vehicles.  Households in non-wealth tax states are 1.05 times more like to purchase a new 
vehicle than households in wealth tax states; however, the remainder of the vehicle age 
distribution is very similar across wealth tax status.  Thus the results of the linear 
regression model of vehicle age may fail to reveal the complete effects of motor vehicle 
wealth taxes on the decision to purchase a new vehicle.  The first three columns of Table 
2.12 present results from a probit model of the household’s decision to purchase a new 
versus used vehicle.  The dependent variable in the model takes a value of one for 
households that purchased at least one new vehicle in 2001.  After controlling for the 
effects of the other explanatory variables, the motor vehicle wealth tax measures fail to 
affect the probability that a household chooses to purchase a new vehicle versus a used 
vehicle.   The results of the Heckman probit model suggest that these results are again 
robust to controls for sample selection bias.  
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Conclusions Regarding the Effects of Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes on Household  
    Vehicle Purchase and Age Decisions 
 
The results presented in this portion of the analysis indicate that motor vehicle 
wealth taxes have a statistically significant but rather modest effect on the probability that 
a household purchases a vehicle in a given year.  Households’ vehicle purchase decisions 
are responsive not only to the presence of a motor vehicle wealth tax but also to the 
relative tax treatments of new and used vehicles.  The presence of a motor vehicle wealth 
tax decreases the probability that a household purchases a vehicle by nearly 4.6 percent, 
all else constant.  The ratio of tax liabilities is highly statistically significant.  These 
results are fairly robust to various specifications of the model and to the use of an 
alternative representative vehicle. 
Contrary to the proposed hypothesis, motor vehicle wealth taxes appear to have 
no significant effects on vehicle age.  All three wealth tax measures failed to be 
statistically significant in the baseline model as well as all alternative specifications of the 
model.  However, this result alone does not provide conclusive evidence that motor 
vehicle wealth taxes have no effects on vehicle age distributions.  Wealth taxes may have 
an indirect effect on vehicle age through their influence on households’ vehicle purchase 
decisions.  As households delay the purchase of a vehicle their current vehicles continue 
to age.  If this process continues for several years in a row, the overall effect on vehicle 
age distributions could be quite dramatic when even a modest effect is aggregated across 
households in a state.  Unfortunately, the NHTS data used in this analysis do not capture 
specific details of vehicle transactions such as information on whether the transaction 
represented a vehicle replacement or an overall addition to the household’s stock of 
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vehicles.  There is at least a possibility that the purchases recorded for households in 
wealth tax states represent trade-ins of newer, more valuable vehicles for older, less 
valuable vehicles.  An analysis of vehicle age distributions by state is necessary to 
capture these potential indirect effects.  Thus far, the analysis has focused on the effects 
of motor vehicle wealth taxes on recently purchased vehicles; however, an analysis of the 
entire vehicle age distribution is necessary to identify the complete effects of these taxes 
on vehicle age. 
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Chapter 3 
Effects of Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes on Vehicle Age Distributions 
 
Introduction to the Analysis of Vehicle Age Distributions 
 
 Motor vehicle wealth taxes were found to have a statistically significant effect on 
households’ vehicle purchase decisions in the analysis of the previous chapter.  The 
objective of this portion of the analysis is to determine whether this effect significantly 
affects vehicle age distributions.  State vehicle age distributions are modeled using 
vehicle registration data from R.L. Polk and Company that provide an aggregate count of 
vehicles by age for each state.  The empirical analysis uses a multinomial logit model to 
estimate the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on the proportion of vehicles in each 
age group.  Simulations are used to identify the effects of changes in motor vehicle 
wealth tax regimes at the national and state level. 
 The chapter begins with a description of the Polk data used in the analysis.  I then 
present descriptive statistics used to motivate the multivariate empirical model.  I then 
review the multinomial logit model before presenting the main results of the analysis.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion of results from alternative specifications of the 
model that use the ratio and difference measures of the motor vehicle wealth tax to test 
the robustness of the baseline model.  
Data Used to Model Vehicle Age Distributions 
The data I used to construct vehicle age distributions are from the 2001 National 
Vehicle Population Profile maintained by R.L. Polk & Company which represents a 
quarterly census of all registered cars and light duty trucks in the U.S.  As of 2001, there 
were over 209 million vehicles registered throughout the lower continental United 
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States.18 However, I excluded light duty trucks from the analysis due to a lack of data on 
wealth tax provisions for commercial vehicles. 19  This leaves 129,266,768 cars, or 61.71 
percent of the national vehicle fleet for use in this analysis.  
The original data file contained aggregate counts of vehicles by state in 30 
different model year categories, ranging from brand new vehicles to vehicles that are 30 
years of age or more.  However, I condensed vehicle counts to 25 age categories to 
facilitate the construction of vehicle age distributions that meet the requirements of the 
mobile source emissions model to be described in the next chapter.  After reconstruction, 
the brand new vehicle age category consisted of both 2002 and 2001 model year vehicles, 
while vehicles with model years of 1977 or earlier are lumped into a 25 plus age 
category.  From these data, I constructed state vehicle age distributions by dividing the 
count of vehicles in each age category by the total number of vehicles.  
The motor vehicle wealth tax data used in the analysis discussed above was also 
used to supplement the Polk data.  Thus, there are three different motor vehicle wealth 
tax measures in the data.  The first is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
state had an annual tax on motor vehicles in 2001.  The second is a ratio of the present 
value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities for a new 2001 Honda Accord versus the 
present value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities for a used 1998 Honda Accord.  The 
third measure represents the absolute difference between these tax liabilities.  Merging 
                                                          
18 Hawaii and Alaska are excluded from the analysis as the supply of both new and used vehicles may be 
affected by their isolated locations. 
19 To be sure, passenger cars may also be registered as commercial vehicles, but the utility of light-duty 
trucks increases their probability of commercial registration.  As it is impossible to distinguish between 
private and commercial registrations in the Polk file, the best course of action was to eliminate light-duty 
vehicles from the analysis.  Recent strong sales of sports utility vehicles and the findings of Pickrell and 
Schimck (1998) suggest that the exclusion of light-duty vehicles may slightly bias vehicle age distributions 
towards older vehicles. 
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these variables with Polk’s vehicle registration data provides several advantages over the 
analysis of the National Household Transportation Survey data.  Vehicle registration data 
allow for the identification of the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on entire vehicle 
age distributions for the lower 48 continental states; whereas, the analysis of the NHTS 
data was restricted to only a subset of vehicle fleets in only 36 states.  The analysis of the 
NHTS data was also limited to a set of vehicles recently purchased by a sample of 
households; whereas, the Polk data allow for an analysis of every single vehicle 
registered in the United States as of July of 2001. 
To complete the analysis, I collected additional data from a variety of sources.  I 
obtained state and local sales tax data from the 2001 U.S. Master Sales and Use Tax 
Guide.  I collected economic indicators including gross state product, income per capita 
and average unemployment rates by state for 2001 from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  I obtained state demographic data from U.S. 
Census Bureau.  Finally, I collected variables reflecting the demand and use of motor 
vehicles from a variety of sources.  A complete list of variables used in this portion of the 
analysis as well as their sources appears in Table 3.1.  I discuss the details regarding these 
additional variables, as well as their use in the model, in the text below. 
Motivating Statistics 
Table 3.2 provides a count and average age of vehicles in 2001 by state and 
wealth tax status.  Approximately 50 percent of the nation’s 129.3 million vehicles were 
registered in wealth tax states as of 2001.  As expected, states with larger populations had 
larger vehicle counts.  California’s vehicle fleet represented 11.20 percent of the national 
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fleet, while Wyoming’s fleet represented only 0.13 percent.  The national average vehicle 
age was 9.58 years; however, vehicles in wealth tax states were slightly older than 
vehicles in non-wealth-tax states with a mean age of 9.71 versus 9.46.  The variation in 
vehicle age was also slightly larger in wealth tax states.  However, the range of average 
vehicle age was very similar for the two groups.  Average fleet age in wealth tax states 
ranged from 8.76 to 11.69 while the range for non-wealth-tax states was 8.74 to 11.71.  
 Figure 3.1 shows the average distribution of vehicles across age categories by 
wealth tax status.  Only modest differences exist for much of the vehicle age distribution.  
In fact, the differences between these distributions are only one-tenth of a percentage 
point or less for age categories 5 through 24.   States without motor vehicle wealth taxes 
have on average a larger fraction of vehicles in each of the first four age categories. The 
largest discrepancy occurs for two-year old vehicles where the fraction of vehicles in 
non-wealth-tax states is 7.2 percent larger than the fraction of vehicles in this category for 
wealth tax states.  The remaining differences over this range are at least a quarter of a 
percentage point higher in favor of non-wealth-tax states.  At the opposite end of the 
distribution, vehicles in wealth tax states are more likely to be in the 25 and older age 
category.  On average, the fraction of vehicles in this group is 18.42 percent larger in 
wealth tax states than the fraction for non-wealth-tax states.  Thus, the difference in the 
mean vehicle age for wealth tax versus non-wealth-tax states is a result of deviations in 
the distributions that occur in the tails. 
 Table 3.3 presents state summary statistics by wealth tax status for a large number 
of factors that may also affect vehicle age distributions.  The tax portfolios of 58 percent 
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(or 28 states) of the states used in this analysis include some form of a motor vehicle 
wealth tax.  The average ratio and difference of new versus used wealth tax liabilities for 
the Honda Accord in wealth tax states were 1.72 and $558.31 respectively in 2001.  
Statistics reported in Table 3.3 reveal that on average wealth tax and non-wealth-tax 
states differed in several respects as of 2001.   A smaller percentage of the population in 
wealth tax states lived in a metropolitan statistical area or in areas with motor vehicle 
inspection/maintenance programs.  Wealth tax states also tend to have lower state and 
average local sales tax rates.  The gross state product, personal income, and public 
transportation trips per capita are also lower in wealth tax states.  Table 3.4 presents 
similar statistics using vehicles as the unit of observation.  A more thorough analysis of 
the statistics in these tables is left to the reader.  
The modest age differences that exist across state fleets by wealth tax status 
suggests that motor vehicle wealth taxes have few consequences on state vehicle age 
distributions.  However, the statistics presented thus far fail to control for the effects other 
factors may have on vehicle age.  Factors related to the economic well being, 
demographic composition, and automobile demand and use in a state such as those 
summarized in Table 3.3 may also have significant effects on the state’s vehicle age 
distribution.  If any of these factors are also correlated with the use of motor vehicle 
wealth taxes, the preliminary conclusion suggested by these basic statistics that wealth 
taxes do not have major effects on vehicle age could be biased.  To be sure, a multivariate 
regression strategy is required to isolate the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on 
vehicle age distributions.  
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Overview of the Multinomial Logit Model 
The multivariate regression strategy of choice for this analysis is the multinomial 
logit model (MNLM).  The multinomial logit model is the most frequently used model 
for nominal dependent variables.  A variable is considered to be nominal if it consists of 
discrete outcomes whose categories cannot be ordered.  Classic examples of nominal 
outcomes include occupation and mode of transportation decisions made by individuals.  
Examples of nominal outcomes in the vehicle choice literature include decisions 
regarding vehicle type and ownership levels (i.e. the number of vehicles a household 
chooses to own).  For specific examples see Johnson (1978) and Manski and Sherman 
(1980).20  Vehicle age may also be viewed as a nominal outcome as owners must choose 
a vehicle of either one age or another.  Although age categories could certainly be 
ordered from youngest to oldest, not all owners would agree that newer vehicles are 
necessarily better in all respects.21 
Given that the objective of this portion of the analysis is to model the effects of 
motor vehicle wealth taxes on the fraction of vehicles in each age group, it is convenient 
to derive the multinomial logit model as a probability model.22 The probability that a 
vehicle selected at random from a state’s fleet is of a particular age is equal to the fraction 
                                                          
20 For other applications of the multinomial logit model see Hensher (1986), Schmidt and Strauss (1975) 
and McFadden (1974). 
21 Some researchers may argue that an ordered regression model should be used.  However, estimated 
coefficients are biased when an ordered model is used on a nominal variable, while the consequence of the 
use of a nominal model on an ordered variable is a loss of efficiency.  Long (1997, p.149) argues that when 
the nature of the variable is in doubt the MNLM should be used to avoid biased coefficients. 
22 The discrete choice model could also be used to derive the model.  The discrete choice model assumes 
that an individual will choose an outcome that maximizes the utility gained from that choice.  Therefore if 
the utility of holding a vehicle of a particular age is Uj, the probability of outcome m is equal to the Pr(Um > 
Uj  for all j not equal to m).  The MNLM is obtained if utility is then set equal to xIβm + εim.  McFadden 
(1973) proved that the MNLM results if and only if the error terms are independent and have a type I 
extreme-value distribution.  
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of vehicles that are in that respective age category in the state.  Therefore, let y denote 
vehicle age with 25 possible outcomes, where outcomes 1 through 24 correspond to 
vehicle age in years and outcome 25 represents vehicles that are 25 years of age or older.  
Let Pr( y = m | x ) be the probability of observing a particular age outcome, m, given a 
vector of explanatory variables x.   A distinguishing feature of the MNLM is that it 
assumes that Pr( y = m | x) is a function of the linear combination xβm, where the vector 
βm includes an intercept and coefficients for each of the independent variables that are 
unique for each outcome m.  For example the coefficient for the effect of a motor vehicle 
wealth tax on the probability that a vehicle is two years old is different from the 
coefficient for the effect it has on the probability that a vehicle is ten years old.   
Several adjustments must be made to the probabilities before the model can be 
considered complete.  First, the fraction of vehicles in each age category must be 
nonnegative; therefore, it is necessary to take the exponential of xβm.  To ensure that each 
vehicle falls into at least one of the twenty-five age categories, it is necessary to divide 
exp(xβm) by the sum of exp(xβj) across all age outcomes, which are indexed by j.  Thus 
the probability that a vehicle is in a particular age category is equal to: 
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However this specification allows for more than one set of coefficients to generate the 
same probabilities of observed vehicle age outcomes.  Therefore some sort of constraint 
must be imposed in order to identify the model.  The most common constraint is to 
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assume that β1 = 0, or in other words set the coefficient for the effect of each independent 
variable on the probability that a vehicle is brand new equal to zero.  The probability that 
a vehicle is brand new then becomes:  
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 Estimation of the multinomial logit model is straightforward using maximum 
likelihood techniques.  Assuming observations are independent, the likelihood equation is 
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where pi is the probability of observing the value of y that was actually observed for the 
ith observation.  Substituting equation 3.1 for pi gives: 
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where ∏ is the product over all cases for which yi=m.  The Newton-Raphson 
method then estimates the coefficients using the log of the likelihood equation. 
=myi
Unfortunately the coefficients estimated by the multinomial logit model provide 
little information regarding the effects of the independent variables on vehicle age 
outcomes.  For example, given the identifying constraint that β1=0, the coefficient βkm 
represents the effect of a unit change in xk on the logit of outcome m relative to new 
vehicles holding all other variables constant.  This definition lacks real usefulness, as it is 
 50
often difficult to convey the meaning of a change in the logit of two outcomes.  
Therefore, this analysis must rely on other forms of interpretation.23  
Generating predicted probabilities is perhaps the simplest method of 
interpretation.  Probabilities that each of the 25 age outcomes are observed can be 
calculated using equations 3.1 and 3.2, the respective coefficients for each age outcome 
generated by the model and the mean values of the independent variables.  A graph of 
these probabilities provides an illustration of the vehicle age distribution estimated by the 
model.  To identify the effects of an individual variable, this procedure is repeated after 
some desired discrete change has been made to this variable holding all else constant.  
Graphing both distributions would then reveal the effects of this variable on fleet age.  
Measures of discrete change in probabilities are also an effective method for 
interpreting the results of a multinomial logit model.24  A discrete change in probabilities 
is defined as the change in the predicted probability when xk changes from a start value of 
xs to an end value of  xe, or in other words: 
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Changing the value of xk from 0 to 1 identifies the effect of a dummy variable on the 
probability that a particular age outcome is observed.  The effects of continuous variables 
                                                          
23 The MNLM requires the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) in order to estimate unbiased 
coefficients.  This assumption requires that the relative probabilities for each pair of outcomes remain 
constant regardless of which outcomes are included in the choice set.  
24 Although marginal effects are often a popular method of interpreting empirical results, Long (1997, 
p166) discourages their use in conjunction with the multinomial logit model.  Unlike the discrete changes 
in probabilities, the sum of the marginal effects across outcomes is not restricted to sum to one, which is 
counterintuitive given that an observation falls into only one category of the dependent variable.   The 
value as well as the sign of a marginal effect may change with the value of xk, further decreasing its 
attractiveness.  
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are calculated by allowing the variable to change by a single unit or by a standard 
deviation centered at the mean.  A thorough analysis includes 25 discrete change 
measures (one for each age outcome) for each independent variable.  Computing the 
average absolute discrete change summarizes these changes.  This measure is derived as: 
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where the absolute value is required since the sum of discrete changes in probabilities 
across all outcomes is necessarily zero.   
Although the discrete change in probabilities is a convenient method for 
interpreting the effects of independent variables in the MNLM, it does have some 
limitations.  Due to the nonlinearity of the model, the discrete change values are 
dependent upon the start value of xk, the magnitude of the change and the values at which 
the other independent variables are held constant.  Second, measures of discrete change 
fail to capture the dynamics among the dependent outcomes.  For example, the discrete 
change method may indicate that the presence of a wealth tax increases the probability of 
both a new and two-year old vehicle when the more relevant question may be how the 
wealth tax increases the relative probability of new versus two-year-old vehicles.   
A measure of the ratio of the relative risk of the two outcomes provides the 
answer to this question.  The relative probability (i.e. the relative risk) that a vehicle is 
two years of age relative to being brand new is: 
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The ratio of the relative risk for a one-unit change in xi is then: 
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Thus the relative risk ratio for outcome m given a one-unit change in an independent 
variable is equal to the exponential value of the coefficient.  This result can also be 
interpreted as the expected change in the odds of outcome m relative to the base category 
(new vehicles) for a unit change in xi holding all other variables constant.  For dummy 
variables the relative risk ratio of outcome m relative to the base category is calculated as: 
 
0
1
)1Pr(
)Pr(
)1Pr(
)Pr(
=
=
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
=
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
=
bleDummyVaria
bleDummyVaria
y
my
y
my
                                                                                      3.9 
The relative risk ratio does not depend on the level of the variable of interest or on the 
level of any other independent variable which makes it an attractive measure for 
interpretation.  However, all three measures of interpretation are included in the 
discussion that follows.  For further details regarding the derivation, estimation and 
interpretation of the multinomial logit model see Long (1997, Chapter 6) and Greene 
(2000, pp. 859-862). 
I estimate three separate multinomial logit models for this analysis as described 
above.  The baseline model includes a dummy variable indicating whether or not the state 
had some form of a motor vehicle wealth tax.  I then estimate additional models that 
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include the ratio and difference in new and used wealth tax liabilities for a Honda Accord 
to test the robustness of the baseline model.  
The estimation procedure requires the expansion of the original Polk data file 
such that each of the 48 states has one line of data for each of the 25 possible age 
outcomes.  The estimation of each of these models uses frequency weights equal to the 
number of vehicles from a state’s fleet that are in each respective age category.  I have 
corrected the standard errors estimated by the model  for heteroskedasticity using a robust 
standard errors option that is similar to White’s correction.25  I merged numerous state-
level independent variables related to the economic well being, demographic 
composition, and automobile demand with the Polk data to isolate the effects of motor 
vehicle wealth taxes on vehicle age distributions.  I included three measures of economic 
well being (gross state product per capita, personal income per capita and the state 
average unemployment rate) in the model to control for the fact that on average residents 
in states with better economic conditions can afford newer vehicles.  I used state 
demographic variables in the model include measures of race, education, age, household 
size and home ownership.  I also included state and local average sales tax rates. 
I have also included several variables that influence the demand for motor vehicle 
transportation in the model.  These variables include average gas prices, public 
transportation trips per capita, and total miles driven per household.  To some extent, 
                                                          
25 The model was also estimated using a robust cluster option that relaxes the assumption that the error 
terms within a group (i.e. state in this analysis) are independent to control for heteroskedasticity.  Given 
that the variables on the right-hand side of the model are identical within a group, the fixed effect nature of 
the robust cluster option results in coefficients that fail to be statistically significantly different from zero. 
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each of these variables may affect state vehicle age distributions.  Higher gas prices may 
increase the demand for newer, more fuel-efficient vehicles.26  The availability and 
frequent use of public transportation as an alternative mode of transportation may result 
in older vehicle fleets, as households are likely to be less reliant upon their vehicles. 
Vehicle fleets in states with higher average total miles traveled per year by household 
experience more wear and tear and as a result may have a more rapid turnover. 
Inspection and maintenance programs are frequently included as part of state 
strategies to decrease emissions from motor vehicles and improve air quality.  Most of 
these programs require either annual or biennial tests of the performance of the emissions 
control systems of all vehicles registered in the region.  Older vehicles are more likely to 
fail these tests due to less sophisticated or deteriorating emissions control systems.  
Owners of vehicles that fail to pass these tests must either make repairs necessary to meet 
emissions standards or must salvage their vehicles.27  As a result of this additional 
ownership cost, households in areas with I/M programs may be less likely to own older 
vehicles.  To control for this possibility, I included a variable that measures the fraction 
of a state’s population that lives in an area with mandatory inspections in the model. 
It is entirely possible that weather conditions in various regions of the country 
also affect vehicle age distributions.  Vehicles in states that use larger amounts of road 
salt during the course of a winter may age prematurely as a result of corrosion caused by 
                                                          
26 Newer vehicles are more full-efficient, all else constant, as the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration periodically increases the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards.  For an 
overview of the CAFÉ standards see www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/CAFÉ/overview.htm.  
27 For more information on Inspection/Maintenance Programs see the information provided by the 
Environmental Protection Agency at www.epa.gov/otaq/im.htm. 
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the salt.  According to a report by the Transportation Research Board (1991), states 
throughout the U.S. use nearly 10 million tons of salt each year as part of their deicing 
strategies.  Over 50 percent of deicing salt is applied to roadways in states in the New 
England and Great Lakes regions, where average annual salt loading rates are 15.23 and 
9.36 tons per lane mile respectively.28  In an attempt to control for the effects of regional 
weather conditions, I included a set of regional dummy variables in the model.  I defined 
the region dummies to correspond to the regions used in the report by the Transportation 
Research Board (1991).  The Great Lakes region serves as the reference category in the 
model given its frequent use of road salt and relatively large fraction of the nation’s 
vehicle fleet.  Of course, these regional dummy variables also serve to control for any 
unobservable factors that are correlated across states within a region that affect vehicle 
age distributions.  Again, Table 3.1 provides a complete list of the independent variables 
used in the model as well as their definitions and sources. 
An Overview of the Multinomial Logit Model Results 
The discussion that follows analyzes the results of three separate multinomial 
logit models of vehicle age.  The primary focus of the discussion is on the results from 
the baseline model that includes a wealth tax dummy variable.  Results of separate 
models that include a ratio and difference of tax liabilities between new and used vehicles 
as measures of the wealth tax are briefly presented to highlight the robustness of the 
baseline model.  Estimating these models is mathematically straightforward; however, the 
nonlinearity of the multinomial logit model makes interpreting the results quite 
                                                          
28 For additional details regarding the official salt use policies in various states see Transportation Research 
Board (1991) 
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challenging.  A large number of outcomes further adds to the complexity of identifying 
the effects of individual variables on the distribution of vehicles across age outcomes.  
The model I used in this analysis contains 25 dependent categories and 27 explanatory 
variables.  As a result each model provides estimates for 672 parameters.  I illustrate the 
effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes and other factors on vehicle age distributions by 
analyzing calculations of predicted probabilities, discrete changes and relative risk ratios.  
Simulations designed to identify the effects of changes in the use and structure of motor 
vehicle wealth taxes on vehicle age distributions also facilitate the interpretation of the 
estimated parameters.   
Basic Results of the Model 
The coefficients of the multinomial logit model of vehicle age are reported in 
Table 3.5.  The independent variables used in the model are all highly statistically 
significant in determining vehicle age.  The vast majority of the variables are statistically 
significant at the one-percent level or better for each of the vehicle age outcomes as 
indicated by the lack of bold type or asterisk.29 The presence of a wealth tax on motor 
vehicles has a statistically significant effect on the distribution of vehicle age holding all 
other variables constant.  The coefficient on the wealth tax dummy variable is significant 
at the one-percent level for all outcomes except ten-year-old vehicles.  Coefficients that 
are not statistically significant are limited to only nine independent variables and are 
scattered across age outcomes.  Median age, home ownership rate, region 2 and region 8 
coefficients are more likely not to be statistically significant.  However, no real patterns 
                                                          
29 Given the extremely large number of observations used in the model (129,266,768), it is not surprising 
that the model is very efficient. 
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seem to emerge in terms of effects on vehicle age.  Determining whether a variable has 
no effect on the vehicle age distribution requires a test that all 24 of its coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero.  Results of separate Wald tests indicate that the hypothesis 
that the coefficients associated with each of the independent variables are simultaneously 
equal to zero is rejected at the 0.01 level for all twenty-seven variables.30 
Each coefficient represents the expected change in the logit of outcome m versus 
the base outcome, new vehicles, for a unit change in the independent variable.  For 
example, a one-year increase in a state’s median age would decrease the logit of two-year 
old vehicles to new vehicles by –0.074.   The coefficients on the other independent 
variables have similar interpretations.  However, this interpretation of the results is 
unsatisfactory since it is difficult to convey the meaning of a change in the log of the 
odds.  Other methods of interpretation are explored below in order to determine whether 
the variables that were found to be statistically significant also have economically 
significant effects on vehicle age distributions.  
The prevalence of coefficients that are statistically significant in the model may 
suggest that the model is an excellent predictor of vehicle age distributions.  In fact a chi-
squared test of all coefficients indicates that the model is highly statistically significant.  
However various other measures of goodness of fit do not provide strong support for this 
claim.  McFadden’s adjusted R2 has a value of 0.0024 for this model, which suggests 
little improvement over a model that includes only an intercept.  The adjusted count R2, 
                                                          
30 According to Long and Freese (2003), the likelihood-ratio test is superior to the Wald test.  However the 
computational costs of the LR test can be prohibitive for complex models such as the one estimated in this 
analysis.  Considering that the LR and Wald tests are asymptotically equivalent, the LR test would likely 
lead to the same results reported here given the sample size. 
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which compares observed and predicted outcomes to evaluate the model, has a value of 
0.004 suggesting only 0.4 percent of the observations have a correctly-predicted age 
outcome.  However given the format of the data used to estimate the model, it is not 
entirely clear as to whether these measures of fit are appropriate representations of the 
performance of the model.   Because the data include twenty-five observations with 
identical values for the independent variables for each state, the predicted probabilities of 
each age outcome are identical for all observations within each state.31   
A more appropriate test of the performance of the model may be to compare the 
actual vehicle age distribution derived from the Polk data to the predicted vehicle age 
distribution estimated by the MNLM model.  Figure 3.2 provides an illustration of both 
actual and predicted age distributions at the national level.  Overall, the model does a 
good job of predicting the national vehicle age distribution.  For the majority of age 
outcomes the difference between these distributions is very small.  In fact the largest 
absolute value of their difference is less than 0.007 or approximately three-fourths of a 
percentage point.  The largest differences occur for age outcomes between one and four 
years of age, which suggests that the predicted age distribution slightly favors older 
vehicles.  Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide a similar comparison for wealth tax and non-
wealth-tax states respectively.  Wealth tax states have a predicted vehicle age distribution 
that performs slightly better than that of non-wealth-tax states.  Differences between 
these distributions are slightly larger for non-wealth-tax states.  The largest absolute 
value of their differences is 0.007 for non-wealth-tax states and only 0.005 for wealth tax 
                                                          
31 A more traditional data set for the MNLM includes only one line of data for each individual.  Thus it 
would be nearly impossible for any two observations to have identical values for the predicted probabilities 
of each outcome. 
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states.  However, the overall patterns in the differences are the same for both figures, 
which suggests that any errors in prediction that occur are non-random.  Similar errors 
will occur in the prediction of vehicle age distributions for wealth tax and non-wealth-tax 
states.  As a whole these three figures suggest that the multinomial logit model estimated 
in this analysis is a fairly good predictor of vehicle age distributions. 
Predicted Probabilities 
 Figure 3.5 shows predicted vehicle age distributions by wealth tax status.  At first 
glance these distributions appear to be nearly identical.  However, a closer inspection 
reveals differences in the proportion of vehicles in the newer age groups.  These 
differences suggest that vehicle fleets in wealth tax states are slightly older than those in 
states without a wealth tax, which is consistent with the hypothesis of this analysis.  The 
presence of a wealth tax on motor vehicles has little effect on the proportion of vehicles 
that are brand new.  In contrast, the wealth tax appears to have at least some effect on the 
proportion of vehicles in used age groups.  Vehicles in non-wealth-tax states are more 
likely to be between the ages of two and four, while a larger fraction of vehicles are 
between the ages of five and ten in wealth tax states.  Figure 3.6 highlights the 
differences between wealth and non-wealth-tax states over this portion of the age 
distribution.  Magnifying the differences does little to hide the fact that their magnitudes 
are very small.  The largest difference in these fractions, 0.0031 (less than a third of a 
percentage point) occurs for two-year old vehicles.  Thus while differences do exist 
between these age distributions, it is unlikely that they would lead to noticeable 
environmental consequences.  Wealth and non-wealth-tax states have virtually the same 
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fraction of vehicles in each age group beyond the age of thirteen.  This result is perhaps 
unsurprising considering that motor vehicle wealth taxes are generally phased out or 
reach a minimum for vehicles 12 years of age or older in most states and thus remove any 
tax incentive that may have existed to hold older vehicles. 
National vehicle age distributions that would result from a uniform national tax 
policy further illustrate the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on fleet age in Figure 
3.7.  If all states were to impose some form of a motor vehicle wealth tax, the model 
simulates a national vehicle age distribution that is represented by the solid black line.  
On the other hand, if all forms of the wealth tax used across states were removed, the 
model simulates a national vehicle age distribution that is represented by the broken gray 
line.  Differences between these distributions run counter to the hypothesis proposed by 
this analysis.  Interestingly, under a uniform wealth tax policy a slightly larger fraction of 
vehicles would be brand new even though their owners would pay higher taxes relative to 
vehicles of other ages.  However, the magnitude of this difference as well as those for the 
first 10 age groups is rather modest.  The largest differences occur between the ages of 10 
and 16 and the 25 plus age group.  Vehicles are much more likely to be between the ages 
of 10 and 16 under a national wealth tax policy.  The fraction of vehicles that are 15 years 
of age under the wealth tax policy is nearly 8 percent larger than the fraction of vehicles 
of this age under the no wealth tax policy.  Moving from no tax to a wealth tax policy 
would also increase the fraction of vehicles that are 13, 14, or 16 years of age by 6 
percent respectively.  However such a move would decrease the fraction of vehicles in 
the older age categories.  The magnitudes of these differences are quite a bit smaller with 
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the exception of vehicles that are 25 years old or older.   A uniform policy to tax vehicles 
would result in a fraction of vehicles in this age group that is 16 percent smaller than the 
fraction that would result from a no tax policy.  This result is interesting in that it 
suggests that the average age of vehicles in the nation might possibly increase if states 
removed their wealth taxes.  Given this information, the effects of a move from a uniform 
wealth tax policy to a no tax policy (or vice versa) on emission levels remain ambiguous.  
Although the fraction of vehicles in older age groups increases under a no tax policy, 
emissions may not necessarily increase as these vehicles tend to be driven less often than 
are newer vehicles.  Thus emission levels may be higher under the presence of the tax 
given the larger fraction of vehicles between the ages of 10 and 16.  
Relative Risk Ratios 
As mentioned above it is often useful to present relative risk ratios to assess the 
magnitudes of the effects of the independent variables due to the limitations of the 
discrete change calculations.  Table 3.6 reports the relative risk ratios for the independent 
variables included in the model calculated using equations 3.8 and 3.9 and new vehicles 
as the reference outcome.32  The first line of this table presents the results for the wealth 
tax dummy variable.  A value greater than one indicates that the relative risk of the 
respective age outcome versus a new vehicle is greater in the presence of a wealth tax and 
vice versa.  For example, with a value of 0.96, the relative risk of a vehicle being two 
years old versus brand new is lower in wealth tax states than in non-wealth-tax states.  In 
                                                          
32 The relative risk ratio results differ based on the reference group chosen.  Thus there are 25 sets of 
different results that exist for this analysis.  However, for the purposes of this analysis, new vehicles are 
likely the better reference group.  Due to the rapid depreciation of vehicles in the first year, the wealth tax 
is likely to have its largest effect on the purchase of new vehicles relative to other vehicles and emissions 
for new vehicles are much smaller relative to emissions of vehicle of other ages.  
 62
other words, vehicles in wealth tax states have a higher probability of being brand new 
verses being two years old than do vehicles in non-wealth-tax states.  In fact, the presence 
of a motor vehicle wealth tax decreases the odds of vehicle age outcomes two through 
nine and eleven relative to a new vehicle, which certainly contradicts the hypothesis of 
this analysis.  However, the results indicate that the risk of outcomes 12 through 16 
relative to new vehicles is higher in wealth tax states, which provides some support for 
the main hypothesis.  Statistical significance of the coefficient on the wealth tax dummy 
for each of these age outcomes suggests that these relative risk ratios are statistically 
significantly different from one; however, these values have little economic significance.  
The odds that a vehicle is 15 years of age relative to one year of age are 1.05 times 
greater in wealth tax states, all else constant.  Thus if the ratio of 15-year-old vehicles to 
one-year-old vehicles is 0.1 in non-wealth-tax states, this ratio would have a value of only 
0.105 in wealth tax states.  Interestingly, vehicles in wealth tax states have a lower risk of 
being in the oldest age groups relative to the risk of being a new vehicle.  Given that 
wealth taxes are phased out entirely or reach their minima well before the age of 18, this 
result is certainly surprising.  It may perhaps suggest that a variable that affects the 
distribution of vehicles in older age groups and that is correlated with motor vehicle 
wealth taxes has been excluded from the analysis. The statistical significance of the 
relative risk ratios mirrors that of the coefficient estimates.  Since the coefficient on the 
wealth tax dummy fails to be statistically significantly different from zero for outcome 
ten, the corresponding relative risk ratio is not statistically different from 1. 
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Changes in average gas prices and the percent of the state’s population that is 
between the ages of 15 and 21 have the largest effects on the odds ratios reported in 
Table 3.6.  If the average gas price were to increase by one dollar (which would represent 
a very large increase), the odds of a vehicle being brand new versus being two years of 
age would change by a factor of 0.77.  Thus the probability that a vehicle is brand new 
would increase relative to the probability that the vehicle is two years of age.  The 
decreasing relative risk ratios across age outcomes suggest that increasing average gas 
prices increase the probability of a new vehicle versus an older vehicle at an increasing 
rate.  Thus, increases in average gas prices would result in older, higher polluting 
vehicles being traded in for new vehicles.  Increasing a state’s 15 to 21 year old 
population increases the odds ratios of vehicles of all ages relative to new vehicles.  The 
largest effect occurs for 14 and 15-year-old vehicles.  If a state’s young driver population 
were to increase by one percentage point the odds of 14 to one-year-old vehicles and 
odds of 15 to one-year-old vehicles would increase by a factor of 1.57.  These results 
indicate that states with larger percentages of residents between the ages of 15 and 21 
have vehicle age distributions that are skewed towards older vehicles, all else constant. 
Relative risk ratios allow for the quick identification of variables that have little or 
no economically significant effects on vehicle age distributions.  A relative risk ratio with 
a value of one indicates that changes in the independent variable would have no effect on 
the odds of the two outcomes.  Thus even a quick glance at Table 3.6 identifies 
inspection/maintenance programs and per capita public transportation trips as variables 
with no economic effects on vehicle age.  Other variables, such as race, education, home 
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ownership rates, MSA residency and total miles driven by households, have very little 
effect on vehicle age distributions as their respective relative risk ratio values deviate 
only slightly from one.   
Discrete Changes in Probabilities 
Table 3.7 contains estimates of the effects of discrete changes in individual 
variables on predicted probabilities calculated using equation 3.5 above.  The first set of 
values in the table gives the discrete change in probabilities as the listed dummy variables 
change from zero to one.   Holding all other variables at their means, the presence of a 
motor vehicle wealth tax actually increases the probability of owning a new vehicle by 
one tenth of a percentage point, a rather small effect yet one that contradicts the main 
hypothesis of this analysis.  The presence of a wealth tax decreases the probability that a 
vehicle is between the ages of 5and 7 and increases the probability that a vehicle is 
between the ages of 9 and 16.  On average the wealth tax has little effect on vehicle age 
distributions as evidenced by the modest value (0.001517) of the average absolute change 
reported in column 1 of this table.  By comparison the remaining dummy variables have 
larger effects on vehicle age than does the wealth tax.  Location in region 9 (Pacific 
West) has the largest average absolute change with a value of 0.0089 percentage points.  
Vehicles located in this region are less likely to be in any of the first 14 age groups than 
are vehicles in the Great Lakes region (region 5, the reference category) holding all other 
variables constant.  In fact, only vehicles in the South and Lower Plains (regions 4 and 6) 
are more likely to be in the first six age groups than are vehicles in region 5. 
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Table 3.7 also shows the effects of a one-unit increase in each of the six variables 
listed.  Of these variables an increase in the average household size has the largest overall 
effect on vehicle age distributions as indicated by the larger value of the average absolute 
change.  Increasing the average household by one additional member would increase the 
fraction of vehicles between the ages of one and four and decrease the fraction of 
vehicles between the ages of 6 and 11.  The effect of average household size is largest on 
the probability of new vehicles, where the expected change of a one-unit increase is 2.4 
percentage points. 
Of the remaining variables in this set of results, median age and average gas price 
have the largest effects.  The average absolute change for a one-unit increase is 0.0025 
for median age and 0.0066 for the average gas price variable.  Increasing the median age 
of residents in a state by one year would slightly increase the fraction of vehicles in the 
older age categories.  As average gas prices increase across a state the demand for more 
fuel-efficient vehicles is expected to increase.  The results reported in Table 3.7 support 
this hypothesis as a one-unit increase in the average gas price shifts the vehicle age 
distribution in favor of newer (and perhaps more fuel-efficient) vehicles. 
An increase in both state and local sales tax rates has little effect on the 
distribution of motor vehicles across age outcomes.  The average absolute change for a 
one-unit increase in each variable is below one-tenth of a percentage point.  Interestingly, 
what little effects do exist appear to be in opposite directions.  A one-unit increase in the 
state sales tax rate increases the probability that vehicles are in each of the first twelve 
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age groups, while an equal increase in the average local sales tax rate in the state 
decreases these probabilities. 
Table 3.7 also reports the discrete change in probabilities of various age outcomes 
resulting from a one-standard-deviation change in the remaining variables used in the 
model.  Of these variables, a change in per capita income has the largest average absolute 
effect on vehicle age distributions with a rather modest value of 0.0054.  However, the 
individual effects across probabilities indicate that increases in per capita income result in 
older vehicle fleets which is certainly counter-intuitive.  The fraction of a state’s 
population that is between the ages of 15 and 21 also has a larger effect than the majority 
of variables in this set.  Increasing the percentage of the population that is in this age 
group decreases the fraction of vehicles between the ages of one and eight years old as 
expected.  The effect is largest for the first three age outcomes, which is also consistent 
with the theory that parents are less likely to purchase newer vehicles for younger drivers.  
As expected, increasing gross state product per capita increases the fraction of vehicles in 
newer age categories; however, the effects are again rather modest. 
Effects of Wealth Taxes on State Vehicle Age Distributions 
The discussion of the results has thus far been limited to an analysis of the effects 
of wealth taxes and other factors on national or hypothetical vehicle age distributions.  Of 
much greater interest and importance are the effects on the age distributions of vehicle 
fleets in individual states.  State and local governments determine motor vehicle wealth 
tax policies and design and implement plans to combat emissions.  Therefore the results 
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of the model should be evaluated at the state level if they are to have any impact on 
policy. 
Figures 3.8 through 3.15 provide vehicle age distributions for six states with the 
most severe ozone problems in the U.S. as classified by the Environmental Protection 
Agency.33 I added Tennessee to this group due to the potential classification of several of 
its metropolitan statistical areas as non-attainment zones in the near future, but mostly for 
the more obvious reason.  I also added Georgia due to recent proposals to remove or 
reduce its motor vehicle wealth tax and its continued air quality concerns in the Atlanta 
MSA.  Included in each figure are three separate vehicle age distributions.  The first is the 
state’s actual vehicle age distribution as determined from the Polk data.  The second is 
the predicted age distribution under the state’s current wealth tax regime (i.e. wealth tax 
or no wealth tax) derived using the coefficients generated by the model and the state’s 
respective values of the independent variables.  The third is the vehicle age distribution 
that results after simulating a change in the wealth tax regime.  Thus each figure 
identifies how well the multinomial logit model performs for individual states and 
identifies the effects of a wealth tax on the state’s vehicle age distribution.  Comparing 
the predicted wealth tax vehicle age distribution to the predicted non-wealth tax age 
distribution identifies the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes, holding all else constant.  
A comparison of actual age distributions would fail to isolate the effects of motor vehicle 
wealth taxes. 
                                                          
33 For a map of non-attainment areas, see the Environmental Protection Agency’s Air Trends report 
available at www.epa.gov/airtrends/non.html.  Several states such as Illinois and Texas had relatively small 
areas that were classified as non-attainment zones in 2002.  However, these states do not have motor 
vehicle wealth taxes and thus could not potentially reduces emissions by removing the tax; therefore, they 
are not highlighted by this analysis. 
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 A comparison of Tennessee’s actual and predicted vehicle age distributions in 
Figure 3.8 reveals that the model fails to perform as well at the state level as it does at the 
national level.  The model over-predicts the fraction of vehicles below the age of 12 and 
under-predicts the fraction of vehicles in older age groups.  However, the magnitudes of 
the differences between the actual and predicted (i.e. status quo) age distributions are 
never more than half of a percentage point and the prediction follows the trends of the 
actual distribution.  The effect on the age of the vehicle fleet of imposing a motor vehicle 
wealth tax in Tennessee is represented by the difference between the status quo age 
distribution and the distribution labeled “Change”.  If Tennessee were to impose an 
annual wealth tax on vehicles, the fraction of vehicles between the ages of 10 and 16 
would increase by nearly a quarter of a percentage point for each age.  This increase is 
countered by a reduction in the fraction of vehicles in the 17 plus age categories.  The 
figure reveals few differences for the remaining age groups.  As before, it is impossible to 
determine the effects of such a change on emissions given that change in tax policy does 
not unilaterally skew the vehicle age distribution in one direction or another. 
California is an interesting case study due to recent discussions in the state 
legislature to further reduce or even remove the wealth tax on motor vehicles in the wake 
of the 1998 reduction in the wealth tax rate.34  Figure 3.9 reveals that the model offers an 
accurate prediction of California’s vehicle age distribution.  A comparison of the status 
quo vehicle age distribution to the distribution that would result if the tax were 
completely removed indicates that very little change would occur in the fraction of 
                                                          
34 In 1998, the state legislature enacted a 25 percent reduction in the motor vehicle wealth tax.  The state 
legislature further reduced the tax in 2000 by implementing a 67.5 percent offset (California State Senate 
Republican Caucus, 2002). 
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vehicles in the first eleven age groups.  Beyond the eleventh age group there are two 
main changes that occur.  First, the fraction of vehicles between the ages of 12 and 16 
would decrease.  The largest decrease, 0.0036 percentage points, would occur for 
vehicles of the age of thirteen.  The overall effect of this reduction on emissions depends 
upon how the vehicle age distribution adjusts to accommodate this change.  The second 
major change that occurs in the age distribution as a result of the removal of the wealth is 
that the fraction of vehicles between the ages of 18 and 25 would increase.  The largest 
increase, 0.0078 percentage points, occurs in the 25 plus age category, which is not 
surprising given the results presented thus far.  The effect of removing the wealth tax on 
emissions remains ambiguous without information on the annual vehicle miles traveled 
for vehicles in these age groups. 
The vehicle age distributions presented in the figures for the remaining six states 
tend to follow some general patterns.35  The model fails to perform as well for the smaller 
states including Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland and Rhode Island.  This is 
presumably due to the fact that these states contain a much smaller fraction of the 
national vehicle fleet.  As a result, the multinomial logit model places less weight on 
these observations; therefore, they have less influence on the parameter estimates.  The 
model performs much better for states that have a larger number of registered vehicles 
(California, Georgia and New Jersey).  For the most part, the vehicle age distributions 
that result from the status quo wealth tax policy and a change in the tax policy are 
                                                          
35 The fact that the vehicle age distributions across these eight states follow the same general pattern is not 
surprising given the method for calculating the fraction of vehicles in each age group.  The only element 
that distinguishes one state’s calculation from another is the use of individual values of the independent 
variables.  Each calculation uses the same coefficients generated by the model. 
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virtually identical for the first ten vehicle age outcomes.  It is not until the eleventh age 
category that the wealth tax policy appears to have any effect.  Wealth tax policies result 
in a larger fraction of vehicles between the ages eleven and sixteen.  A policy of no 
wealth tax appears to result in a larger fraction of vehicles between the ages of 17 and 25 
plus.  In general, however, the magnitudes of the differences between the wealth tax and 
no wealth tax age distributions are rather modest.  It remains to be seen whether these 
modest differences affect emissions and, if so, which is the preferred tax policy in terms 
of air quality. 
Alternative Wealth Tax Specifications 
I re-estimated the baseline multinomial logit model using different measures of 
the wealth tax to test the robustness of the results discussed above.  In the first of these 
models I replace the wealth tax dummy variable with the ratio of the 2001 wealth tax 
liabilities for a new and used representative vehicle.  In the second model the wealth tax 
variable of interest is the difference between the 2001 wealth tax liabilities for a new and 
used representative vehicle.36  Table 3.8 provides a comparison of the coefficients 
generated from these models.  The pattern of statistical significance of the coefficients in 
the wealth tax ratio model is very similar to that of the wealth tax dummy model.  In 
addition to the coefficient for age outcome ten remaining insignificant, the coefficient for 
outcome eight also fails to be statistically significantly different from zero.  However, the 
signs of the coefficients in the ratio model differ from those from the wealth tax dummy 
model across several of the age outcomes.  The pattern of significance for the wealth tax 
                                                          
36 The results reported here are from models that use a 2001 Honda Accord and 1998 Honda Accord as the 
respective new and used vehicles.  The results are robust to the use of a 2001 Ford Taurus and a 1998 Ford 
Taurus as the representative vehicles. 
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difference model is quite different from that of the baseline model.  The coefficients for 
outcomes three, thirteen and fifteen fail to be statistically significant, while the category 
of statistical significance decreases for outcomes two, six and twelve.  Again the signs of 
several of the coefficients from this model differ from those of the baseline model.   
However, Figure 3.16 reveals that these differences as well as differences in the 
magnitudes of the coefficients fail to significantly affect the vehicle age distributions 
generated by these models.  The resulting vehicle age distributions from all three models 
are for all practical purposes identical to one another.  
As mentioned above, there are a variety of methods that could be employed to 
interpret the results of these additional multinomial logit models.  However, plotting 
predicted probabilities generated from the results of the model is perhaps the most 
effective.  The effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on vehicle age distributions are 
easily identified by simulating the effects of a complete removal of the tax on fleet age.  
Figure 3.17 shows the results of this simulation for the wealth tax ratio model.  The solid 
black line in this figure represents the vehicle age distribution that I generated using the 
coefficients of the MNLM and the mean values of the independent variables across 
wealth tax states including the actual mean ratio of wealth tax liabilities in 2001.  The 
broken gray line is the vehicle age distribution that results from simulating the removal of 
the wealth tax.  I also generated it using the coefficients of the model and the mean values 
of the independent variables; however, I set the ratio of wealth tax liabilities equal to one 
in this calculation.  A wealth tax ratio of one indicates that new and used vehicles are 
treated equally by the tax system, which could also be interpreted as a complete removal 
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of the motor vehicle wealth tax.  For the most part these distributions are quite similar to 
one another.  The differences that do exist suggest that removing the wealth tax may even 
slightly increase the average age of a state’s vehicle fleet.  The fraction of vehicles 
between the ages of 1 and 7 is slightly lower after the removal of the wealth tax.  The 
removal of the wealth tax does slightly reduce the fraction of vehicles between the ages 
of 11 and 15 which would reduce emissions and improve air quality, all else constant.  
However, due to the nature of probabilities these reductions must translate into increases 
in some portion of the age distribution.  These increases take place between the ages of 
17 and 25.  As a whole, little emphasis should be placed on the shifts in the vehicle age 
distribution in wealth tax states that takes place due to the elimination of the tax as the 
average absolute difference between the two distributions across age outcomes is only 
0.0015.  Thus, on average the difference between these distributions is less than two 
tenths of a percentage point at any position along the distribution. 
Figure 3.18 presents the results of a similar comparison generated from 
simulations using the coefficients estimated by the MNLM that includes the difference in 
wealth tax liabilities as the policy measure.  Here the broken gray line represents the 
vehicle age distribution that would result if tax policies were changed such that the 
difference between the tax liabilities of a new and used vehicle was equal to zero, or in 
other words a repeal of the wealth tax.  The solid black line represents the distribution 
that results given the average tax liability difference in 2001.  The average absolute 
difference between these distributions is 0.0013, which again suggests that motor vehicle 
wealth taxes have little effect on vehicle age distributions. 
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Conclusions Regarding the Effects of Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes on Vehicle Age  
   Distributions 
 
The primary hypothesis that motor vehicle wealth taxes skew vehicle age 
distributions towards older vehicles is not supported by the results from multinomial logit 
models of vehicle age.  The model itself is a relatively good predictor of vehicle age 
distributions and includes many parameters that are highly statistically significant.  
Although the coefficient on the wealth tax dummy variable is highly statistically 
significant in the model, this statistical significance does not translate into economic 
significance.  On average the wealth tax has little effect on vehicle age distributions as 
evidenced by a modest value of the average absolute discrete change.  A comparison of 
predicted vehicle age distributions reveals only a few slight differences for wealth tax 
states and non-wealth-tax states.  A uniform national wealth tax policy would increase the 
fraction of vehicles between the ages of 10 and 16 and decrease the fraction of vehicles in 
older age categories relative to a uniform national policy not to tax vehicles. Overall, the 
magnitudes of these differences are very small and quite possibly do not translate into 
effects for emissions levels.   
Alternative specifications of the motor vehicle wealth tax measure suggest that 
the conclusions of the baseline model are robust.  These alternative specifications replace 
the motor vehicle wealth tax dummy variable with continuous measures of wealth tax 
liabilities that better reflect the dynamic structure of motor vehicle wealth taxes.  
Predicted vehicle age distributions that result from these additional models are nearly 
identical to the vehicle age distribution generated by the baseline model.  Simulating the 
effects of a complete removal of the wealth tax in these models reveals only modest 
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changes in vehicle age distributions.  Once again, the largest effects occur for vehicles in 
the oldest age categories. 
Results of separate state-level analyses echo the conclusions of the national 
model.  Simulations of vehicle age distributions in states with extreme ozone problems 
reveal that changes to motor vehicle wealth tax policies are unlikely to be solutions to 
their emissions problems.  States that decide to repeal their motor vehicle wealth taxes 
might see a slight decrease in the fraction of middle-aged vehicles but also a slight 
increase in the fraction of vehicles in the oldest age categories.  Further analysis is 
necessary to determine whether these slight changes affect emissions.  The direction of 
any such effect may very well depend on the distribution of vehicle miles traveled across 
vehicle age categories.  
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Chapter 4  
Effects of Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes on Emissions 
 
Introduction to the Emissions Analysis 
 The results of the previous chapter suggest that motor vehicle wealth taxes have 
two distinct effects on vehicle age distributions.  First, the presence of a motor vehicle 
wealth tax increases the fraction of vehicles that are between the ages of 10 and 16.  This 
effect increases emissions, all else constant, as vehicles in these age categories pollute 
more than newer vehicles.  However, states with motor vehicle wealth taxes are also 
likely to have smaller fractions of vehicles in the oldest age categories.  This results in 
lower emissions, all else constant, as vehicles in these age categories are the dirtiest in the 
fleet.  To the extent that vehicles between the ages of 17 and 25 pollute more than 
middle-aged vehicles, these results imply that emissions may actually be lower and air 
quality better in states with a motor vehicle wealth tax.  However, this conclusion fails to 
take into consideration the fact that older vehicles tend to be driven less often. The 
distribution of vehicle miles traveled across age categories may be a key determinant in 
estimating the effects of wealth taxes on emissions.  If vehicles between the ages of 10 
and 16 are driven more often than are older vehicles, emission levels would be higher in 
wealth tax states as a result of the increase in the fraction of vehicles in these age 
categories.  
 Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of average annual miles traveled by vehicles in 
various age categories.  The results presented in this figure represent an average of the 
total annual miles households in the 2001 National Household Transportation Survey 
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reported for their automobiles.37  On average, households drive brand-new vehicles 
roughly 14,000 miles in the first year.  Annual vehicle miles traveled then declines 
steadily with vehicle age.  Vehicles between the ages of 10 and 16 are driven nearly 
8,000 miles per year, while vehicles in older age categories are driven only 5,000 miles 
per year on average.38  Thus, overall emissions in motor vehicle wealth tax states may 
increase as households drive vehicles between the ages of 10 and 16 more miles each 
year than they drive older vehicles.  However, the overall effect is still ambiguous and 
further analysis is necessary to determine whether the rather modest differences between 
vehicle age distributions in wealth tax and non-wealth tax states affect emissions. 
 The objective of this portion of the analysis is to identify how motor vehicle 
wealth taxes affect emissions.  I use the MOBILE6 emissions model i to estimate 
emission factors for three criteria pollutants (hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and 
nitrogen oxide) using various vehicle age distributions generated from the results of the 
previous chapter.  I then compare emission factors that result from various wealth tax 
scenarios to identify the effects of wealth taxes on emissions.  As in Chapter 3, I also 
conduct a state-level analysis to identify the potential effects of changes in state motor 
vehicle wealth tax policies on emissions levels. 
MOBILE6 Emissions Model 
 MOBILE6 is a software application program designed by the Environmental 
Protection Agency to provide estimates of emissions from mobile sources.  This model 
                                                          
37 Mini-vans, SUVs and trucks were excluded from these calculations so that the results would correspond 
to the types of vehicles used in the Polk analysis. 
38 Pickrell and Schimck (1998) provide evidence from the 1995 National Personal Transportation Survey 
that older vehicles are driven fewer miles in a year. 
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represents the state of the art in emissions models.  State and local regional planning 
agencies use it to develop mobile source emission control strategies, improve 
transportation planning and develop environmental impact statements.  The model is 
capable of calculating average emission factors for three main criteria pollutants: 
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides for calendar years between 1952 
and 2050.39  The model’s inputs include travel indicators such as vehicle age 
distributions, mileage accumulation rates, vehicle miles traveled, fuel volatility, and 
climate conditions as well as other factors that affect emissions.  National default values 
are available for a large majority of these factors which simplify the task of estimating 
emissions.  At a minimum the user must supply the year, minimum and maximum daily 
temperatures, and a fuel volatility measure. 
Replacing the national default values with information that better describes local 
conditions generates more precise estimates of local emissions.  For example, the model 
is capable of using vehicle age distributions that reflect the status of motor vehicle wealth 
tax policies.  Inserting commands that give the fraction of vehicles in each of twenty-five 
age categories allows for the calculation of emissions for specific vehicle age 
distributions.  Vehicle age is calculated according to the following equation:  
age=calendar year – model year +1.40  The final age category consists of all vehicles that 
are 25 years of age or older.  The model uses decimals to represent vehicle age fractions 
for each of the 25 model years.  Thus, the sum of the 25 values must equal 1.0. 
                                                          
39 Mobile6 is also capable of providing estimates of carbon dioxide; however, the EPA admits that the 
calculations are rather simplistic.  Thus, these results are not reported here. 
40 This is the same age calculation that is used in the analysis of the Polk data. 
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The output of the model reports emission rates for each pollutant in grams of 
pollutant per vehicle mile traveled.  Multiplying these results by estimates of total vehicle 
miles traveled provides estimates of total emissions for each pollutant.  MOBILE6 is 
capable of providing emission factors for 16 different vehicle classes based on vehicle 
type, weight and fuel class.  However, the vehicle age distributions generated in the Polk 
analysis are limited to passenger vehicles; therefore, the emissions factors presented in 
this analysis are limited to light-duty gasoline vehicles.41  
Comparing the emission factors generated by models that use different vehicle 
age distributions identifies the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on emissions.  
Therefore, it is essential that all other inputs are identical across models in order to isolate 
the effects of wealth taxes.  Such a comparison demands that even the minimum required 
inputs be the same for models whose results are being compared.  All models used in this 
analysis estimate emission factors for July of 2001.  The minimum temperature is set to 
64o F and the maximum is set to 92o F.  A fuel volatility measure of 7.0 psi is used in 
each of the models. These assumptions are nearly identical to those used in Miller et al. 
(2002) to model the effects of county-level vehicle age distributions on emission factors.  
Again, the model estimates more accurate emission factors if local values of the inputs 
are used.  However, the primary objective of this analysis is not to model emissions as 
accurately as possible but to identify the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes.  To 
achieve this objective, the most straightforward course of action is to use national default 
                                                          
41 Further details on the structure and use of the MOBILE6 emissions model can be obtained from the 
User’s Guide to Mobile 6.1 and Mobile 6.2 available at www.epa.gov/otaq/models/mobile6/420r03010.pdf. 
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values for all input parameters. The only feature that distinguishes one model from 
another is a unique vehicle age distribution.42 
MOBILE6 Results 
 Table 4.1 provides estimates of emission factors in grams per mile traveled by 
pollutant type for various scenarios modeled by MOBILE6.  The first set of results 
reports emission factors for two national vehicle fleet scenarios.  The first column reports 
results from a scenario that uses the actual vehicle age distribution provided by the Polk 
data to model emission factors.  The results indicate that on average a light-duty gasoline 
vehicle fleet with this particular age distribution would emit 2.00 grams of hydrocarbons 
(measured here as volatile organic compounds) per vehicle mile traveled.  The emission 
factors for carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide are 20.55 and 1.41 grams per vehicle 
mile traveled respectively.  The second column reports results from a scenario that uses 
the national vehicle age distribution predicted by the multinomial logit model to estimate 
emission factors.  The predicted vehicle age distribution is slightly skewed in favor of 
older vehicles relative to the actual age distribution, which results in higher emission 
factors for each of the pollutants.  However, the differences in the emission factors 
between the two scenarios are rather modest.  The third column presents the difference as 
a percentage of the emission factors from the actual vehicle age distribution scenario. 
Emission factors from the predicted age distribution are never more than 6.2 percent 
larger than the emission factors from the actual age distribution. 
 The remaining sets of results in Table 4.1 report similar estimates by motor 
vehicle wealth tax status.  The emissions model generates emission factors using average 
                                                          
42 The MOBILE6 input files I used to generate the results of this analysis are included in Appendix D. 
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actual and predicted vehicle age distributions for wealth tax and non-wealth tax states.  
The percent error column indicates that the difference between actual and predicted 
emission factors is a smaller percentage of the actual emission factors in wealth tax states 
than in non-wealth tax states.  Although the magnitudes of the errors in the emission 
factor estimates differ based on wealth tax status, the general patterns are the same. The 
largest error in the calculation of emission factors occurs for hydrocarbons in both wealth 
tax and non-wealth tax states, while nitrogen oxide emission factors have the smallest 
error.   
The differences in both actual and predicted emission factors suggest that on 
average wealth tax states have slightly higher emission factors for each criteria pollutant.  
The largest difference occurs in the emission factors for carbon monoxide.  Wealth tax 
states have a predicted carbon monoxide emission factor of 21.62 g/mile traveled, while 
the estimate for non-wealth tax states is 21.53 g/mile traveled.  However, the difference 
of 0.09 is extremely small and represents less than 0.5 percent of the emission factor for 
non-wealth tax states.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the difference is well within the 
error range of the carbon monoxide emission factor estimate for both wealth tax and non-
wealth tax states.  The differences for the hydrocarbon and nitrogen oxide emission 
factors are equally as small.  
 The final set of results in Table 4.1 is perhaps the most interesting.  The results 
reported in this portion of the table compare emission factors generated under a national 
motor vehicle wealth tax policy to the emission factors generated under a national policy 
of no wealth tax.  The vehicle age distributions used in these scenarios hold other factors 
 81
that affect vehicle age constant.  Thus, these results isolate the effects of motor vehicle 
wealth taxes on emissions.  Interestingly, the emission factors for each of the criteria 
pollutants is lower under a national wealth tax policy, which suggests that wealth taxes 
may actually improve air quality.  Recall that a national wealth tax policy would slightly 
increase the fraction of vehicles between the ages of 10 and 16 and slightly decrease the 
fraction of vehicles in the older age categories relative to the vehicle age distribution 
under a uniform no wealth tax policy.  Although households drive older vehicles less 
often, this slight shift in the age distribution decreases emissions factors.  However, the 
magnitudes of the differences between the emission factors under these policies are rather 
modest.  In fact, the difference as a percentage of the non-wealth tax policy emission 
factors are lower than the percent errors reported for non-wealth tax states.  Thus, the 
effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on emissions identified here are well within the 
model’s range of error. 
Table 4.2 provides results from the MOBILE6 emissions model for individual 
states.  The vehicle age distributions for each respective state shown in Figures 3.8 
through 3.15 were used in separate scenarios of the emissions model.  The first column of 
the table provides the emission factors for the criteria pollutants generated using each 
state’s actual vehicle age distribution provided by the Polk data.  The second column 
presents emission factors generated using each state’s predicted vehicle age distribution 
from the multinomial logit model.  Overall, the predicted emission factors are very 
similar to the actual emission factors.  Column three of this table presents the difference 
as a percent of the actual emission factor.  The difference is never larger than 8.1 percent 
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of the actual emission factor.  Notice the predictions are more accurate for California, 
Georgia and Massachusetts.   
Column 4 of Table 4.2 provides estimates of emission factors that result from 
simulating the effects of changes in each states’ status quo wealth tax policy on its 
vehicle age distribution.  For example the model predicts that emission factors for all 
three criteria pollutants would slightly increase if Tennessee were to impose a wealth tax 
on motor vehicles.  However, these differences are rather modest; in fact, the differences 
as a percentage of the predicted emission factor are less than the model’s error.  A change 
in California would imply a removal of its motor vehicle wealth tax and would increase 
emission factors by a modest amount.  The increase in the emission factor for 
hydrocarbons represents only 5 percent of the predicted emission factor, while the 
increases for the other pollutants are even smaller.  The simulations predict similar trends 
for the remaining six states.  The effects of a change in the wealth tax policy on emission 
factors are rather modest.  For a majority of the states the change in emission factors as a 
percent of their predicted values is less than the expected error of the model.43 
Conclusions Regarding the Effects of Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes on Emissions 
 The results of scenarios estimated by the MOBILE6 emissions model suggest that 
the slight differences that exist between vehicle age distributions by wealth tax status 
have virtually no effect on emissions.  Emission factors for hydrocarbons, carbon 
monoxide, and nitrogen oxide that correspond to a national motor vehicle wealth tax 
policy are nearly identical to those associated with a national policy of no motor vehicle 
                                                          
43 The complete MOBILE6 output file for this analysis appears in Appendix E. 
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wealth tax.  The slight differences that do exist were less than 4.7 percent of the emission 
factors resulting from either policy. 
  State-level simulations reveal that adjustments to motor vehicle wealth tax 
policies are unlikely to be viable substitutes or even complements to existing emissions 
control strategies.  A comparison of emission factors corresponding to the status quo 
wealth tax policy to those corresponding to a change in the wealth tax policy revealed 
only small differences.  Moreover, in most cases these differences were smaller in 
magnitude than the differences between the emission factors generated from actual 
vehicle age distributions and emission factors generated from predicted age distributions. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Caveats and Directions for Future Research 
 
General Conclusions 
 
 This analysis is perhaps the first to model the effects of motor vehicle wealth 
taxes on household vehicle purchase decisions, state vehicle age distributions and 
emissions and air quality.  My primary hypothesis is that the use of motor vehicle wealth 
taxes skews state vehicle age distributions towards older vehicles as households have the 
incentive to delay the purchase of a new vehicle or to enter the used vehicle market, thus 
increasing emissions from mobile sources.  As hypothesized, motor vehicle wealth taxes 
have a statistically significant and negative, yet somewhat modest, effect on household 
vehicle purchase decisions.  Marginal effects from a probit model of 2001 vehicle 
purchase decisions indicate that households are not only responsive to the presence of a 
motor vehicle wealth tax but also respond to the relative tax treatments of new versus 
used vehicles.   
Specifically, the presence of a motor vehicle wealth tax decreases the probability 
that a household purchases a vehicle by nearly 4.6 percent.  Although the marginal effect 
for the wealth tax ratio variable is highly statistically significant, the magnitude of effect 
is rather modest.  A one-percent increase in the ratio of the present value of a ten-year 
stream of tax liabilities of a new versus used vehicle would decrease the probability that a 
vehicle is purchased by only 0.10 percent.  These results are fairly robust to various 
specifications of the model and to the use of an alternative representative vehicle, which 
lends further support to the conclusion that motor vehicle wealth taxes affect the timing 
of vehicle purchases.  However, the hypothesis that households in motor vehicle wealth 
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tax states purchase older vehicles to avoid higher tax liabilities is not supported by the 
results of the analysis.  All three wealth tax measures fail to be statistically significant in 
the baseline multivariate regression model of vehicle age, as well as all alternative 
specifications of the model.  Thus, once a household has decided to purchase a vehicle 
neither the presence of a motor vehicle wealth tax nor the relative tax treatments of new 
versus used vehicles affects its choice of vehicle age. 
Contrary to my hypothesis that vehicle age distributions in states with motor 
vehicle wealth taxes would be skewed towards older vehicles, motor vehicle wealth taxes 
appear to have only a modest effect on state vehicle age distributions.  My analysis of the 
vehicle registration data from R.L. Polk and Company in Chapter 3 allows for states’ 
entire vehicle age distributions to be examined; whereas, my analysis in Chapter 2 only 
studies recently purchased vehicles.  Although the household analysis predicts that 
households living in motor vehicle wealth tax states are likely to delay the purchase of a 
new vehicle, which could theoretically impact vehicle age distributions over time, this 
effect appears to have little impact on fleet age.   
Many of the coefficients from the multinomial logit model are highly statistically 
significant, including those for each of the wealth tax measures.  However, this statistical 
significance does not translate into economic significance.  A comparison of predicted 
vehicle age distributions for wealth tax and non-wealth tax states reveals only slight 
differences.  Simulations of vehicle age distributions for various wealth tax regimes 
suggest that a complete removal of the motor vehicle wealth tax would lead to a slight 
decrease in the fraction of vehicles between the ages of 10 and 16 and an increase in the 
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fraction of older vehicles.  The results of separate state-level analyses echo the 
conclusions of the national model, suggesting that states cannot significantly affect the 
age of their fleets by adjusting motor vehicle wealth tax policies. 
 Results from the MOBILE6 emissions model suggest that the slight shift in the 
average vehicle age distribution that would result from the removal of the motor vehicle 
wealth tax would have virtually no impact on emissions.  The vehicle age distributions 
that would result if all states were to impose a motor vehicle wealth tax generate nearly 
identical emission factors for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxide as 
vehicle age distributions that would result if no state had a motor vehicle wealth tax.  The 
results of state-level simulations reveal that adjustments to motor vehicle wealth tax 
policies are unlikely to be viable substitutes or even complements to existing emissions 
control strategies.  The good news is that the results of this analysis suggest that states 
that impose a motor vehicle wealth tax are not faced with unintended environmental 
consequences stemming from the economic incentives associated with the tax that 
encourages households to keep older vehicles. 
Caveats and Directions for Future Research 
 In this analysis, I have focused on identifying the potential effects of motor 
vehicle wealth taxes on fleet turnover that may affect emissions and air quality.  
Although the results of this analysis provide strong support for the conclusion that wealth 
taxes do not affect vehicle age, these taxes may very well affect other vehicle 
consumption decisions that may have environmental consequences.  Therefore, future 
research should consider the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes on other household 
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vehicle consumption decisions.  Specifically, the presence of a motor vehicle wealth tax 
may affect households’ vehicle ownership levels (i.e. the number of vehicles owned by 
the household).  Such a tax effectively raises the cost of owning vehicles and thus may 
discourage households from owning multiple vehicles.  Obviously, the fewer vehicles 
there are on the road the lower the pollution levels, all else constant.  Therefore, to the 
extent that motor vehicle wealth taxes decrease the size of vehicle stocks they may also 
be beneficial to the environment.   
An analysis of the effects of wealth taxes on households’ vehicle ownership 
decisions is beyond the intended scope of my analysis but could be completed in future 
research.  The 2001 National Household Travel Survey contains a wealth of information 
on individual households’ vehicle stocks (including a count of vehicles owned by the 
household) that could be used with several econometric approaches to model vehicle 
ownership levels.  Perhaps the most common econometric method used for modeling 
vehicle ownership is the multinomial logit model.44  A second possible econometric 
approach would be either a poisson or negative binomial model, where the dependent 
variable in the model represents a count of the vehicles owned by the individual 
household.  Of course, an analysis of the effect of wealth taxes on aggregate state vehicle 
stocks would also be required.   
If motor vehicle wealth taxes are found to have statistically and economically 
significant effects on vehicle stocks, a further investigation would be required to 
determine how this result affects annual vehicle miles traveled and thus emissions and air 
quality.  Although motor vehicle wealth taxes may reduce the number of vehicles owned 
                                                          
44 For examples see Johnson (1978) and Manski & Sherman (1980). 
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by households, if the annual vehicle miles traveled for these households is similar to 
those with a larger number of vehicles there would be no environmental benefits. 
 Motor vehicle wealth taxes may also affect the types of vehicles households 
choose to purchase, all else constant.  Households may be less likely to select the more 
expensive (often less fuel-efficient) luxury and sports utility vehicles given that their tax 
liability would be a function of the value of the vehicle.  Therefore, to the extent that 
wealth taxes encourage households to purchase smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles, they 
may offer positive environmental externalities.  I could also test this hypothesis using the 
data from the National Household Travel Survey.  The data set includes a variable that 
classifies each of the vehicles owned by the household into one of several vehicle types, 
including automobile, van, sports utility vehicle, and pickup truck.  However, the data 
also include information on the make and model of each vehicle, which would allow for a 
reclassification of vehicles, based on fuel efficiency rates if so desired.   
In future research, I could use the multinomial logit model to examine the effects 
of motor vehicle wealth taxes on household vehicle type decisions.  This model might 
include variables that describe the characteristics of the household and respective vehicle 
types.  Alternative-specific variables might include the average carrying capacity, engine 
displacement or fuel-efficiency of the average vehicle in each category.  Such a model 
would have characteristics of both a multinomial logit model and a conditional logit 
model as it would include both individual-specific and alternative-specific variables.  A 
mixed model, as described by Long and Freese (2001, p.243), would allow for the use of 
characteristics of the vehicle type and the characteristics of the household.  
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In future research, I could also explore a joint estimation of households’ vehicle 
ownership, type and vehicle age decisions.  The nested logit model would be the perfect 
candidate for the estimation procedure used by such an analysis.  For example, I could 
estimate a nested logit model to examine the distribution of vehicles across types 
conditioned on the number of vehicles in the household’s stock.  In fact, these household 
vehicle consumption decisions could be paired and modeled using several different 
methods.  
  A panel data set would be ideal for future research, as it would allow for a 
survival analysis of household vehicle holdings, as well as many other ideas.  Households 
in motor vehicle wealth tax states are expected to hold on to their current vehicles longer 
to avoid higher tax liabilities, all else constant.  A survival analysis would be useful for 
modeling the effects of wealth taxes on the probability that a household purchases a new 
vehicle at various points in time.  Although the National Household Travel Survey is 
conducted roughly every five years, it does not represent a true panel data set as a new 
random sample of households is drawn for each survey.45  Panel data techniques could 
also be used to model state vehicle age distributions if multiple years of vehicle 
registration data were available.  Such an analysis would allow me to take advantage of 
recent changes in motor vehicle wealth tax provisions in several states that have occurred 
in recent years to identify the effects of the wealth taxes on vehicle age distributions.  
However, the cost of acquiring vehicle registration data from R.L. Polk & Company 
currently prevents an analysis of even a short panel that spans two or three years. 
                                                          
45 Prior to 2001, the National Household Travel Survey was referred to as the National Personal 
Transportation Survey. 
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 In future research, I might explore the effects of motor vehicle wealth taxes in a 
transactions model.  Unfortunately, the National Household Travel Survey does not 
include detailed data on the transactions of motor vehicles.  The data allow for the 
identification of households that purchased a vehicle in 2001; however, there is no 
information that indicates whether the acquisition represents a trade-in or an addition to 
the households’ vehicle fleet.  This information would be useful as households in wealth 
tax states are probably less likely to make additions to their vehicle stocks and may even 
trade in newer vehicles for older ones to reduce their tax liabilities.  To complete such an 
analysis, I will need to search for additional data as all data sets involving vehicle 
transactions discovered thus far lack the state-level variation that would be required to 
identify the effects of wealth taxes. 
  The current analysis also suffers from the exclusion of some information.  In 
particular, households living in Virginia are excluded from the analysis of the NHTS data 
and Virginia and Rhode Island are excluded from the models of vehicle age distributions 
that include the continuous wealth tax measures due to the unavailability of motor vehicle 
wealth tax data.  Wealth taxes in these states have undergone several changes in the past 
several years.  Although information is available on the structure of the tax prior to 2001, 
these data do not accurately reflect the status of the tax as of 2001.  The states were 
excluded only after numerous attempts to contact state officials to obtain the necessary 
information.   
 Recall that light-duty trucks have been excluded from the analysis of vehicle age 
distributions due to an inability to separate non-commercial vehicles from commercial 
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vehicles.  Motor vehicle wealth tax provisions often differ for commercial vehicles.  Thus 
it would be inappropriate to include them in this analysis given the unavailability of 
wealth tax data for commercial vehicles.  The exclusion of these vehicles may have 
biased vehicle age distributions towards older vehicles.  Pickrell and Schmick (1998) 
present evidence from the 1995 National Personal Transportation Survey that indicates 
that light-duty trucks have aged more slowly as a group than passenger vehicles.  This is 
largely due to lower average ages of vans and sports utility vehicles, which appears to 
reflect the increasing substitution of first mini-vans and then sports utility vehicles for 
passenger cars.  It is unclear as to how the exclusion of light-duty trucks might affect the 
results reported for the motor vehicle wealth tax measures.   
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Appendix A: Figures 
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Figure 1.1: States with Motor Vehicle Wealth Taxes in 2001 
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Figure 1.2: Honda Depreciation Schedule 
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Figure 1.3: Taurus Depreciation Schedule 
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Figure 1.4: Federal Emission Standards
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Figure 2.1: Vehicle Age at Purchase by Motor Vehicle Wealth Tax Status 
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Figure 3.1: Actual Vehicle Age Distribution by Wealth Tax Status 
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Figure 3.2: Actual versus Predicted National Vehicle Age Distribution 
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Figure 3.3: Actual versus Predicted Vehicle Age Distribution for Wealth Tax States 
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Figure 3.4: Actual versus Predicted Vehicle Age Distribution for Non-wealth-tax States 
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Figure 3.5: Predicted Vehicle Age Distribution by Wealth Tax Status 
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Figure 3.6: Differences in Predicted Vehicle Age Distributions for Wealth Tax and Non-wealth-tax States 
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Figure 3.7: Predicted Vehicle Age Distribution Under a Uniform Tax Policy Across States 
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Figure 3.8:  Tennessee’s Vehicle Age Distribution 
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Figure 3.9: California’s Vehicle Age Distribution 
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Figure 3.10: Connecticut’s Vehicle Age Distribution 
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Figure 3.11: Georgia’s Vehicle Age Distribution 
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Figure 3.12: Maryland’s Vehicle Age Distribution 
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Figure 3.13: Massachusetts’ Vehicle Age Distribution
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Figure 3.14: New Jersey’s Vehicle Age Distribution 
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Figure 3.15: Rhode Island’s Vehicle Age Distribution 
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Figure 3.16: Vehicle Age Distribution for Wealth Tax States by Wealth Tax Measure 
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Figure 3.17: Effects of Removing the Wealth Tax on Vehicle Age Distributions in Wealth Tax States –Wealth Tax Ratio 
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Figure 3.18: Effects of Removing the Wealth Tax on Vehicle Age Distributions in Wealth Tax States – Wealth Tax Difference 
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Figure 4.1: Average Vehicle Miles Traveled by Vehicle Age 
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Table 1.1: Description of Motor Vehicle Wealth Tax Provisions 
 
 126
State Valuation Method Assessment Ratio Tax rate / Mill rate Minimum tax Other Comments
Alabama NADA Blue Book 15% Ave. = 39.16 mills
Max = 57.91mills
Min = 18.5 mills
Arizona MSRP 60% $28(new), $28.9(used)
Assessed value reduced by for every $1,000 of
16.25 % for each year since assessed value
vehicle was first registered in
the state
Arkansas NADA blue book 20% Ave. = 42.2 mills
Max = 131.173 mills
Min = 36.574 mills
California Purchase price Varies by year of registration 0.65% Assessement ratios start over at 
1- 100%        2- 90 % year one if the vehicle is purchased used
3- 80%          4- 70%
5- 60%          6- 50%
7- 70%          8- 30%
9- 25%         10- 20%
11- 15%        12+ - 15%
Colorado MSRP 85% Year 1 = 2.10 %
Year 2 = 1.50 %
Year 3 = 1.20 %
Year 4 =  0.9 %
Year 5 - 9 = 0.45 %
Year 10 + = $3
Connecticut Average retail 70% Ave. = 24.84 mills
value as determined Max = 62.4 mills
by local assessor Min = 0.27 mills
Georgia Value determined 40% Ave. = 30 mills
by Revenue Max = 48 mills
Commissioner on Min = 0 mills
an annual basis
Indiana Factory delivered 100% The amount of the tax is based on the
price value classification of the vehicle and
the age of the vehicle in accordance with
a schedule  
Table 1.1: Continued 
 
State Valuation Method Assessment Ratio Tax rate / Mill rate Minimum tax Other Comments
Kansas MSRP 85% State = 1.5 mills $24.00 Discount factors that differ
Max combined = 131.173 by vehicle age are applied
Min combined = 36.574 to determine the taxable
value of the vehicle
Kentucky NADA blue book 100% State = 4.5 mills
Ave. local = 9.8 mills
Max local = 11 mills
Min local = 0
Maine MSRP 100% First or current year 24 $5.00
Year 2 - 17.5 mills
Year 3 - 13.5 mills
Year 4 - 10 mills
Year 5 - 6.5 mills
Year 6 + - 4 mills
Mass. MSRP Year prior to manufacture 50% 2.5% $5.00
Year 1 - 90%
Year 2 - 60%
Year 3 - 40%
Year 4 - 25%
Year 5+ - 10%
Michigan List price 100% Year 1 0.5 % of price; All vehicles with model year 1983 and 
Year 2,3 and 4 - equals earlier are taxed based upon vehicle
90% of prior years tax; weight.
Thereafter remains the
same
Minnesota MSRP Year 1 and 2 - 100% $10 plus 1.25 % of No Maximum tax year 1
Year 3 and 4 - 90% assessed value Max for 1st renewal period = $189
Year 5 and 6 - 75% Max tax for subsequent renewal = $99
Year 7 - 60% Minimum tax = $35
Year 8 - 40% Flat tax for vehicles over ten years old=$35
Year 9 - 30%
Year 10 - 10%
Mississippi MSRP Year 1 - 30 % Ave. = 112 mills 5 % of assessed value is deducted if tax 
Year 2 - 23 % is paid on time.
Year 3 - 19 % Minimum assessed value is $100
Year 4 - 15 %
Year 5 - 12 %
Year 6 - 9 % 
Year 7 - 7%
Year 8 - 5%
Year 9 - 4%
Year 10 - 3%  
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Table 1.1: Continued 
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State Valuation Method Assessment Ratio Tax rate / Mill rate Minimum tax Other Comments
Missouri NADA blue book 33.33% Ave. = 59.9 mills
Max = 80 mills
Min = 30 mills
Montana Years 0-4 = $195 Age based fee became effective on
Years 5-10 = $65 January 1, 2001.  In addition counties may
11 years old $6 levy up to a 0.7% tax as a local option
Nebraska MSRP Base tax is set in model year Year 2 90% of base tax Base tax ranges from $1460 for vehicles
Then depreciated every year Year 3- 80% Year 4-70% with values of $78,000 or greater
Year 5- 60% Year 6- 51% to $60 for vehicles with values of $9,999
Year 7-42% Year 8-33% or less
Year 9-24% 10,11-15%
12,13-7% 14+ -0
Nevada MSRP Year 1 - 35% * MSRP 4% $6 Counties may impose a supplemental
Year 2 - 35%*85%*MSRP services tax of not more than 1%
Year 3 - 35%*75%
Year 4 - 35%*55%
Year 5 - 35%*45%
Year 6 - 35%*35%
Year 7 - 35%*25%
Year 8 - 35%*15%
Year 9 - 35%*5%
New Hamp. MSRP Current year - 18 mills $5
Year 2 - 15 mills
Year 3 - 12 mills
Year 4 - 9 mills
Year 5 - 6 mills
Year 6+ - 3 mills
N. Carolina Retail market value 100% Ave. = 10.5 mills
as determined by Max = 19.5 mills
the local county Min = 4.2 mills
assessor
Oklahoma Year 1 - 4 = $91 $21
Year 5 - 8 = $81
Year 9 - 12 = $61
Year 13 - 16 = $41
Year 17 + = $21
S. Carolina NADA blue book 10.50% Ave. = 268 mills (2002) Discounts are allowed for high mileage.
may not exceed
95% of previous
year's value
 
Table 1.1: Continued 
 
State Valuation Method Assessment Ratio Tax rate / Mill rate Minimum tax Other Comments
Utah Less than 3 = $150 Age base fee effective January 1, 1999.
Year 3-5 = $110 Old policy was a 1.5 % fee on fair market
Year 6-8 = $80 value
Year 9-11 = $50
Year 12 + = $10
W. Virginia Amount property 60% Ave. = 26.1 mills
would be worth in
a sale between
a buyer and seller  
 
 129
Table 1.2: Motor Vehicle Wealth Tax Liabilities for the Honda Accord 
 
2001 Honda 1998 Honda Difference Ratio
Accord Accord (01-98) (01/98)
Alabama $704 $510 $194 1.38
Arizona 1,738 1,073 665 1.62
Arkansas 1,011 733 278 1.38
California 724 519 205 1.39
Colorado 1,374 585 789 2.35
Connecticut 2,083 1,509 574 1.38
Georgia 1,450 1,050 400 1.38
Indiana 1,080 444 636 2.43
Kansas 1,365 613 752 2.23
Kentucky 1,713 1,241 472 1.38
Maine 1,850 971 879 1.91
Massachusetts 1,419 572 847 2.48
Michigan 627 477 150 1.31
Minnesota 1,043 629 414 1.66
Mississippi 1,909 636 1,273 3.00
Missouri 2,368 1,716 652 1.38
Montana 1,011 537 474 1.88
Nebraska 1,662 975 687 1.70
Nevada 1,267 604 663 2.10
New Hamshire 1,518 790 728 1.92
North Carolina 1,258 911 347 1.38
Oklahoma 668 583 85 1.15
South Carolina 3,372 2,443 929 1.38
Utah 823 547 276 1.50
West Virginia 1,876 1,359 517 1.38
Wyoming 1,640 1,010 630 1.62
Note:  Tax liabilities represent the present value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities.  
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Table 1.3: Motor Vehicle Wealth Tax Liabilities for the Ford Taurus 
 
2001 Ford 1998 Ford Difference Ratio
Taurus Taurus (01-98) (01/98)
Alabama $342 $187 $155 1.83
Arizona 1,392 823 569 1.69
Arkansas 491 269 222 1.83
California 580 224 356 2.59
Colorado 1,100 450 650 2.44
Connecticut 1,012 554 458 1.83
Georgia 704 386 318 1.82
Indiana 1,080 444 636 2.43
Kansas 753 284 469 2.65
Kentucky 832 456 376 1.82
Maine 1,482 745 737 1.99
Massachusetts 1,136 438 698 2.59
Michigan 502 366 136 1.37
Minnesota 972 609 363 1.60
Mississippi 1,533 499 1,034 3.07
Missouri 1,151 630 521 1.83
Montana 1,011 537 474 1.88
Nebraska 1,271 746 525 1.70
Nevada 1,015 463 552 2.19
New Hamshire 1,216 605 611 2.01
North Carolina 611 335 276 1.82
Oklahoma 668 583 85 1.15
South Carolina 1,638 897 741 1.83
Utah 823 547 276 1.50
West Virginia 912 499 413 1.83
Wyoming 1,313 774 539 1.70
Note:  Tax liabilities represent the present value of a ten-year stream of tax liabilities.  
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Table 2.1: Distribution of NHTS Households Across Various Characteristics 
 
All HHs HHs without HHs with Average vehicle  
Percent a purchase a purchase  purchase age
Motor vehicle wealth tax Yes 49.29 24.95 24.75 5.24
No 50.71 75.05 75.25 5.42
Purchased vehicle Yes 24.81
   in 2001 No 75.19
1 86.26 5.16
Number of vehicles 2 12.22 6.32
   purchased 3 1.21 7.02
4 0.23 8.59
5 0.08 8.40
1 21.70 25.18 11.13 5.12
Household size 2 38.46 39.06 36.63 4.63
3 16.00 14.53 20.46 5.31
4 14.65 13.28 18.80 5.80
5 or more 9.19 7.95 12.98 6.84
Black 7.02 7.48 5.60 6.83
Race of HH respondent White 80.87 80.40 82.28 5.08
Other 12.12 12.12 12.12 6.34
0 - $9,999 7.26 8.45 3.79 10.12
$10,000 - $19,999 11.67 12.77 8.46 8.30
$20,000 - $29,999 13.60 14.41 11.24 7.10
Household income $30,000 - $39,999 13.42 13.53 13.10 6.58
$40,000 - $49,999 11.35 11.12 11.99 5.46
$50,000 - $59,999 9.64 9.34 10.50 4.85
$60,000 - $69,999 7.00 6.64 8.08 4.16
$70,000 - $79,999 6.14 5.71 7.38 4.29
$80,000 or more 19.92 18.03 25.45 3.35
Less than high school graduate 9.37 9.97 7.58 8.44
High school graduate, or GED 30.62 30.47 31.06 5.91
Vocational/technical training 4.08 4.10 4.05 5.75
Education of HH Some college 17.78 17.50 18.59 5.65
   respondent Associate's Degree 7.09 6.79 7.97 5.12
Bachelor's Degree 17.40 17.15 18.15 3.90
Some graduate school 2.30 2.31 2.27 4.15
Professional degree 11.37 11.71 10.33 3.69
College Degree Yes 38.15 37.96 38.72 4.02
No 61.85 62.04 61.28 6.13
17-25 6.27 5.41 8.87 6.67
26-35 15.43 14.39 18.57 5.86
Age of household 36-45 21.11 19.69 25.42 5.76
   respondent 46-55 20.49 19.99 22.02 5.16
56-65 15.31 15.85 13.68 4.50
66 or older 21.39 24.67 11.44 3.82  
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Table 2.1: Continued 
 
All HHs HHs without HHs with Average vehicle  
Percent a purchase a purchase  purchase age
No children 32.86 35.55 32.86 4.88
Household life cycle Youngest child 15 or younger 39.57 29.06 39.57 6.01
Youngest child 21 or younger 9.40 4.61 9.40 6.04
Retired adults 18.17 30.78 18.17 4.32
Own 81.52 77.86 81.52 4.89
Home ownership Rent 18.07 21.72 18.07 7.33
Provided by job or military 0.39 0.33 0.39 6.43
Other 0.02 0.09 0.02 1.00
1 3.79 5.03 0.00 5.95
Number of drivers in HH 2 27.77 31.24 17.25 4.93
3 55.33 53.44 61.05 5.88
4 or more 13.12 10.30 21.70 6.23
0 22.99 26.44 12.54 4.77
Number of workers in HH 1 32.91 34.23 28.91 5.60
2 36.06 33.20 44.72 5.06
3 or more 8.02 6.12 13.83 6.17
Motor vehicle transaction Yes 98.30 98.27 98.39 5.31
   tax No 1.70 1.73 1.61 6.98
Local option transaction Yes 51.58 51.59 51.54 5.10
   tax No 48.42 48.41 48.46 5.55
Trade-in credit Yes 75.84 75.60 76.56 5.30
No 24.16 24.40 23.44 5.29
More than 1 mil, heavy transit 15.66 16.55 12.94 3.99
MSA category More than 1 mil, no transit 40.18 40.03 40.63 4.80
Less than 1 mil 23.80 23.48 24.77 5.75
Not in MSA 20.36 19.93 21.66 6.66
Less than 250,000 7.17 7.08 7.45 5.97
250,000-499,999 8.60 8.50 8.93 5.78
MSA size category 500,000-999,999 8.02 7.90 8.39 5.52
1,000,000-2,999,999 22.63 22.69 22.45 4.92
3 million or more 33.21 33.90 31.11 4.37
Not in MSA 20.36 19.93 21.66 6.66
Public transportation Yes 20.22 20.80 18.47 5.17
   use No 79.78 79.20 81.53 5.37
Other than auto Automobile 5.03
Van 5.61
Less than 5 miles 54.83 57.97 45.30 5.64
Average distance 5 - 9 miles 16.96 16.07 19.65 5.21
   to work 10 -19 miles 17.20 15.92 21.09 4.97
20 or more miles 11.01 10.04 13.95 5.05  
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Table 2.1: Continued 
 
All HHs HHs without HHs with Average vehicle  
Percent a purchase a purchase  purchase age
Less than 4,000 9.08
Estimated annual 4,000-7,999 6.07
   miles 8,000-11,999 4.76
12,000-19,999 3.80
20,000 or more 3.83
1 - 3 years 14.96 14.24 17.37 3.65
Average HH fleet age 4 - 6 years 26.45 27.16 24.11 4.01
7 - 9 years 25.14 25.44 24.14 5.12
10 - 12 years 16.77 16.95 16.17 6.04
13 or more years 16.68 16.22 18.20 7.39
Less than 11,000 34.45 39.74 21.02 6.88
Total HH annual 11,000 - 19,999 24.28 25.05 22.32 4.80
   miles 20,000 - 29,999 20.09 18.29 24.66 4.68
30,000 - 39,999 11.34 9.86 15.08 4.65
40,000 or more 9.84 7.06 16.91 4.67  
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Wealth Tax Measures for All NHTS Households 
 
Number of Standard
Variable observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Motor vehicle wealth 23,278 0.48 0.50 0 1
   tax dummy
2001 Honda Accord 23,278 588.62 750.77 0 3,372
   tax liability
1998 Honda Accord 23,278 380.13 507.2 0 2,443
   tax liability
Ratio (01/98) 23,278 1.29 0.43 1 3
Difference (01-98) 23,278 208.48 285.4 0 1,273
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Table 2.3: Definitions for Variables Used in the Analysis of Household Vehicle Purchase and Age Decisions 
 
Variable
Age Age of the household respondent in years
Average age of HH fleet Average age of the vehicles owned by the household excluding vehicles that were purchased in 2001 and 2002
Ave. distance to work Average distance to work for household workers (in 10s of miles)
Ave. local transaction Average value of the local transaction tax rates imposed by local taxing jurisdictions
    tax rate
College degree Dummy variable indicating that the household respondent received a college degree
Driver count Count of drivers in the household
Estimated miles driven Estimated number of miles the new vehicle will be driven in the first year ( in 1,000 miles)
HH black Dummy variable indicating that the household respondent was black
HH other Dummy variable indicating that the household respondent was not black or white
HH size Count of all household members
Income Income is reported in the NHTS files as a categorical variable.  Households were assigned an income equal to the
mid-point of their respective category
Life cycle 1 Dummy variable indicating that the household members are not retired and have no kids.
Life cycle 2 Dummy variable indicating that the household has a youngest child younger than 16
Life cycle 3 Dummy variable indicating that the household has a youngest child between the ages of 16 and 21
(Used as the reference group in the models)
Life cycle 4 Dummy variable indicating that the household is retired
MSA 1mil +, heavy trans Dummy variable indicating that the household lives in an MSA with a population greater than one million
and a heavy transit system (such as a metro line) (Used as the reference group in the model)
MSA 1mil +, Dummy variable indicating that the household lives in an MSA with a population greater than one million
  no heavy trans but does not have a heavy transit system 
MSA smaller than 1mil. Dummy variable indicating that the household lives in an MSA with a population that is less than one million
Not in MSA Dummy variable indicating that the household does not live in an MSA
Other than auto Dummy variable indicating that at least one of the vehicles the household purchase in 2001 was something
other than an automobile (such as an SUV or truck)
Own home Dummy variable indicating that the household owned its place of residence
Definition
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Table 2.3: Continued 
 
Variable
Public transportation Dummy variable indicating that at least one member of the household has used public transportation at least once in the past
two months
Ratio vehicles to Ratio of vehicles to the number of drivers in the household
   drivers
Ratio vehicles to Ratio of vehicles to the number of workers in the household
   workers
State transaction tax 2001 transaction tax rate in the household's state of residence
    rate
Trade in credit Dummy variable indicating that the state of the household's state of residence allowed the value of trade-in vehicles to be credited
against the sales price of a newly purchased vehicle for purposes of transaction tax calculations
Total annual miles Total miles driven by the household in a year (in 1,000 of miles)
   driven by HH
Wealth tax Dummy variable indicating that the household lived in a state that imposed a wealth tax on motor vehicles in 2001
Wealth tax difference Present value of the ten-year tax liability stream for a new 2001 Accord minus the present value of the
ten-year tax liability stream for a used 1998 Accord (in $100s)
Wealth tax ratio Present value of the ten-year tax liability stream for a new 2001 Accord divided by the present value of the
ten-year tax liability stream for a used 1998 Accord
Worker count Count of household members with jobs
Definition
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Wealth Tax Measures for NHTS Households That  
                       Purchased A Vehicle 
 
Number of Standard
Variable observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Motor vehicle wealth 5,783 0.48 0.50 0 1
   tax dummy
2001 Honda Accord 5,783 597.02 762.85 0 3,372
   tax liability
1998 Honda Accord 5,783 389.37 520.15 0 2,443
   tax liability
Ratio (01/98) 5,783 1.28 0.42 1 3
Difference (01-98) 5,783 207.65 281.77 0 1,273
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Table 2.5: Marginal Effects for the 2001 Vehicle Purchase Decision 
 
Variable 1 2 3
Wealth tax dummy -0.0123**
(0.0062)
Wealth tax ratio -0.0214***
(0.0074)
Wealth tax difference ( in $100s) -0.0017
(0.0011)
HH black -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0012
(0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0134)
HH other -0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0022
(0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0098)
Income (in $1,000s) 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
College degree -0.0274*** -0.0274*** -0.0274***
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Age -0.0030*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Life cycle 1 - no kids -0.0569*** -0.0571*** -0.0569***
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0135)
Life cycle 2 - youngest less than 16 -0.0561*** -0.0561*** -0.056***
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0145)
Life cycle 4 - retired -0.0264* -0.0268* -0.0267*
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160)
Own home -0.0337*** -0.0337*** -0.0335***
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0091)
HH size 0.0113** 0.0112** 0.0112**
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0047)
Worker count 0.0127** 0.0129** 0.0128**
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Ratio vehicles to drivers 0.0983*** 0.098*** 0.0979***
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0058)
State transaction tax rate 0.0020 0.0013 0.0021
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Ave. local transaction tax rate -0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0029
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
MSA 1 mil +, no heavy trans. 0.0307*** 0.03*** 0.0303***
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098)
MSA smaller than 1 mil 0.0429*** 0.0429*** 0.0433***
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0113)
Not in MSA 0.0432*** 0.0432*** 0.0434***
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Public transportation -0.0127 -0.0121 -0.0124
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0082)
Ave. distance to work (in 10s of miles) 0.0075*** 0.0075*** 0.0075***
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Driver Count 0.0688*** 0.0687*** 0.0687***
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0070)
Number of observations 21,253 21,253 21,253
Pseudo R-squared 0.0596 0.0598 0.0595
Predicted probability 0.2531 0.2530 0.2531
Notes:  Marginal effects that are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
            are indicated with a ***, ** and * respectively.
            Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses.
Model
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Table 2.6: First Set of Robustness Checks of the Baseline Vehicle Purchase Model 
 
Variables 1 2 3 1 2 3
Wealth tax dummy -0.0211 -0.0089
(0.0114) (0.0062)
Wealth tax ratio -0.0224 -0.0201
(0.0115) (0.0074)
Wealth tax difference ( in $100s) -0.0034 -0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0011)
HH black -0.0106 -0.0120 -0.0106 -0.0073 -0.0082 -0.0073
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0132)
HH other -0.0275 -0.0276 -0.0278 -0.0048 -0.0053 -0.0055
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0098)
Income (in $1,000s) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
College degree -0.0344 -0.0345 -0.0345 -0.0284 -0.0284 -0.0284
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Age -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Life cycle 1 - no kids -0.0370 -0.0374 -0.0377 -0.0639 -0.0642 -0.0640
(0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134)
Life cycle 2 - youngest less than 16 -0.0222 -0.0222 -0.0227 -0.0609 -0.0610 -0.0608
(0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Life cycle 4 - retired 0.0069 0.0064 0.0059 -0.0293 -0.0297 -0.0295
(0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Own home 0.0039 0.0036 0.0037 -0.0354 -0.0354 -0.0352
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0090)
HH size 0.0043 0.0042 0.0042 0.0122 0.0121 0.0121
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Worker count 0.1411 0.1410 0.1412 0.0146 0.0148 0.0147
(0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Ratio vehicles to drivers 0.1009 0.1009 0.1008 0.0984 0.0982 0.0981
(0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064)
State transaction tax rate 0.0035 0.0041 0.0040 0.0031 0.0022 0.0030
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Ave. local transaction tax rate -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0024
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
MSA 1 mil +, no heavy trans. 0.0068 0.0044 0.0049 0.0269 0.0264 0.0267
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098)
MSA smaller than 1 mil 0.0158 0.0133 0.0142 0.0398 0.0394 0.0402
(0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Not in MSA 0.0131 0.0104 0.0113 0.0416 0.0414 0.0418
(0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0120)
Public transportation -0.0203 -0.0194 -0.0200 -0.0103 -0.0099 -0.0101
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Ave. distance to work (in 10s of miles) -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0075 0.0074 0.0074
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Trade in credit 0.0005 0.0112 0.0126
(0.0134) (0.0114) (0.0113)
Ratio vehicles to workers 0.1423 0.1420 0.1423
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216)
Average age of hh fleet -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Additional Variables 4th Quarter Interview
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Table 2.6: Continued 
 
Variables 1 2 3 1 2 3
Total annual miles driven by HH 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Driver Count 0.0700 0.0701 0.0699 0.0694 0.0693 0.0693
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070)
Sept. 2001 0.1800 0.1801 0.1801
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057)
Number of observations 9,449 9,449 9,449 21,253 21,253 21,253
Pseudo R-squared 0.1595 0.1595 0.1595 0.0948 0.0951 0.0948
Predicted probability 0.2262 0.2262 0.2262 0.2438 0.2438 0.2439
Notes:  Marginal effects that are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in bold type.
             Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses.
Additional Variables 4th Quarter Interview
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Table 2.7: Second Set of Robustness Checks of the Baseline Vehicle Purchase Model 
 
Variables 1 2 3 2 3
Wealth tax dummy -0.0151
(0.0078)
Wealth tax ratio -0.0271 -0.0208
(0.0093) (0.0050)
Wealth tax difference ( in $100s) -0.0027 -0.0035
(0.0014) (0.0013)
HH black 0.0163 0.0152 0.0165 -0.0020 -0.0014
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0133) (0.0133)
HH other -0.0052 -0.0060 -0.0064 0.0013 -0.0014
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0100) (0.0099)
Income (in $1,000s) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
College degree -0.0341 -0.0342 -0.0341 -0.0271 -0.0273
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Age -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0030
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Life cycle 1 - no kids -0.0743 -0.0747 -0.0745 -0.0572 -0.0570
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Life cycle 2 - youngest less than 16 -0.0734 -0.0735 -0.0734 -0.0564 -0.0563
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0146) (0.0147)
Life cycle 4 - retired -0.0587 -0.0594 -0.0594 -0.0265 -0.0267
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0160) (0.0160)
Own home -0.0384 -0.0382 -0.0380 -0.0350 -0.0338
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0090) (0.0090)
HH size 0.0081 0.0080 0.0080 0.0113 0.0113
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Worker count 0.0114 0.0117 0.0116 0.0128 0.0128
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Ratio vehicles to drivers 0.0877 0.0874 0.0872 0.0986 0.0980
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0063) (0.0063)
State transaction tax rate 0.0027 0.0017 0.0024 0.0014 0.0018
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Ave. local transaction tax rate 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0022 -0.0028
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0029)
MSA 1 mil +, no heavy trans. 0.0294 0.0286 0.0291 0.0285 0.0303
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0098) (0.0098)
MSA smaller than 1 mil 0.0433 0.0430 0.0441 0.0400 0.0429
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Not in MSA 0.0431 0.0429 0.0436 0.0400 0.0430
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Public transportation -0.0074 -0.0066 -0.0071 -0.0125 -0.0125
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Ave. distance to work (in 10s of miles) 0.0072 0.0071 0.0071 0.0077 0.0075
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Driver Count 0.0638 0.0637 0.0636 0.0688 0.0687
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0071) (0.0071)
Number of observations 15,007 15,007 15,007 21,253 21,253
Pseudo R-squared 0.0336 0.0339 0.0336 0.0601 0.0597
Predicted probability 0.3127 0.3126 0.3184 0.2529 0.253
Notes:  Marginal effects that are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in bold type.
            Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses.
Ford Taurus
Tax Liabilities
Households w/ two or
More Vehicles
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Table 2.8: OLS Regression Results for Vehicle Age Decision 
 
Variables 1 2 3 2 3
Wealth tax dummy -0.0151
(0.0078)
Wealth tax ratio -0.0271 -0.0208
(0.0093) (0.0050)
Wealth tax difference ( in $100s) -0.0027 -0.0035
(0.0014) (0.0013)
HH black 0.0163 0.0152 0.0165 -0.0020 -0.0014
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0133) (0.0133)
HH other -0.0052 -0.0060 -0.0064 0.0013 -0.0014
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0100) (0.0099)
Income (in $1,000s) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
College degree -0.0341 -0.0342 -0.0341 -0.0271 -0.0273
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Age -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0030
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Life cycle 1 - no kids -0.0743 -0.0747 -0.0745 -0.0572 -0.0570
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Life cycle 2 - youngest less than 16 -0.0734 -0.0735 -0.0734 -0.0564 -0.0563
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0146) (0.0147)
Life cycle 4 - retired -0.0587 -0.0594 -0.0594 -0.0265 -0.0267
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0160) (0.0160)
Own home -0.0384 -0.0382 -0.0380 -0.0350 -0.0338
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0090) (0.0090)
HH size 0.0081 0.0080 0.0080 0.0113 0.0113
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Worker count 0.0114 0.0117 0.0116 0.0128 0.0128
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Ratio vehicles to drivers 0.0877 0.0874 0.0872 0.0986 0.0980
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0063) (0.0063)
State transaction tax rate 0.0027 0.0017 0.0024 0.0014 0.0018
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Ave. local transaction tax rate 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0022 -0.0028
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0029)
MSA 1 mil +, no heavy trans. 0.0294 0.0286 0.0291 0.0285 0.0303
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0098) (0.0098)
MSA smaller than 1 mil 0.0433 0.0430 0.0441 0.0400 0.0429
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Not in MSA 0.0431 0.0429 0.0436 0.0400 0.0430
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Public transportation -0.0074 -0.0066 -0.0071 -0.0125 -0.0125
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Ave. distance to work (in 10s of miles) 0.0072 0.0071 0.0071 0.0077 0.0075
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Driver Count 0.0638 0.0637 0.0636 0.0688 0.0687
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0071) (0.0071)
Number of observations 15,007 15,007 15,007 21,253 21,253
Pseudo R-squared 0.0336 0.0339 0.0336 0.0601 0.0597
Predicted probability 0.3127 0.3126 0.3184 0.2529 0.253
Notes:  Marginal effects that are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in bold type.
            Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses.
Ford Taurus
Tax Liabilities
Households w/ two or
More Vehicles
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Table 2.9: First Set of Robustness Checks of the Vehicle Age Model 
 
Variable 1 2 3 1 2 3
Wealth tax dummy 0.1684 0.1416
(0.2251) (0.1387)
Wealth tax ratio -0.0041 0.1018
(0.2339) (0.1616)
Wealth tax difference ( in $100s) 0.0001 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0002)
HH black 0.7611 0.7672 0.7652 0.8493 0.8562 0.8432
(0.5432) (0.5417) (0.5426) (0.3398) (0.3395) (0.3396)
HH other 0.1655 0.1597 0.1618 0.3845 0.3910 0.3949
(0.3017) (0.3018) (0.3020) (0.2145) (0.2147) (0.2146)
Income (in $1,000s) -0.0293 -0.0292 -0.0292 -0.0385 -0.0385 -0.0385
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
College degree -0.6340 -0.6377 -0.6367 -0.9641 -0.9650 -0.9660
(0.1940) (0.1940) (0.1940) (0.1407) (0.1407) (0.1407)
Age -0.0183 -0.0184 -0.0184 -0.0251 -0.0252 -0.0253
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Life cycle 1 - no kids -0.8039 -0.8046 -0.8031 -1.0688 -1.0676 -1.0633
(0.3500) (0.3499) (0.3502) (0.2649) (0.2647) (0.2649)
Life cycle 2 - youngest less than 16 -0.6659 -0.6699 -0.6686 -1.0645 -1.0663 -1.0624
(0.4083) (0.4078) (0.4079) (0.2789) (0.2787) (0.2789)
Life cycle 4 - retired -1.2088 -1.2120 -1.2084 -1.5359 -1.5313 -1.5231
(0.4669) (0.4672) (0.4676) (0.3359) (0.3361) (0.3362)
Own home -0.8766 -0.8746 -0.8736 -1.5016 -1.5007 -1.5010
(0.3188) (0.3193) (0.3193) (0.2072) (0.2072) (0.2072)
HH size 0.5235 0.5236 0.5238 0.6001 0.6012 0.6015
(0.1555) (0.1557) (0.1556) (0.0919) (0.0919) (0.0918)
Worker count -0.5938 -0.5914 -0.5917 -0.0101 -0.0102 -0.0111
(0.2521) (0.2525) (0.2525) (0.1046) (0.1046) (0.1046)
Ratio vehicles to drivers 1.4059 1.4031 1.4036 1.5768 1.5786 1.5810
(0.3747) (0.3748) (0.3748) (0.1507) (0.1507) (0.1507)
State transaction tax rate 0.2396 0.2041 0.2124 4.0771 3.6564 4.8005
(0.1038) (0.1009) (0.1011) (6.2936) (6.2987) (6.3220)
Ave. local transaction tax rate 0.1946 0.1842 0.1880 9.9706 10.0910 10.3690
(0.0922) (0.0939) (0.0929) (6.4052) (6.4743) (6.4152)
MSA 1 mil +, no heavy trans. 0.8515 0.8869 0.8816 0.7942 0.8069 0.7960
(0.2549) (0.2500) (0.2506) (0.1898) (0.1885) (0.1888)
MSA smaller than 1 mil 1.6522 1.6741 1.6717 1.3741 1.3792 1.3670
(0.3043) (0.3035) (0.3036) (0.2156) (0.2158) (0.2158)
Not in MSA 2.0945 2.1266 2.1215 1.9715 1.9818 1.9667
(0.3419) (0.3403) (0.3405) (0.2401) (0.2400) (0.2399)
Public transportation 0.3565 0.3521 0.3527 0.4397 0.4342 0.4406
(0.2324) (0.2324) (0.2324) (0.1791) (0.1788) (0.1789)
Other than auto -0.9874 -0.9849 -0.9853 -0.7935 -0.7913 -0.7952
(0.1939) (0.1939) (0.1938) (0.1404) (0.1404) (0.1404)
Ave. distance to work (in 10s of miles) -0.0391 -0.0417 -0.0412 -0.1321 -0.1317 -0.1316
(0.0939) (0.0941) (0.0940) (0.0626) (0.0626) (0.0625)
Estimated miles driven (in 1,000s of miles) -0.2118 -0.2118 -0.2117
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169)
Trade in credit 0.2672 0.1699 0.1704
(0.2569) (0.2294) (0.2297)
Ratio vehicles to workers -0.4445 -0.4411 -0.4415
(0.2952) (0.2957) (0.2957)
Average age of hh fleet 0.1746 0.1746 0.1745
(0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0244)
Total annual miles driven by HH 0.0538 0.0540 0.0539
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095)
Purchased in 4th quarter -0.4404 -0.4413 -0.4400
(0.1429) (0.1429) (0.1429)
Constant 4.9637 5.2961 5.2321 6.4852 6.4289 6.4364
(1.1542) (1.1919) (1.1097) (0.6506) (0.7052) (0.6514)
Number of observations 2,505 2,505 2,505 5,656 5,656 5,656
R-squared 0.2564 0.2562 0.2562 0.1719 0.1718 0.1721
Notes:  Coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in bold type.
            Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses.
Additional Variables Purchased in 4th Quarter
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Table 2.10: Second Set of Robustness Checks of the Vehicle Age Model 
 
Variable 1 2 3 2 3
Wealth tax dummy 0.0809
(0.1501)
Wealth tax ratio 0.1161 0.1684
(0.1792) (0.1163)
Wealth tax difference ( in $100s) 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003)
HH black 1.0860 1.0922 1.0791 0.8544 0.8457
(0.4037) (0.4030) (0.4037) (0.3399) (0.3398)
HH other 0.3855 0.3891 0.3948 0.3719 0.3898
(0.2366) (0.2369) (0.2370) (0.2144) (0.2142)
Income (in $1,000s) -0.0368 -0.0368 -0.0368 -0.0388 -0.0388
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0025)
College degree -0.8928 -0.8937 -0.8937 -0.9658 -0.9667
(0.1519) (0.1520) (0.1519) (0.1406) (0.1406)
Age -0.0210 -0.0212 -0.0212 -0.0250 -0.0251
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Life cycle 1 - no kids -1.2221 -1.2186 -1.2170 -1.0574 -1.0540
(0.2719) (0.2718) (0.2719) (0.2649) (0.2650)
Life cycle 2 - youngest less than 16 -0.9668 -0.9665 -0.9644 -1.0448 -1.0411
(0.2885) (0.2883) (0.2885) (0.2790) (0.2790)
Life cycle 4 - retired -1.4749 -1.4671 -1.4631 -1.5237 -1.5154
(0.3550) (0.3554) (0.3553) (0.3363) (0.3366)
Own home -1.4366 -1.4348 -1.4354 -1.5013 -1.5063
(0.2509) (0.2509) (0.2509) (0.2077) (0.2076)
HH size 0.5080 0.5091 0.5091 0.5983 0.5980
(0.1024) (0.1023) (0.1023) (0.0920) (0.0920)
Worker count 0.0464 0.0455 0.0448 -0.0148 -0.0146
(0.1114) (0.1114) (0.1114) (0.1047) (0.1047)
Ratio vehicles to drivers 1.6358 1.6365 1.6376 1.5640 1.5686
(0.1620) (0.1620) (0.1619) (0.1495) (0.1496)
State transaction tax rate 6.3655 6.5380 7.1905 4.3037 4.5299
(6.4692) (6.4632) (6.4702) (6.2345) (6.2517)
Ave. local transaction tax rate 3.9607 4.3190 4.3271 9.1733 9.7938
(6.9391) (6.9865) (6.9348) (6.3677) (6.3901)
MSA 1 mil +, no heavy trans. 0.7173 0.7226 0.7159 0.7846 0.7705
(0.2088) (0.2076) (0.2079) (0.1878) (0.1883)
MSA smaller than 1 mil 1.3778 1.3802 1.3723 1.3641 1.3446
(0.2374) (0.2375) (0.2375) (0.2158) (0.2152)
Not in MSA 1.8963 1.8996 1.8904 1.9733 1.9543
(0.2605) (0.2603) (0.2603) (0.2401) (0.2397)
Public transportation 0.4029 0.4001 0.4050 0.4526 0.4551
(0.1916) (0.1914) (0.1914) (0.1792) (0.1792)
Other than auto -0.8860 -0.8852 -0.8884 -0.8072 -0.8092
(0.1496) (0.1496) (0.1495) (0.1406) (0.1405)
Ave. distance to work (in 10s of miles) -0.1159 -0.1155 -0.1155 -0.1312 -0.1310
(0.0664) (0.0664) (0.0664) (0.0627) (0.0626)
Constant 6.1375 6.0082 6.0745 6.2089 6.3705
(0.7111) (0.7608) (0.7107) (0.6775) (0.6494)
Number of observations 4,778 4,778 4,778 5,656 5,656
R-squared 0.1599 0.1599 0.1600 0.1707 0.1708
Notes:  Coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in bold type.
             Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses.
Households w/ two or Ford Taurus
More Vehicles Tax Liabilities
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Table 2.11: Third Set of Robustness Checks of the Vehicle Age Model 
 
Variable 1 2 3 1 2 3
Wealth tax dummy 0.0753 0.1480
(0.1404) (0.1385)
Wealth tax ratio 0.0520 0.1331
(0.1652) (0.1716)
Wealth tax difference ( in $100s) 0.0302 0.0354
(0.0250) (0.0247)
HH black 0.9547 0.9580 0.9500 0.9860 0.9947 0.9813
(0.3476) (0.3474) (0.3475) (0.3021) (0.3025) (0.3022)
HH other 0.2779 0.2811 0.2847 0.4202 0.4276 0.4318
(0.2093) (0.2094) (0.2094) (0.2139) (0.2140) (0.2140)
Income (in $1,000s) -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0409 -0.0409 -0.0409
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
College degree -0.9377 -0.9382 -0.9392 -0.8996 -0.8977 -0.8987
(0.1448) (0.1448) (0.1448) (0.1610) (0.1611) (0.1611)
Age -0.0259 -0.0260 -0.0261 -0.0184 -0.0183 -0.0184
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088)
Life cycle 1 - no kids -1.1345 -1.1336 -1.1280 -0.9737 -0.9644 -0.9615
(0.2725) (0.2724) (0.2726) (0.3190) (0.3196) (0.3193)
Life cycle 2 - youngest less than 16 -1.1588 -1.1587 -1.1551 -0.9524 -0.9440 -0.9417
(0.2833) (0.2832) (0.2835) (0.3551) (0.3554) (0.3552)
Life cycle 4 - retired -1.7627 -1.7594 -1.7501 -1.5065 -1.4984 -1.4915
(0.3376) (0.3379) (0.3381) (0.3418) (0.3423) (0.3422)
Own home -1.4233 -1.4228 -1.4229 -1.5715 -1.5681 -1.5693
(0.2066) (0.2067) (0.2066) (0.1990) (0.1990) (0.1989)
HH size 0.6123 0.6127 0.6135 0.5139 0.5123 0.5125
(0.0950) (0.0950) (0.0950) (0.1089) (0.1088) (0.1089)
Worker count -0.0842 -0.0839 -0.0859 -0.0689 -0.0729 -0.0733
(0.1082) (0.1082) (0.1083) (0.1283) (0.1287) (0.1285)
Ratio vehicles to drivers 1.5998 1.6000 1.6019 1.3518 1.3456 1.3481
(0.1553) (0.1554) (0.1552) (0.2310) (0.2308) (0.2307)
State transaction tax rate 0.0093 0.0066 0.0203 0.0321 0.0297 0.0389
(0.0656) (0.0659) (0.0663) (0.0562) (0.0563) (0.0566)
Ave. local transaction tax rate 0.1132 0.1137 0.1182 0.0958 0.0990 0.1001
(0.0672) (0.0679) (0.0674) (0.0641) (0.0649) (0.0642)
MSA 1 mil +, no heavy trans. 0.8057 0.8125 0.8015 0.6824 0.6921 0.6815
(0.1897) (0.1885) (0.1887) (0.2292) (0.2285) (0.2289)
MSA smaller than 1 mil 1.4066 1.4093 1.3991 1.2100 1.2113 1.1987
(0.2189) (0.2191) (0.2190) (0.2596) (0.2594) (0.2602)
Not in MSA 1.9688 1.9738 1.9589 1.7678 1.7734 1.7586
(0.2407) (0.2405) (0.2406) (0.2726) (0.2723) (0.2729)
Public transportation 0.4253 0.4221 0.4279 0.5235 0.5190 0.5253
(0.1768) (0.1766) (0.1766) (0.1849) (0.1846) (0.1848)
Other than auto -0.9411 -0.9402 -0.9437
(0.1383) (0.1383) (0.1383)
Ave. distance to work (in 10s of miles) -0.1186 -0.1182 -0.1182 -0.1529 -0.1530 -0.1530
(0.0626) (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.0643) (0.0643) (0.0643)
Constant 6.8598 6.8348 6.7757 7.3549 7.3065 7.3643
(0.6605) (0.7139) (0.6629) (1.4766) (1.4472) (1.4811)
Mills ratio -0.7097 -0.7500 -0.7479
(0.9528) (0.9541) (0.9546)
Number of observations 6,551 6,551 6,551 5,656 5,656 5,656
R-squared 0.1647 0.1647 0.1649
Notes:  Coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in bold type.
             Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses.
Vehicle as Unit of Analysis Heckman Selection Model
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Table 2.12: Fourth Set of Robustness Checks of the Vehicle Age Model 
 
Variable 1 2 3 1 2 3
Wealth tax dummy 0.0753 0.1480
(0.1404) (0.1385)
Wealth tax ratio 0.0520 0.1331
(0.1652) (0.1716)
Wealth tax difference ( in $100s) 0.0302 0.0354
(0.0250) (0.0247)
HH black 0.9547 0.9580 0.9500 0.9860 0.9947 0.9813
(0.3476) (0.3474) (0.3475) (0.3021) (0.3025) (0.3022)
HH other 0.2779 0.2811 0.2847 0.4202 0.4276 0.4318
(0.2093) (0.2094) (0.2094) (0.2139) (0.2140) (0.2140)
Income (in $1,000s) -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0409 -0.0409 -0.0409
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
College degree -0.9377 -0.9382 -0.9392 -0.8996 -0.8977 -0.8987
(0.1448) (0.1448) (0.1448) (0.1610) (0.1611) (0.1611)
Age -0.0259 -0.0260 -0.0261 -0.0184 -0.0183 -0.0184
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088)
Life cycle 1 - no kids -1.1345 -1.1336 -1.1280 -0.9737 -0.9644 -0.9615
(0.2725) (0.2724) (0.2726) (0.3190) (0.3196) (0.3193)
Life cycle 2 - youngest less than 16 -1.1588 -1.1587 -1.1551 -0.9524 -0.9440 -0.9417
(0.2833) (0.2832) (0.2835) (0.3551) (0.3554) (0.3552)
Life cycle 4 - retired -1.7627 -1.7594 -1.7501 -1.5065 -1.4984 -1.4915
(0.3376) (0.3379) (0.3381) (0.3418) (0.3423) (0.3422)
Own home -1.4233 -1.4228 -1.4229 -1.5715 -1.5681 -1.5693
(0.2066) (0.2067) (0.2066) (0.1990) (0.1990) (0.1989)
HH size 0.6123 0.6127 0.6135 0.5139 0.5123 0.5125
(0.0950) (0.0950) (0.0950) (0.1089) (0.1088) (0.1089)
Worker count -0.0842 -0.0839 -0.0859 -0.0689 -0.0729 -0.0733
(0.1082) (0.1082) (0.1083) (0.1283) (0.1287) (0.1285)
Ratio vehicles to drivers 1.5998 1.6000 1.6019 1.3518 1.3456 1.3481
(0.1553) (0.1554) (0.1552) (0.2310) (0.2308) (0.2307)
State transaction tax rate 0.0093 0.0066 0.0203 0.0321 0.0297 0.0389
(0.0656) (0.0659) (0.0663) (0.0562) (0.0563) (0.0566)
Ave. local transaction tax rate 0.1132 0.1137 0.1182 0.0958 0.0990 0.1001
(0.0672) (0.0679) (0.0674) (0.0641) (0.0649) (0.0642)
MSA 1 mil +, no heavy trans. 0.8057 0.8125 0.8015 0.6824 0.6921 0.6815
(0.1897) (0.1885) (0.1887) (0.2292) (0.2285) (0.2289)
MSA smaller than 1 mil 1.4066 1.4093 1.3991 1.2100 1.2113 1.1987
(0.2189) (0.2191) (0.2190) (0.2596) (0.2594) (0.2602)
Not in MSA 1.9688 1.9738 1.9589 1.7678 1.7734 1.7586
(0.2407) (0.2405) (0.2406) (0.2726) (0.2723) (0.2729)
Public transportation 0.4253 0.4221 0.4279 0.5235 0.5190 0.5253
(0.1768) (0.1766) (0.1766) (0.1849) (0.1846) (0.1848)
Other than auto -0.9411 -0.9402 -0.9437
(0.1383) (0.1383) (0.1383)
Ave. distance to work (in 10s of miles) -0.1186 -0.1182 -0.1182 -0.1529 -0.1530 -0.1530
(0.0626) (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.0643) (0.0643) (0.0643)
Constant 6.8598 6.8348 6.7757 7.3549 7.3065 7.3643
(0.6605) (0.7139) (0.6629) (1.4766) (1.4472) (1.4811)
Mills ratio -0.7097 -0.7500 -0.7479
(0.9528) (0.9541) (0.9546)
Number of observations 6,551 6,551 6,551 5,656 5,656 5,656
R-squared 0.1647 0.1647 0.1649
Notes:  Coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in bold type.
             Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and are reported in parentheses.
Vehicle as Unit of Analysis Heckman Selection Model
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Table 3.1: Variables Used in the Analysis of Vehicle Age Distributions 
 
Variable Definition Source
Age 15 to 21 Percent of the state's population between the ages of 15 and 21 U.S. Census Bureau
Ave. gas price Average price per gallon as of 7/3/01 Nebraska Department of Roads 
   www.nebraskatransportation.org/transplan.pdfs/mftax7-01.pdf
   Accessed on 1/12/04
Ave. local sales tax rate Average local sales tax rate on the transaction of automobiles in 2001 2001 U.S. Master Sales and Use Tax Guide
Average HH size Average size of households in the state in 2000 U.S. Census Bureau
College degree Percent of population with at least some type of college degree in 2000 U.S. Census Bureau
GSP per capita Gross state product per capita 2001(in millions of dollars) Created from data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
   and the U.S. Census
HH age 65 Percent of households with at least one member above the age of 65 in 2000 U.S. Census Bureau
Home ownership rate Homeownership rate in 2001. U.S. Census Bureau
I/M Program Percent of states population that lives in an area subject to an I/M program Authors calculations based on data collected from
   the EPA and various state web sites
Income per capita Income per capita in 2001 Bureau of Economic Analysis
Median age Median age of the states population in 2000. U.S. Census Bureau
Percent living in MSA Percent of a state's population living in an MSA in 2000 U.S. Census Bureau
Percent black Percent of a state's population that was black in 2000 U.S. Census Bureau
Percent other Percent of a state's population that was another race in 2000 U.S. Census Bureau
Public transportation trips Total number of passenger trips on public transportation in the state in 2001 (in 1,000s) 2001 National Transit Database
   (by the Federal Transit Administration)
Region 1 (New England) M.E., N.H., V.T., M.A., R.I., C.T. Transportation Research Board
Region 2 (Upper Mid Atlantic) N.Y., P.A., N.J., D.E., M.D. Transportation Research Board
Region 3 (Lower Mid Atlantic) W.V., V.A., N.C, K.Y., T.N. Transportation Research Board
Region 4 (South) S.C., G.A., F.L., A.L., M.S., L.A., T.X. Transportation Research Board
Region 5 (Great Lakes) W.I., I.L., I.N., O.H., M.I. Transportation Research Board
Region 6 (Lower Plains) K.S., M.O., A.K., O.K. Transportation Research Board
Region 7 (Upper Plains) N.D., S.D., N.E., I.O., M.N. Transportation Research Board
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Table 3.1: Continued 
 
Variable Definition Source
Region 8 (Mountain) M.T., W.Y., C.O., N.M., U.T., I.D. Transportation Research Board
Region 9 (Pacific West) A.Z., C.A., N.V., O.R., W.A. Transportation Research Board
State sales tax rate State sales tax rate on the transaction of automobiles in 2001 2001 U.S. Master Sales and Use Tax Guide
Total miles driven per HH Total number of miles driven in the state per household in 2001 Created from data from the Federal Highway
   Administration and the U.S. Census Bureau
Unemployment rate Unemploment rate in 2001 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Table 3.2: Mean Vehicle Age by State and Wealth Tax Status 
 
Number of Standard Number of Standard
observations Mean deviation observations Mean deviation
Alabama 2,173,589 10.19 6.04 Delaware 411,278 9.12 5.80
Arizona 1,892,366 9.66 6.60 Florida 7,993,229 8.74 5.81
Arkansas 1,024,107 9.42 5.75 Idaho 467,609 11.17 6.51
California 14,483,688 9.90 6.32 Illinois 6,205,690 9.28 5.75
Colorado 1,714,662 10.01 6.55 Iowa 1,500,954 10.72 6.39
Connecticut 1,936,393 9.68 6.00 Louisiana 1,884,627 9.74 6.05
Georgia 3,632,941 9.39 6.01 Maryland 2,692,618 8.81 5.69
Indiana 2,972,128 9.92 5.95 New Jersey 4,581,918 9.41 6.13
Kansas 1,225,883 10.30 6.27 New Mexico 721,107 10.24 6.46
Kentucky 1,824,706 9.76 5.74 New York 8,067,403 9.71 5.82
Maine 2,094,789 9.74 6.00 North Dakota 327,241 11.71 6.51
Massachusetts 3,303,218 8.76 5.40 Ohio 6,048,923 9.38 5.73
Michigan 5,211,896 9.66 6.02 Oregon 1,481,621 11.49 7.01
Minnesota 2,273,032 9.57 5.59 Pennslyvania 6,096,801 9.40 5.83
Mississippi 1,064,186 9.67 5.67 South Dakota 378,659 10.90 6.36
Missouri 2,565,450 9.65 6.05 Tennessee 2,602,446 10.23 6.17
Montana 380,662 11.69 6.74 Texas 7,773,282 8.87 5.84
Nebraska 760,163 10.39 6.32 Vermont 319,091 9.20 5.62
Nevada 721,208 9.41 6.61 Washington 2,434,280 10.63 6.50
New Hampshire 707,095 9.42 5.81 Wisconsin 2,570,009 9.35 5.49
North Carolina 3,649,510 9.32 5.83
Oklahoma 1,504,854 10.28 6.35
Rhode Island 531,478 9.27 5.56
South Carolina 1,687,930 9.90 5.94
Utah 794,540 9.66 5.77
Virginia 3,642,497 9.41 5.79
West Virginia 773,223 9.75 5.80
Wyoming 161,788 11.16 6.74
All wealth tax 64,707,982 9.71 6.06 All non-wealth tax 64,558,786 9.46 5.96
Wealth Tax States Non-Wealth Tax States
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics by Wealth Tax Status 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Ave. gas price 1.58 0.16 1.32 2.01 1.57 0.18 1.32 2.01 1.59 0.11 1.33 1.79
Ave. household size 2.55 0.12 2.39 3.13 2.55 0.14 2.39 3.13 2.55 0.09 2.41 2.74
Ave. local sales tax rate 0.73 1.01 0.00 4.32 0.68 0.83 0.00 2.65 0.81 1.20 0.00 4.32
Car total 2,693,058 2,714,389 161,788 14,500,000 2,310,999 2,630,502 161,788 14,500,000 3,227,939 2,742,135 319,091 8,067,403
College degree 24.84 4.33 15.30 34.60 24.43 5.02 15.30 34.60 25.41 3.04 20.00 32.30
GSP per capita (in millions of $) 0.034 0.006 0.023 0.051 0.033 0.006 0.023 0.048 0.035 0.005 0.028 0.051
Home ownership rate 70.28 4.91 53.90 77.10 70.94 4.93 58.20 77.10 69.36 4.73 53.90 76.60
I/M Programs 37.19 36.92 0.00 100.00 30.65 37.54 0.00 100.00 46.34 34.02 0.00 100.00
Income per capita 28,976.96 4,463.26 21,653.00 42,377.00 28,657.04 4,761.03 21,653.00 42,377.00 29,424.85 3,970.95 23,081.00 38,625.00
Median age 35.59 1.87 27.10 38.90 35.44 2.08 27.10 38.90 35.80 1.49 32.30 38.70
Percent black 10.21 9.57 0.30 36.34 10.18 9.86 0.30 36.34 10.24 9.15 0.42 32.49
Percent living in MSA 68.34 20.42 27.80 100.00 66.89 19.79 30.00 96.70 70.38 21.13 27.80 100.00
Percent other 8.96 6.81 1.79 33.77 8.49 6.86 1.79 33.77 9.62 6.69 2.72 31.36
Population age 15 to 21 10.25 0.91 8.51 13.69 10.27 0.92 8.69 13.69 10.23 0.90 8.51 11.84
Population over 65 22.85 2.27 17.32 30.02 22.51 2.19 17.32 26.91 23.33 2.30 19.94 30.02
Public transportation trips 16.33 25.61 0.37 163.54 10.77 13.36 0.37 61.45 24.11 34.96 1.27 163.54
Region 1 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1
Region 2 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.25 0.43 0 1
Region 3 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1
Region 4 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Region 5 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Region 6 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0
Region 7 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Region 8 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1
Region 9 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1
State sales tax rate 4.39 1.88 0.00 7.00 4.23 1.91 0.00 7.00 4.60 1.82 0.00 6.50
Tax liability - new Honda * 816.37 845.39 0.00 3,372.00 1,444.35 597.39 627.00 3,372.00 0 0 0 0
Tax liability - used Honda * 500.80 557.61 0.00 2,443.00 886.04 456.75 444.00 2,443.00 0 0 0 0
Total miles driven per HH 12.42 2.40 7.61 23.54 12.91 2.58 9.44 23.54 11.73 1.93 7.61 15.27
Unemployment rate 4.49 0.84 2.90 6.40 4.45 0.75 3.10 5.50 4.55 0.95 2.90 6.40
Vehicle age 13 7.214109 1 25 13 7.216259 1 25 13 7.218324 1 25
Vehicle total 4,358,818 4,247,774 548,948 23,400,000 3,824,874 4,204,960 739,533 23,400,000 5,106,339 4,198,435 548,948 14,000,000
Wealth tax difference * 315.57 344.36 0.00 1,273.00 558.31 272.41 85.00 1,273.00 0 0 0 0
Wealth tax dummy 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Wealth tax ratio * 1.41 0.49 1.00 3.00 1.72 0.45 1.15 3.00 1 0 1 1
Notes:   A * denotes Virginia and Rhode Island were excluded from the calculations.
All (N=48) Wealth tax (N=28) Non-wealth tax (N=20)
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Table 3.4: Weighted Descriptive Statistics by Wealth Tax Status 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Ave. gas price 1.61 0.20 1.32 2.01 1.63 0.24 1.32 2.01 1.58 0.13 1.33 1.79
Ave. household size 2.59 0.14 2.39 3.13 2.61 0.16 2.39 3.13 2.57 0.10 2.41 2.74
Ave. local sales tax rate 0.92 1.09 0.00 4.32 0.83 0.88 0.00 2.65 1.00 1.26 0.00 4.32
Car total 5,426,666 3,971,991 161,788 14,500,000 5,300,898 5,060,010 161,788 14,500,000 5,552,725 2,428,015 319,091 8,067,403
College Degree 25.62 3.83 15.30 34.60 25.51 4.61 15.30 34.60 25.73 2.83 20.00 32.30
GSP per capita (in millions of $) 0.035 0.005 0.023 0.051 0.035 0.006 0.023 0.048 0.036 0.005 0.028 0.051
Home ownership rate 68.21 6.54 53.90 77.10 69.03 6.98 58.20 77.10 67.38 5.96 53.90 76.60
I/M Programs 48.56 37.21 0.00 100.00 45.55 41.51 0.00 100.00 51.57 32.05 0.00 100.00
Income per capita 30,523.78 4,109.57 21,653.00 42,377.00 30,051.40 4,405.80 21,653.00 42,377.00 30,997.26 3,729.94 23,081.00 38,625.00
Median age 35.45 1.81 27.10 38.90 35.00 1.67 27.10 38.90 35.91 1.83 32.30 38.70
Percent black 12.23 7.72 0.30 36.34 11.49 8.80 0.30 36.34 12.98 6.38 0.42 32.49
Percent living in MSA 80.03 15.76 27.80 100.00 76.74 17.72 30.00 96.70 83.34 12.68 27.80 100.00
Percent other 11.65 9.34 1.79 33.77 13.12 11.77 1.79 33.77 10.18 5.61 2.72 31.36
Population age 15 to 21 9.93 0.73 8.51 13.69 10.07 0.63 8.69 13.69 9.80 0.79 8.51 11.84
Population over 65 23.10 2.66 17.32 30.02 22.17 1.81 17.32 26.91 24.02 3.02 19.94 30.02
Public transportation trips 29.26 37.99 0.37 163.54 18.09 16.98 0.37 61.45 40.45 48.48 1.27 163.54
Region 1 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.00 0.07 0 1
Region 2 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0 0.34 0.47 0 1
Region 3 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
Region 4 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.27 0.45 0 1
Region 5 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Region 6 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0
Region 7 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.03 0.18 0 1
Region 8 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.02 0.13 0 1
Region 9 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
State sales tax rate 5.02 1.40 0.00 7.00 4.72 1.46 0.00 7.00 5.32 1.27 0.00 6.50
Tax liability - new Honda * 604.41 755.14 0.00 3,372.00 1,249.02 610.95 627.00 3,372.00 0 0 0 0
Tax liability - used Honda * 386.23 501.82 0.00 2,443.00 798.14 437.75 444.00 2,443.00 0 0 0 0
Total miles driven per HH 11.74 2.07 7.61 23.54 12.52 1.39 9.44 23.54 10.96 2.32 7.61 15.27
Unemployment rate 4.71 0.72 2.90 6.40 4.66 0.78 3.10 5.50 4.76 0.65 2.90 6.40
Vehicle age 9.58 6.01 1 25 9.71 6.06 1 25 9.46 5.96 1 25
Vehicle total 8,607,522 6,389,017 548,948 23,400,000 8,580,621 8,190,296 739,533 23,400,000 8,634,486 3,807,359 548,948 14,000,000
Wealth tax difference * 218.18 295.53 0.00 1,273.00 450.87 274.89 85.00 1,273.00 0 0 0 0
Wealth tax Dummy 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Wealth tax ratio * 1.30 0.43 1.00 3.00 1.62 0.42 1.15 3.00 1 0 1 1
Notes:   A * denotes Virginia and Rhode Island were excluded from the calculations.
            The number of observations for these variables is 60,534,007.
All (N=129,266,768) Wealth tax (N=64,707,982) Non-wealth tax (N=64,558,786)
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Table 3.5: Multinomial Logit Model Coefficients (Base Category is New Car) 
 
Wealth tax GSP Income Unemployment State sales Ave. local sales
Vehicle age dummy per capita per capita rate tax rate tax rate
2 -0.036 -12.864 0.00004 0.036 -0.032 0.035
3 -0.019 -14.185 0.00004 0.057 -0.034 0.037
4 -0.008 -20.525 0.00005 0.046 -0.035 0.014
5 -0.038 -26.889 0.00006 0.020 -0.030 0.011
6 -0.031 -30.158 0.00007 0.010 -0.024 0.016
7 -0.041 -30.729 0.00007 0.019 -0.031 0.022
8 -0.028 -34.030 0.00008 0.020 -0.028 0.014
9 -0.026 -39.710 0.00009 0.035 -0.037 0.024
10 -0.003 -38.471 0.00010 0.053 -0.031 0.037
11 -0.010 -37.893 0.00010 0.065 -0.031 0.042
12 0.017 -37.274 0.00010 0.063 -0.026 0.042
13 0.039 -35.331 0.00009 0.062 -0.038 0.046
14 0.031 -37.856 0.00011 0.068 -0.045 0.058
15 0.044 -41.316 0.00012 0.061 -0.053 0.065
16 0.032 -36.879 0.00012 0.080 -0.055 0.079
17 -0.061 -29.268 0.00012 0.121 -0.069 0.084
18 -0.113 -31.209 0.00013 0.140 -0.075 0.102
19 -0.149 -28.523 0.00013 0.155 -0.079 0.109
20 -0.200 -26.401 0.00014 0.160 -0.082 0.136
21 -0.208 -29.018 0.00014 0.175 -0.092 0.140
22 -0.194 -39.837 0.00017 0.181 -0.102 0.146
23 -0.147 -39.389 0.00015 0.152 -0.090 0.135
24 -0.181 -46.431 0.00016 0.159 -0.102 0.138
25 -0.206 -63.585 0.00020 0.037 -0.124 0.103
Notes:  Coefficients that appear in bold are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better.
             A ** indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
             A * indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 3.5: Continued 
 
Percent Percent College Median
Vehicle age black other degree age HH age 65 Age 15 to 21
2 0.001 0.005 -0.001 -0.074 0.046 0.090
3 0.001** 0.002 -0.004 -0.091 0.047 0.081
4 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.054 0.041 0.173
5 0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.084 0.043 0.217
6 0.007 0.004 -0.004 -0.074 0.036 0.231
7 0.009 0.005 -0.008 -0.066 0.032 0.230
8 0.010 0.003 -0.012 -0.049 0.029 0.255
9 0.006 0.002 -0.016 -0.032 0.028 0.287
10 0.006 0.003 -0.018 -0.020 0.027 0.338
11 0.004 0.005 -0.017 0.024 0.013 0.388
12 0.006 0.005 -0.019 0.061 0.009 0.429
13 0.007 0.003 -0.025 0.087 0.015 0.428
14 0.008 0.002 -0.028 0.112 0.016 0.449
15 0.010 0.003 -0.033 0.132 0.019 0.454
16 0.008 0.007 -0.035 0.112 0.024 0.433
17 0.005 0.010 -0.039 0.031 0.030 0.327
18 0.005 0.013 -0.045 0.017 0.029 0.325
19 0.006 0.015 -0.046 0.005 0.031 0.288
20 0.003 0.024 -0.047 0.010** 0.024 0.317
21 0.004 0.020 -0.058 0.002 0.020 0.288
22 0.003 0.014 -0.059 -0.030 0.032 0.271
23 0.005 0.014 -0.053 -0.067 0.038 0.251
24 0.004 0.016 -0.057 -0.102 0.041 0.236
25 0.007 0.020 -0.070 -0.174 0.033 0.248
Notes:  Coefficients that appear in bold are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better.
             A ** indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
             A * indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
 154
Table 3.5: Continued 
 
Average HH Home ownership Average gas Public trans. Miles traveled
Vehicle age size MSA rate price trips per HH
2 -0.484 -0.007 0.005 -0.263 -0.001 0.005
3 -0.600 -0.008 0.003 -0.275 -0.001 0.009
4 -0.484 -0.008 0.001 -0.549 -0.001 0.004
5 -0.855 -0.009 0.005 -0.492 -0.001 0.001
6 -0.879 -0.009 0.004 -0.519 -0.001 -0.004
7 -0.842 -0.009 0.006 -0.528 0.000 0.000
8 -0.829 -0.008 0.003 -0.546 0.000 0.009
9 -0.851 -0.008 0.003 -0.571 0.000 0.013
10 -0.959 -0.010 0.000 -0.582 0.000* 0.013
11 -0.730 -0.010 0.001** -0.494 0.000 0.011
12 -0.534 -0.009 -0.001 -0.595 0.000 0.012
13 -0.217 -0.007 -0.002 -0.528 0.000 0.017
14 0.096 -0.007 -0.002 -0.616 0.000 0.015
15 0.271 -0.007 -0.002 -0.693 0.000 0.017
16 0.178 -0.007 0.002 -0.800 0.000 0.023
17 -0.312 -0.009 0.010 -0.915 0.001 0.030
18 -0.332 -0.011 0.014 -0.918 0.000 0.028
19 -0.315 -0.014 0.012 -1.005 -0.001 0.029
20 -0.208 -0.016 0.011 -1.123 -0.003 0.022
21 -0.344 -0.015 0.009 -1.245 -0.003 0.032
22 -0.653 -0.017 0.007 -1.322 -0.004 0.033
23 -1.111 -0.018 0.006 -1.331 -0.004 0.040
24 -1.483 -0.018 0.010 -1.357 -0.004 0.043
25 -2.494 -0.014 0.009 -1.105 -0.003 0.010
Notes:  Coefficients that appear in bold are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better.
             A ** indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
             A * indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 3.5: Continued 
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nt
Vehicle I/M
age programs 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 Consta
2 0.001 0.113 0.076 0.037 -0.026 -0.051 0.091 -0.153 -0.027 1.912
3 0.001 0.052 -0.003 -0.054 -0.131 -0.059 0.153 -0.245 -0.157 3.105
4 0.002 0.106 0.066 0.063 -0.019 -0.023 0.180 -0.120 0.037 1.154
5 0.002 0.207 0.056 0.151 0.029 0.070 0.208 0.000 0.179 2.333
6 0.002 0.218 0.049 0.175 0.051 0.089 0.231 0.053 0.166 2.221
7 0.002 0.254 0.035 0.183 0.032 0.076 0.265 0.005 0.145 1.956
8 0.001 0.222 -0.005 0.178 -0.028 0.051 0.281 0.043 0.155 1.022
9 0.002 0.163 0.001 0.201 0.006* 0.015 0.284 0.055 0.150 0.114
10 0.001 0.089 0.016 0.146 -0.057 -0.055 0.234 0.015** 0.078 -0.679
11 0.002 0.023 0.003 0.133 -0.068 -0.032 0.252 0.014* 0.156 -3.205
12 0.002 0.080 0.044 0.164 -0.093 -0.075 0.290 0.080 0.174 -5.282
13 0.002 0.061 -0.054 0.138 -0.185 -0.143 0.315 0.002 0.110 -7.067
14 0.002 0.128 -0.023 0.193 -0.190 -0.135 0.352 0.085 0.179 -9.149
15 0.002 0.162 0.033 0.270 -0.162 -0.141 0.381 0.199 0.332 -10.740
16 0.001 0.145 0.027 0.209 -0.208 -0.155 0.308 0.205 0.319 -10.028
17 0.000 0.312 0.103 0.206 -0.095 -0.036 0.327 0.292 0.411 -5.730
18 0.000 0.357 0.173 0.259 -0.050 0.030 0.377 0.342 0.511 -5.746
19 -0.001 0.447 0.219 0.299 0.021 0.133 0.479 0.489 0.649 -5.309
20 -0.002 0.615 0.410 0.359 0.129 0.235 0.459 0.570 0.799 -6.141
21 -0.002 0.610 0.392 0.287 0.048 0.195 0.578 0.641 0.871 -4.917
22 -0.001 0.523 0.440 0.326 0.133 0.208 0.649 0.757 1.034 -3.272
23 0.000 0.313 0.322 0.213 0.009 0.116 0.632 0.582 0.919 0.070
24 0.000 0.322 0.342 0.254 0.040 0.166 0.639 0.632 1.016 1.752
25 -0.001 0.321 0.317 0.299 0.066 0.354 0.722 0.939 1.251 8.948
Notes:  Coefficients that appear in bold are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better.
             A ** indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
             A * indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Region
 
Table 3.6: Relative Risk Ratios (Base Category is New Car) 
 
Wealth tax GSP Income Unemployment State sales Ave. local sales
Vehicle age dummy per capita per capita rate tax rate tax rate
2 0.96 0.00 1.00 1.04 0.97 1.04
3 0.98 0.00 1.00 1.06 0.97 1.04
4 0.99 0.00 1.00 1.05 0.97 1.01
5 0.96 0.00 1.00 1.02 0.97 1.01
6 0.97 0.00 1.00 1.01 0.98 1.02
7 0.96 0.00 1.00 1.02 0.97 1.02
8 0.97 0.00 1.00 1.02 0.97 1.01
9 0.97 0.00 1.00 1.04 0.96 1.02
10 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.05 0.97 1.04
11 0.99 0.00 1.00 1.07 0.97 1.04
12 1.02 0.00 1.00 1.07 0.97 1.04
13 1.04 0.00 1.00 1.06 0.96 1.05
14 1.03 0.00 1.00 1.07 0.96 1.06
15 1.05 0.00 1.00 1.06 0.95 1.07
16 1.03 0.00 1.00 1.08 0.95 1.08
17 0.94 0.00 1.00 1.13 0.93 1.09
18 0.89 0.00 1.00 1.15 0.93 1.11
19 0.86 0.00 1.00 1.17 0.92 1.12
20 0.82 0.00 1.00 1.17 0.92 1.15
21 0.81 0.00 1.00 1.19 0.91 1.15
22 0.82 0.00 1.00 1.20 0.90 1.16
23 0.86 0.00 1.00 1.16 0.91 1.14
24 0.83 0.00 1.00 1.17 0.90 1.15
25 0.81 0.00 1.00 1.04 0.88 1.11
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Table 3.6: Continued 
 
Percent Percent College Median
Vehicle age black other degree age HH age 65 Age 15 to 21
2 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.93 1.05 1.09
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.05 1.08
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.04 1.19
5 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.04 1.24
6 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.04 1.26
7 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.94 1.03 1.26
8 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.95 1.03 1.29
9 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.97 1.03 1.33
10 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.03 1.40
11 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.01 1.47
12 1.01 1.01 0.98 1.06 1.01 1.54
13 1.01 1.00 0.98 1.09 1.02 1.53
14 1.01 1.00 0.97 1.12 1.02 1.57
15 1.01 1.00 0.97 1.14 1.02 1.57
16 1.01 1.01 0.97 1.12 1.02 1.54
17 1.01 1.01 0.96 1.03 1.03 1.39
18 1.00 1.01 0.96 1.02 1.03 1.38
19 1.01 1.02 0.96 1.01 1.03 1.33
20 1.00 1.02 0.95 1.01 1.02 1.37
21 1.00 1.02 0.94 1.00 1.02 1.33
22 1.00 1.01 0.94 0.97 1.03 1.31
23 1.00 1.01 0.95 0.94 1.04 1.29
24 1.00 1.02 0.94 0.90 1.04 1.27
25 1.01 1.02 0.93 0.84 1.03 1.28
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Table 3.6: Continued 
 
Average HH Home ownership Average gas Public trans. Miles traveled
Vehicle age size MSA rate price trips per HH
2 0.62 0.99 1.01 0.77 1.00 1.01
3 0.55 0.99 1.00 0.76 1.00 1.01
4 0.62 0.99 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.00
5 0.43 0.99 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00
6 0.42 0.99 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.00
7 0.43 0.99 1.01 0.59 1.00 1.00
8 0.44 0.99 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.01
9 0.43 0.99 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.01
10 0.38 0.99 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.01
11 0.48 0.99 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.01
12 0.59 0.99 1.00 0.55 1.00 1.01
13 0.80 0.99 1.00 0.59 1.00 1.02
14 1.10 0.99 1.00 0.54 1.00 1.02
15 1.31 0.99 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.02
16 1.19 0.99 1.00 0.45 1.00 1.02
17 0.73 0.99 1.01 0.40 1.00 1.03
18 0.72 0.99 1.01 0.40 1.00 1.03
19 0.73 0.99 1.01 0.37 1.00 1.03
20 0.81 0.98 1.01 0.33 1.00 1.02
21 0.71 0.98 1.01 0.29 1.00 1.03
22 0.52 0.98 1.01 0.27 1.00 1.03
23 0.33 0.98 1.01 0.26 1.00 1.04
24 0.23 0.98 1.01 0.26 1.00 1.04
24 0.08 0.99 1.01 0.33 1.00 1.01
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Table 3.6: Continued 
 
Average HH Home ownership Average gas Public trans. Miles traveled
Vehicle age size MSA rate price trips per HH
2 0.62 0.99 1.01 0.77 1.00 1.01
3 0.55 0.99 1.00 0.76 1.00 1.01
4 0.62 0.99 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.00
5 0.43 0.99 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00
6 0.42 0.99 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.00
7 0.43 0.99 1.01 0.59 1.00 1.00
8 0.44 0.99 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.01
9 0.43 0.99 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.01
10 0.38 0.99 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.01
11 0.48 0.99 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.01
12 0.59 0.99 1.00 0.55 1.00 1.01
13 0.80 0.99 1.00 0.59 1.00 1.02
14 1.10 0.99 1.00 0.54 1.00 1.02
15 1.31 0.99 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.02
16 1.19 0.99 1.00 0.45 1.00 1.02
17 0.73 0.99 1.01 0.40 1.00 1.03
18 0.72 0.99 1.01 0.40 1.00 1.03
19 0.73 0.99 1.01 0.37 1.00 1.03
20 0.81 0.98 1.01 0.33 1.00 1.02
21 0.71 0.98 1.01 0.29 1.00 1.03
22 0.52 0.98 1.01 0.27 1.00 1.03
23 0.33 0.98 1.01 0.26 1.00 1.04
24 0.23 0.98 1.01 0.26 1.00 1.04
24 0.08 0.99 1.01 0.33 1.00 1.01
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Table 3.7: Discrete Change in Predicted Probabilities 
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9
Wealth Tax
Vehicle age Dummy 1 2 3 4 6 7 8
1 0.0011 -0.0065 -0.0023 -0.0059 0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0103 -0.0042 -0.0092
2 -0.0005 -0.0035 0.0012 -0.0072 0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0114 -0.0150 -0.0158
3 0.0005 -0.0067 -0.0035 -0.0116 -0.0050 -0.0036 -0.0074 -0.0186 -0.0208
4 0.0011 -0.0035 0.0005 -0.0051 0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0057 -0.0119 -0.0111
5 -0.0006 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0047 0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0063 -0.0041
6 -0.0002 0.0028 -0.0005 0.0012 0.0058 0.0052 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0046
7 -0.0009 0.0058 -0.0015 0.0019 0.0054 0.0051 -0.0012 -0.0065 -0.0067
8 0.0000 0.0031 -0.0036 0.0013 0.0010 0.0029 -0.0001 -0.0037 -0.0053
9 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0032 0.0027 0.0031 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0030 -0.0056
10 0.0014 -0.0042 -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0048 -0.0087
11 0.0010 -0.0076 -0.0029 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0049 -0.0049
12 0.0024 -0.0046 -0.0007 0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0040 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0039
13 0.0035 -0.0055 -0.0056 -0.0009 -0.0071 -0.0073 0.0017 -0.0054 -0.0070
14 0.0028 -0.0020 -0.0038 0.0019 -0.0066 -0.0063 0.0034 -0.0010 -0.0033
15 0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0049 -0.0045 -0.0055 0.0041 0.0039 0.0035
16 0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0019 -0.0054 -0.0052 0.0009 0.0036 0.0025
17 -0.0009 0.0042 0.0013 0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0011 0.0013 0.0056 0.0048
18 -0.0019 0.0044 0.0026 0.0024 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0021 0.0056 0.0063
19 -0.0016 0.0041 0.0023 0.0020 0.0009 0.0018 0.0028 0.0058 0.0062
20 -0.0015 0.0046 0.0035 0.0019 0.0016 0.0022 0.0016 0.0048 0.0060
21 -0.0013 0.0038 0.0028 0.0010 0.0007 0.0015 0.0024 0.0048 0.0059
22 -0.0010 0.0025 0.0027 0.0011 0.0012 0.0014 0.0026 0.0051 0.0067
23 -0.0009 0.0011 0.0022 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 0.0031 0.0043 0.0067
24 -0.0009 0.0010 0.0019 0.0006 0.0005 0.0010 0.0025 0.0038 0.0063
25 -0.0066 0.0058 0.0105 0.0055 0.0042 0.0148 0.0191 0.0423 0.0560
Average |Change| 0.0015 0.0037 0.0025 0.0026 0.0027 0.0034 0.0038 0.0072 0.0089
Dummy Variables
Region  
 
Table 3.7: Continued 
 
Vehicle age Median age avehhsize00 rate01 localave01 avegasprice unmprate01
1 0.0006 0.0242 0.0017 -0.0017 0.0235 -0.0021
2 -0.0037 0.0076 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0198 -0.0010
3 -0.0046 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0179 0.0003
4 -0.0022 0.0068 0.0003 -0.0016 0.0015 -0.0003
5 -0.0042 -0.0147 0.0007 -0.0019 0.0051 -0.0020
6 -0.0034 -0.0152 0.0009 -0.0016 0.0032 -0.0024
7 -0.0034 -0.0152 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0031 -0.0022
8 -0.0020 -0.0127 0.0008 -0.0017 0.0017 -0.0019
9 -0.0010 -0.0139 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0010
10 -0.0002 -0.0186 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001
11 0.0022 -0.0065 0.0006 0.0000 0.0044 0.0007
12 0.0041 0.0038 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0006
13 0.0054 0.0201 0.0001 0.0002 0.0025 0.0005
14 0.0062 0.0336 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0020 0.0008
15 0.0060 0.0356 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0048 0.0004
16 0.0045 0.0274 -0.0005 0.0013 -0.0079 0.0010
17 0.0013 0.0080 -0.0008 0.0012 -0.0095 0.0020
18 0.0007 0.0058 -0.0008 0.0013 -0.0074 0.0019
19 0.0003 0.0038 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0057 0.0014
20 0.0002 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0048 0.0009
21 0.0001 0.0019 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0049 0.0009
22 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0046 0.0008
23 -0.0004 -0.0037 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0058 0.0008
24 -0.0005 -0.0052 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0047 0.0006
25 -0.0058 -0.0763 -0.0030 0.0022 -0.0193 -0.0005
Average |Change| 0.00252 0.01459 0.00065 0.00097 0.00663 0.00108
One-Unit Change
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Table 3.7: Continued 
 
Percent Percent College Home ownership
Vehicle age black other degree HH age 65 Age 15 to 21 rate
1 -0.0021 -0.0014 0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0102 -0.0006
2 -0.0029 0.0001 0.0047 0.0026 -0.0107 0.0007
3 -0.0028 -0.0012 0.0036 0.0026 -0.0106 0.0001
4 -0.0018 -0.0010 0.0050 0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0007
5 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0044 0.0020 -0.0032 0.0005
6 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0034 0.0009 -0.0023 0.0002
7 0.0020 0.0001 0.0029 0.0005 -0.0027 0.0009
8 0.0024 -0.0008 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0010 0.0001
9 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0000 0.0007 -0.0001
10 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0032 -0.0007
11 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0057 -0.0006
12 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0023 0.0075 -0.0012
13 0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0075 -0.0012
14 0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0021 -0.0014 0.0077 -0.0012
15 0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0027 -0.0009 0.0067 -0.0010
16 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0026 -0.0004 0.0051 -0.0003
17 -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0026 0.0001 0.0014 0.0010
18 -0.0002 0.0011 -0.0025 0.0000 0.0010 0.0012
19 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0016 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006
20 -0.0002 0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
21 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
22 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0011 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
23 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001
24 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0010 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002
25 0.0004 0.0037 -0.0081 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0010
Average |Change| 0.00089 0.00083 0.00236 0.00091 0.00376 0.00059
One-Standard Deviation Change
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Table 3.7: Continued 
 
Public trans. Miles traveled I/M GSP Income
Vehicle age MSA trips per HH programs per capita per capita
1 0.0071 0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0018 0.0074 -0.0157
2 0.0026 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0011 0.0068 -0.0126
3 0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0059 -0.0117
4 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0009 0.0013 0.0035 -0.0094
5 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0014 0.0010 0.0015 -0.0060
6 -0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0020 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0045
7 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0018 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0048
8 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0025
9 0.0004 0.0013 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0031 0.0011
10 -0.0012 0.0006 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0024 0.0028
11 -0.0013 0.0004 0.0000 0.0007 -0.0023 0.0027
12 0.0000 0.0010 0.0002 0.0012 -0.0020 0.0030
13 0.0013 0.0013 0.0008 0.0019 -0.0014 0.0020
14 0.0014 0.0011 0.0006 0.0011 -0.0020 0.0046
15 0.0017 0.0009 0.0007 0.0016 -0.0025 0.0064
16 0.0015 0.0005 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0012 0.0050
17 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0013 -0.0015 0.0003 0.0037
18 -0.0012 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0041
19 -0.0015 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0027
20 -0.0013 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0019
21 -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0018
22 -0.0011 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0022
23 -0.0015 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0022
24 -0.0012 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0021
25 -0.0042 -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0070 0.0189
Average |Change| 0.00145 0.00076 0.00068 0.00101 0.00210 0.00538
One-Standard Deviation Change
 
 164
Table 3.8: MNLM Coefficients for the Wealth Tax Measure Across Specifications 
 
Vehicle age Wealth tax dummy Wealth tax ratio Wealth tax difference
2 -0.0358 0.0177 -0.000008**
3 -0.0186 0.0245 0.000001
4 -0.0076 0.0336 0.000028
5 -0.0380 0.0120 -0.000009
6 -0.0308 0.0117 -0.000007**
7 -0.0406 0.0076 -0.000025
8 -0.0282 -0.0021 -0.000043
9 -0.0260 -0.0125 -0.000058
10 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.000041
11 -0.0096 0.0090 -0.000025
12 0.0169 0.0066 -0.000008**
13 0.0390 0.0183 0.000005
14 0.0305 0.0142 -0.000007*
15 0.0445 0.0098 -0.000006
16 0.0323 -0.0086 -0.000039
17 -0.0610 -0.0591 -0.000139
18 -0.1132 -0.0784 -0.000174
19 -0.1487 -0.0911 -0.000205
20 -0.1999 -0.1149 -0.000253
21 -0.2084 -0.1333 -0.000277
22 -0.1945 -0.1347 -0.000272
23 -0.1467 -0.0963 -0.000209
24 -0.1805 -0.1318 -0.000273
25 -0.2062 -0.2238 -0.000345
Notes:  Coefficients that appear in bold are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better.
              A ** indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
              A * indicates the coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Wealth Tax Specification
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Table 4.1: MOBILE6 Emission Factors (g/mile) 
 
National
Pollutant Actual Predicted Percent error
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 2.00 2.12 6.11
Carbon monoxide 20.55 21.58 5.01
Nitrogen oxide 1.41 1.47 3.75
Wealth Tax
Actual Predicted Percent error
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 2.05 2.12 3.71
Carbon monoxide 20.97 21.62 3.10
Nitrogen oxide 1.44 1.47 2.37
Non-Wealth-Tax
Actual Predicted Percent error
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 1.95 2.11 8.53
Carbon monoxide 20.14 21.53 6.90
Nitrogen oxide 1.39 1.46 5.03
Wealth Tax Versus
Non-Wealth Tax
Actual Dif. Predicted dif.
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 0.10 0.01
Carbon monoxide 0.83 0.09
Nitrogen oxide 0.04 0.007
Uniform National Policy
Wealth Tax Non-Wealth-Tax Difference
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 2.08 2.18 -0.10
Carbon monoxide 21.27 22.10 -0.83
Nitrogen oxide 1.46 1.49 -0.03
Note: Percent error equals (Predicted-Actual)/Actual * 100  
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Table 4.2: MOBILE6 Emission Factors (g/mile) by State 
 
Percent Change Difference as
Actual Predicted error in policy percent of predicted
Tennessee (NWT)
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 2.24 2.07 -7.85 1.99 -3.82
Carbon monoxide 22.54 21.18 -6.03 20.50 -3.21
Nitrogen oxide 1.52 1.45 -4.72 1.43 -1.72
California (WT)
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 2.13 2.13 0.00 2.24 5.15
Carbon monoxide 21.52 21.53 0.05 22.47 4.37
Nitrogen oxide 1.46 1.46 0.00 1.49 2.47
Connecticut (WT)
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 1.99 1.88 -5.82 1.95 3.57
Carbon monoxide 20.32 19.46 -4.23 20.04 2.98
Nitrogen oxide 1.41 1.37 -3.47 1.39 1.47
Georgia (WT)
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 1.97 1.98 0.81 2.08 4.74
Carbon monoxide 20.53 20.63 0.49 21.43 3.88
Nitrogen oxide 1.40 1.41 0.79 1.44 2.13
Maryland (NWT)
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 1.73 1.87 8.08 1.81 -3.37
Carbon monoxide 18.54 19.58 5.61 19.04 -2.76
Nitrogen oxide 1.30 1.36 4.39 1.34 -1.40
Massachusetts (WT)
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 1.73 1.74 0.52 1.79 2.76
Carbon monoxide 18.54 18.44 -0.54 18.85 2.22
Nitrogen oxide 1.30 1.32 1.31 1.33 1.06
New Jersey (NWT)
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 1.93 1.81 -5.77 1.76 -2.98
Carbon monoxide 19.80 18.96 -4.24 18.49 -2.48
Nitrogen oxide 1.37 1.33 -3.21 1.31 -1.21
Rhode Island (WT)
Hydrocarbons -VOCs 1.81 1.68 -6.98 1.71 1.91
Carbon monoxide 18.87 17.96 -4.82 18.24 1.56
Nitrogen oxide 1.36 1.31 -3.62 1.31 0.54
Notes:  State's status quo wealth tax policy appears in parentheses.
             Percent error equals (Predicted-Actual)/Actual * 100
             Difference as percent of predicted equals (Change in policy - Predicted)/Predicted*100  
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Appendix C: The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption 
of the Multinomial Logit Model 
 169
 The multinomial logit model makes the assumption known as the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  This assumption requires that the odds of two alternatives 
be independent of the alternatives included in the choice set.  Therefore, if a new 
alternative becomes available then all probabilities for the original outcomes must adjust 
in precisely the amount necessary to retain the original odds among all pairs of outcomes.  
For example, assume that a household has a choice of two vacation destinations: a beach 
resort that is chosen with a probability of 0.5 and a lake resort that is chosen with a 
probability of 0.5.  The implied odds of taking a beach vacation versus a lake vacation are 
equal to one (0.5/0.5).  Now suppose that a ski resort vacation becomes available.  The 
IIA assumption requires that the household adjusts its probabilities of choosing each 
vacation destination in such a way that the relative odds of the beach and lake resorts 
remain the same.  Thus if the household chooses the ski resort with a probability of 0.4, 
the probability that the beach and lake resorts are chosen must be 0.3 for each alternative.   
The IIA assumption generally fails to hold when a sub-set of the alternatives have similar 
characteristics.  Suppose that a second lake resort that is nearly identical to the first is 
added to the household’s choice set instead of the ski resort.  Given the similarities in the 
lake resorts, it would be unrealistic to assume that the household would adjusts its 
selection such that the odds of the beach resort and the original lake resort vacations 
remain the same.  Realistically, the original probability of a lake resort vacation would be 
split between the two lake destinations.  The new probabilities might be Pr(beach)=0.5, 
Pr(lake1)=0.25 and Pr(lake2)=0.25.  Such a model fails the IIA assumption as the odds of 
a beach vacation versus the original lake vacation change from one to two. 
 The independence of irrelevant alternatives is an important assumption of the 
multinomial logit model.  If the IIA property fails to hold, the parameter estimates 
obtained from the model will be inconsistent.  Fortunately, there are two tests of the IIA 
assumption.  The first is a Hausman-type test developed by Hausman and McFadden 
(1984).  This test is based on the assumption that if an alternative of the choice set is truly 
irrelevant, omitting it from the choice set will not change the parameter estimates 
systematically.  The test statistic is 
χ β β β β2 1= − − −−( $ $ )'[ $ $ ] ( $ $ )R F R F R FV V  
where  are parameter estimates obtained from fitting the full model,  are the 
parameter estimates obtained from fitting a restricted model where one or more of the 
alternatives have been omitted, and and  are the respective estimates of the 
asymptotic covariance matrices.  The test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-
square with degrees of freedom equal to the rows in .  The second test of the IIA 
assumption was developed by Small and Hsiao (1985).  This test is computed by dividing 
the sample randomly into two sub-samples of roughly equal size.  The full MNLM is 
estimated for each of these samples and a weighted average of the coefficients is 
computed as 
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Parameters from a restricted model ( ) are estimated from the second sub-sample after 
eliminating one of the alternatives.  The Small-Hsiao test is a likelihood ratio test where 
the test statistic is  
$βR
S2
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which has a chi-squared distribution with K+1 degrees of freedom where K equals the 
number of independent variables.  Zhang and Hoffman (1993) present a good exposition 
on these methods and provide details on applying each test with statistical software. 
Each of these tests were conducted for the multinomial logit model of vehicle age 
estimated by this analysis.  Small-Hsiao tests of the IIA assumption were estimated in 
Stata.  Twenty-four separate test statistics were estimated using different vehicle ages as 
the omitted alternative.  The p-values of the chi-squared test statistics were all equal to 
one indicating a failure to reject the null hypothesis that the model meets the IIA 
assumption.16  These results suggest that the parameter estimates of the MNLM reported 
in Table 3.5 are consistent and that the odds of two vehicle age outcomes are independent 
of the age outcomes used in the model.  Unfortunately, results of the Hausman test of the 
IIA assumption are unavailable for comparison purposes.  For unknown reasons, the 
Hausman tests of IIA assumption failed to converge in Stata.  Different tests were 
attempted using various vehicle ages as the omitted alternative; however, none of these 
tests converged to a test statistic.  If the Hausman test had converged, the results may or 
may not have supported the conclusions of the Small-Hsiao test.  Long and Freese (2003) 
suggest that the Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests often provide inconsistent results and 
little guidance to violations of the IIA assumption. 
Kennedy (2003, p. 270) offers several alternative estimation procedures to 
circumvent any IIA problems.  Although the results of the Small-Hsiao test suggest that 
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16 A complete set of results is available upon request. 
 172
                                                          
the IIA assumption holds for the vehicle age model, this analysis included an attempt at 
several of these alternatives in hopes of generating vehicle age distributions that could be 
compared to those generated by the multinomial logit model.  The first alternative 
estimation procedure attempted was the multinomial probit model (MNPM).  This model 
is derived by assuming that the errors in the discrete choice model are normally 
distributed.  Its primary advantage over the MNLM is that the errors can be correlated 
across choices, which eliminates the IIA restriction.  However, the computational cost of 
the MNPM can be quite restrictive as multiple (one less than the number of categories) 
integrals must be calculated.  Therefore, it was no surprise that attempts to estimate the 
MNPM in Limdep ultimately failed.17  Other alternatives including the nested logit 
model, heteroskedastic extreme value model and the random parameters logit model were 
also explored using Limdep.  However, these attempts also failed.  Each of these models 
required that each independent variable vary across vehicle age outcomes, which would 
require an interaction with an alternative specific constant given the nature of the data.  
Given the number of independent variables used in the model, this would result in the 
estimation of well over 650 parameters, and unfortunately each of these models is limited 
to 100 parameters in Limdep.  Finally, Kennedy notes that IIA problems are often 
ignored in hopes that the MNLM are not too misleading.  Unfortunately, there would be 
no way to characterize the inconsistency that would result from a failure of the model to 
meet the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption.  Absent a computationally  
17 Limdep was used in the attempt to estimate a MNPM as Stata currently has no program capable of this 
estimation.  As it turns out, Limdep’s MNPM capabilities are limited to models with four or fewer 
outcomes. 
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feasible alternative, the MNLM results are the only results available.  However, the 
results of the Small-Hsiao test suggest that the IIA assumption may not be a concern for 
this analysis and that the parameters used to calculate the predicted probabilities are 
consistent. 
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Appendix D: MOBILE6 Input File 
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MOBILE6 INPUT FILE : 
 
  
RUN DATA 
MIN/MAX TEMP         :  64.  92.  
REG DIST                     :         anation.d 
 
SCENARIO REC         : Scenario Title Text - Actual National 
CALENDAR YEAR    : 2001 
FUEL RVP                   : 7.0 
 
END OF RUN 
 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP       : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          :  prednat.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Predicted National 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP             : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH  : 7 
REG DIST                          : actwt.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Actual Wealth Tax 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP             : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : predwt.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Predicted Wealth Tax 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
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MIN/MAX TEMP            : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : actnwt.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Actual Non Wealth Tax 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : prednwt.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Predicted Non Wealth Tax 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : predawt.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Predicted ALL Wealth Tax 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : predanwt.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Predicted All Non Wealth Tax 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : tna.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC                : Scenario Title Text - Tennessee Actual 
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CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP              : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : tnsq.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Tennessee Status Quo 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP              : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : tnc.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Tennessee Change 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP              : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : caa.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - California Actual 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP              : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : casq.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - California Status Quo 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP            : 64. 92.  
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EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : cac.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - California Change 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP              : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : gaa.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Georgia Actual 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : gasq.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Georgia Status Quo 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : gac.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Georgia Change 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : nja.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - New Jersey Actual 
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CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : njsq.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - New Jersey Status Quo 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP              : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : njc.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - New Jersey Change 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : mda.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Maryland Actual 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : mdsq.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Maryland Status Quo 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP             : 64. 92.  
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EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : mdc.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Maryland Change 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : maa.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Mass Actual 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : masq.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Mass Status Quo 
CALENDAR YEAR         : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : mac.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Mass Change 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : ria.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC              : Scenario Title Text - Rhode Island Actual 
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CALENDAR YEAR           : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                          : risq.d 
FUEL RVP                         : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Rhode Island Status Quo 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : ric.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Rhode Island Change 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : cta.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC                : Scenario Title Text - Conn Actual 
CALENDAR YEAR           : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP               : 64. 92.  
EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : ctsq.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Conn Status Quo 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
 
MIN/MAX TEMP              : 64. 92.  
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EVALUATION MONTH   : 7 
REG DIST                           : ctc.d 
FUEL RVP                          : 7.0 
 
SCENARIO REC               : Scenario Title Text - Conn Change 
CALENDAR YEAR          : 2001 
 
END OF RUN 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 1).                                   
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: ANATION.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Actual National                                                                                     
* File 1, Run 1, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
Calendar Year:  2001 
Month:  July 
Altitude:  Low  
Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
Evap I/M Program:  No   
ATP Program:  No   
Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4596    0.3055    0.1051              0.0367    0.0010    0.0016     
0.0843    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.996     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.862     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.955 
 Composite CO  :     20.55     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.882     1.521     3.821      
 16.31    21.297 
 Composite NOX :      1.414     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.786     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.880 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 2).                                   
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: PREDNAT.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Predicted National                                                                                  
* File 1, Run 2, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
Evap I/M Program:  No   
ATP Program:  No   
Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
 GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4562    0.3073    0.1057              0.0369    0.0011    0.0017     
0.0848    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
Composite VOC :      2.118     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.896     0.871     0.736       
2.14     2.011 
Composite CO  :     21.58     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.928     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.770 
Composite NOX :      1.467     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.825     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.914 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 3).                                   
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: ACTWT.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Actual Wealth Tax                                                                                   
* File 1, Run 3, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4582    0.3062    0.1053              0.0368    0.0010    0.0017     
0.0845    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
Composite VOC :      2.046     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.876     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.978 
Composite CO  :     20.97     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.901     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.491 
Composite NOX :      1.436     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.800     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.894 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 4).                                   
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: PREDWT.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Predicted Wealth Tax                                                                                
* File 1, Run 4, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
   Month:  July 
   Altitude:  Low  
   Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
   Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
   Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
   Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
   Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
   Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
   Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
   Evap I/M Program:  No   
   ATP Program:  No   
   Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
   Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
    GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
   VMT Distribution:    0.4560    0.3074    0.1058              0.0369    0.0011    0.0017     
0.0848    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.122     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.897     0.871     0.736       
2.14     2.012 
 Composite CO  :     21.62     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.929     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.789 
 Composite NOX :      1.470     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.824     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.916 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 5).                                   
************************************************************************ 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: ACTNWT.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Actual Non Wealth Tax                                                                               
* File 1, Run 5, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
 GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4609    0.3047    0.1048              0.0366    0.0010    0.0016     
0.0841    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
Composite VOC :      1.946     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.848     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.932 
Composite CO  :     20.14     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.862     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.104 
Composite NOX :      1.393     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.772     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.867 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 6).                                   
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: PREDNWT.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Predicted Non Wealth Tax                                                                            
* File 1, Run 6, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
 Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
 GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
 VMT Distribution:    0.4565    0.3072    0.1057              0.0369    0.0011    0.0017     
0.0848    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.112     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.894     0.871     0.736       
2.14     2.008 
 Composite CO  :     21.53     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.927     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.744 
 Composite NOX :      1.463     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.826     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.911 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 7).                                   
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: PREDAWT.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Predicted ALL Wealth Tax                                                                            
* File 1, Run 7, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
  Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
  Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
  Evap I/M Program:  No   
  ATP Program:  No   
   Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
  Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
  GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
   VMT Distribution:    0.4568    0.3070    0.1056              0.0369    0.0010    0.0017     
0.0847    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.082     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.885     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.994 
 Composite CO  :     21.27     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.912     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.629 
 
 Composite NOX :      1.456     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.809     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.907 
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************************************************************************
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 8).                                   
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: PREDANWT.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Predicted All Non Wealth Tax                                                                        
* File 1, Run 8, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
   Month:  July 
   Altitude:  Low  
   Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
   Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
   Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
   Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
   Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
   Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
   Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
   Evap I/M Program:  No   
    ATP Program:  No   
    Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
    Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
    GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
   VMT Distribution:    0.4553    0.3078    0.1059              0.0370    0.0011    0.0017     
0.0849    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.179     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.913     0.871     0.736       
2.14     2.038 
 Composite CO  :     22.10     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.953     1.521     3.821      
16.31    22.005 
 Composite NOX :      1.487     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.848     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.925 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 9).                                   
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: TNA.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Tennessee Actual                                                                                    
* File 1, Run 9, Scenario 1.                                                       
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
   Month:  July 
   Altitude:  Low  
   Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
   Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
   Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
   Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
   Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
    Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
   Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
   Evap I/M Program:  No   
   ATP Program:  No   
   Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
   Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
   GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
   VMT Distribution:    0.4520    0.3096    0.1065              0.0372    0.0012    0.0017     
0.0854    0.0064    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.243     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.918     0.871     0.736       
2.14     2.066 
 Composite CO  :     22.54     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.960     1.521     3.821      
16.31    22.200 
 Composite NOX :      1.524     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.862     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.950 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 10).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: TNSQ.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Tennessee Status Quo                                                                                
* File 1, Run 10, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
  Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
 VMT Distribution:    0.4570    0.3069    0.1056              0.0368    0.0010    0.0017     
0.0847    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.067     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.883     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.987 
 Composite CO  :     21.18     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.910     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.585 
 Composite NOX :      1.452     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.815     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.904 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 11).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: TNC.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Tennessee Change                                                                                    
* File 1, Run 11, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
Calendar Year:  2001 
Month:  July 
Altitude:  Low  
Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
 VMT Distribution:    0.4582    0.3063    0.1054              0.0368    0.0010    0.0017     
0.0845    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.988     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.855     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.951 
 Composite CO  :     20.50     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.869     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.274 
 Composite NOX :      1.427     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.775     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.890 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 12).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: CAA.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - California Actual                                                                                   
* File 1, Run 12, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
  Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4567    0.3070    0.1056              0.0369    0.0011    0.0017     
0.0847    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.132     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.889     0.871     0.736       
2.14     2.017 
Composite CO  :     21.52     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.922     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.740 
 Composite NOX :      1.457     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.821     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.908 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 13).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: CASQ.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - California Status Quo                                                                               
* File 1, Run 13, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning:  there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
  Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
 Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
  GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
  VMT Distribution:    0.4567    0.3070    0.1056              0.0369    0.0011    0.0017     
0.0847    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.134     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.890     0.871     0.736       
2.14     2.018 
 Composite CO  :     21.53     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.923     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.745 
 Composite NOX :      1.457     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.823     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.908 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 14).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: CAC.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - California Change                                                                                   
* File 1, Run 14, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
   Month:  July 
   Altitude:  Low  
   Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
   Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
   Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
   Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
   Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
   Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
   Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
   Evap I/M Program:  No   
   ATP Program:  No   
   Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
   Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
    GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
   VMT Distribution:    0.4549    0.3080    0.1059              0.0370    0.0012    0.0017     
0.0850    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      2.244     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.918     0.871     0.736       
2.14     2.067 
 Composite CO  :     22.47     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.964     1.521     3.821      
16.31    22.170 
 Composite NOX :      1.493     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.862     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.929 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 15).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: GAA.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Georgia Actual                                                                                      
* File 1, Run 15, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
   Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
   Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
   Evap I/M Program:  No   
   ATP Program:  No   
   Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
  Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
  GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
   VMT Distribution:    0.4619    0.3042    0.1046              0.0365    0.0010    0.0016     
0.0839    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.968     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.876     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.942 
 Composite CO  :     20.53     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.897     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.286 
Composite NOX :      1.397     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.784     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.866 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 16).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: GASQ.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Georgia Status Quo                                                                                  
* File 1, Run 16, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
  Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
  Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
  Evap I/M Program:  No   
  ATP Program:  No   
  Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
  Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
  GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
  VMT Distribution:    0.4608    0.3048    0.1049              0.0366    0.0010    0.0016     
0.0841    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.984     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.876     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.950 
 Composite CO  :     20.63     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.900     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.329 
 Composite NOX :      1.408     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.799     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.874 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 17).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: GAC.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Georgia Change                                                                                      
* File 1, Run 17, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
  Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------
VMT Distribution:    0.4592    0.3056    0.1051              0.0367    0.0011    0.0017     
0.0843    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
Composite VOC :      2.078     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.905     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.993 
Composite CO  :     21.43     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.942     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.700 
 Composite NOX :      1.438     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.838     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.892 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 18).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: NJA.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - New Jersey Actual                                                                                   
* File 1, Run 18, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
 Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
  GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
 VMT Distribution:    0.4622    0.3040    0.1046              0.0365    0.0011    0.0016     
0.0839    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.925     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.838     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.922 
 Composite CO  :     19.80     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.853     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.944 
 Composite NOX :      1.369     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.779     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.853 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 19).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: NJSQ.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - New Jersey Status Quo                                                                               
* File 1, Run 19, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
 Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
 GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
  VMT Distribution:    0.4655    0.3021    0.1039              0.0363    0.0010    0.0016     
0.0834    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.814     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.806     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.871 
 Composite CO  :     18.96     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.805     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.548 
Composite NOX :      1.325     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.726     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.823 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 20).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: NJC.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - New Jersey Change                                                                                   
* File 1, Run 20, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
   Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
  Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
  Evap I/M Program:  No   
  ATP Program:  No   
  Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
  Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
   GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
   VMT Distribution:    0.4663    0.3017    0.1038              0.0362    0.0009    0.0016     
0.0833    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.760     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.779     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.846 
 Composite CO  :     18.49     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.764     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.328 
 Composite NOX :      1.309     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.685     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.813
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 21).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: MDA.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Maryland Actual                                                                                     
* File 1, Run 21, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
Calendar Year:  2001 
Month:  July 
Altitude:  Low  
Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
Evap I/M Program:  No   
ATP Program:  No   
Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4683    0.3006    0.1034              0.0361    0.0008    0.0016     
0.0830    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.732     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.784     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.832 
 Composite CO  :     18.54     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.766     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.348 
 Composite NOX :      1.299     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.664     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.803 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                              
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 22).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: MDSQ.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Maryland Status Quo                                                                                 
* File 1, Run 22, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
Evap I/M Program:  No   
ATP Program:  No   
Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4638    0.3031    0.1043              0.0364    0.0009    0.0016     
0.0836    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.872     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.831     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.898 
 Composite CO  :     19.58     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.837     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.842  
 Composite NOX :      1.356     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.744     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.842 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 23).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: MDC.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Maryland Change                                                                                     
* File 1, Run 23, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4647    0.3026    0.1041              0.0363    0.0009    0.0016     
0.0835    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.809     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.802     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.869 
 Composite CO  :     19.04     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.794     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.587 
 Composite NOX :      1.337     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.703     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.831 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 24).                                  
************************************************************************ 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: MAA.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Mass Actual                                                                                         
* File 1, Run 24, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
   Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
  Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
  Evap I/M Program:  No   
  ATP Program:  No   
  Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
 Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
 GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
  VMT Distribution:    0.4683    0.3006    0.1034              0.0361    0.0008    0.0016     
0.0830    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.732     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.784     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.832 
 Composite CO  :     18.54     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.766     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.348 
 Composite NOX :      1.299     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.664     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.803 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 25).                                  
************************************************************************ 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: MASQ.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Mass Status Quo                                                                                     
* File 1, Run 25, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
  Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
  Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
  Evap I/M Program:  No   
  ATP Program:  No   
  Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
 Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
 GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
  VMT Distribution:    0.4655    0.3022    0.1040              0.0363    0.0008    0.0016     
0.0834    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.741     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.761     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.837 
 Composite CO  :     18.44     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.738     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.306 
 Composite NOX :      1.316     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.660     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.819 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 26).                                  
************************************************************************ 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: MAC.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Mass Change                                                                                         
* File 1, Run 26, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
Calendar Year:  2001 
Month:  July 
Altitude:  Low  
Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
Evap I/M Program:  No   
ATP Program:  No   
Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4650    0.3025    0.1041              0.0363    0.0009    0.0016     
0.0835    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.789     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.789     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.859 
 Composite CO  :     18.85     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.778     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.501 
 Composite NOX :      1.330     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.700     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.827 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 27).                                  
************************************************************************ 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: RIA.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Rhode Island Actual                                                                                 
* File 1, Run 27, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning:  there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
ATP Program:  No   
Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4624    0.3040    0.1046              0.0365    0.0008    0.0016     
0.0839    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.805     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.763     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.867 
 Composite CO  :     18.87     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.736     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.520 
 Composite NOX :      1.355     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.644     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.846 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 28).                                  
*********************************************************************** 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: RISQ.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Rhode Island Status Quo                                                                             
* File 1, Run 28, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
Calendar Year:  2001 
Month:  July 
Altitude:  Low  
Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
Evap I/M Program:  No   
ATP Program:  No   
Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4657    0.3022    0.1040              0.0363    0.0007    0.0016     
0.0834    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.679     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.723     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.808 
 Composite CO  :     17.96     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.683     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.084 
 Composite NOX :      1.306     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.615     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.814 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 29).                                  
************************************************************************ 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: RIC.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Rhode Island Change                                                                                 
* File 1, Run 29, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
Calendar Year:  2001 
Month:  July 
Altitude:  Low  
Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
Evap I/M Program:  No   
ATP Program:  No   
Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4655    0.3023    0.1040              0.0363    0.0008    0.0016     
0.0834    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.711     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.749     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.823 
 Composite CO  :     18.24     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.721     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.216 
 Composite NOX :      1.313     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.654     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.818 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 30).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: CTA.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Conn Actual                                                                                         
* File 1, Run 30, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
 Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
 Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
 Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi   
 Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4584    0.3061    0.1053              0.0367    0.0010    0.0017     
0.0845    0.0063    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.994     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.840     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.954 
 Composite CO  :     20.32     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.854     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.190 
 Composite NOX :      1.414     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.779     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.883
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 31).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: CTSQ.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Conn Status Quo                                                                                     
* File 1, Run 31, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning: there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
  Calendar Year:  2001 
  Month:  July 
  Altitude:  Low  
  Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
  Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
  Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
  Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
  Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
  Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
VMT Distribution:    0.4622    0.3040    0.1046              0.0365    0.0009    0.0016     
0.0839    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.878     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.810     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.901 
 Composite CO  :     19.46     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.810     1.521     3.821      
16.31    20.790 
 Composite NOX :      1.365     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.731     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.851 
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************************************************************************ 
* MOBILE6.2.03 (24-Sep-2003)                                               
* Input file: EMISS1.IN (file 1, run 32).                                  
************************************************************************ 
 
* Reading Registration Distributions from the following external 
* data file: CTC.D 
  
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
* Scenario Title Text - Conn Change                                                                                         
* File 1, Run 32, Scenario 1.                                                      
* # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
  M 48 Warning:  there are no sales for vehicle class HDGV8b   
 
 Calendar Year:  2001 
 Month:  July 
 Altitude:  Low  
 Minimum Temperature:  64.0 (F) 
 Maximum Temperature:  92.0 (F) 
Absolute Humidity:   75. grains/lb 
Nominal Fuel RVP:   7.0 psi 
Weathered RVP:   6.7 psi 
Fuel Sulfur Content:  299. ppm 
 
 Exhaust I/M Program:  No   
 Evap I/M Program:  No   
 ATP Program:  No   
 Reformulated Gas:  No 
 
 Vehicle Type:      LDGV    LDGT12    LDGT34      LDGT      HDGV      LDDV       
LDDT      HDDV        MC   All Veh 
               GVWR:               <6000     >6000     (All) 
                        ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------    ------ 
 VMT Distribution:    0.4612    0.3046    0.1048              0.0366    0.0010    0.0016     
0.0840    0.0062    1.0000 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------ 
 Composite Emission Factors (g/mi): 
 Composite VOC :      1.945     1.868     2.876     2.126     2.378    0.838     0.871     0.736       
2.14     1.932 
Composite CO  :     20.04     22.21     33.93     25.21     29.26     1.850     1.521     3.821      
16.31    21.057 
 Composite NOX :      1.385     1.427     1.772     1.515     5.191    1.771     1.633    16.685       
1.19     2.863
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